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ABSTRACT
The dissertation traces the development of environmental assessment and environmental
ethics as these disciplines have evolved independently in response to the global
environmental crisis. The aim is to determine the extent to which they can promote the
integration of the dissociated objective and subjective spheres of human valuation of the
environment. This is a necessary condition, it is argued, for arresting the pathology in the
human-environment relationship. The study concludes that both disciplines were initially
trapped in narrow, monistic approaches, which rendered them largely ineffective. However,
their evolutionary advancement, and a common grounding in a radical conceptualization of
sustainable development, greatly enhances their usefulness in environmental decision-
making.
SAMEVATTING
Die verhandeling ondersoek die evolusionêre ontwikkeling van omgewingsimpakbepaling en
die filosofie van omgewingsetika, na die ontstaan van die twee disiplines in reaksie tot die
globale omgewingskrisis. Die studiedoelwit is om te bepaal tot watter mate hulle die
integrasie van die gedissosieerde objektiewe en die subjektiewe sfere van
menslikeomgewingswaardering kan bevorder. Daar word geredeneer dat sodanige
integrasie noodsaaklik is om die patologie in die verhouding tussen die mens en sy
omgewing te stuit. Die belangrikste gevolgtrekking is dat beide disiplines, tydens hulle
aanvangsstadia, vasgeval was in 'n monistiese benadering wat hul doeltreffendheid
belemmer het. Die onlangse ontwikkeling van omgewingsimpakbepaling en omgewingsetika,
sowel as 'n gemeenskaplike uitgangspunt binne 'n radikale vertolking van volhoubare
ontwikkeling, versterk grootliks hulle bruikbaarheid vir omgewingsbesluitneming.
----_._--------_._ ..__._-----_ .._-----_._----_._--_._-_ ..._. __ .._-----_ ...__._- --_ ..•..•..__ .._ ....__ .._-----_._ ..-
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.SUMMARY
CO-EVOLUTIONARY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT
Since the early 1970s many initiatives have emerged to arrest what is described in this
dissertation as the current pathology in the human-environment relationship. Important in
this respect is the practice of environmental assessment, which has a relatively strong
anthropocentric perspective in terms of dealing with the environmental crisis, and the
discipline of environmental ethics, which deviates from the anthropocentrism of human
ethics in its attempt to deliver a new moral theory of environmental value.
The dissertation has as its research intent the investigation of the individual evolutionary
trajectories of environmental assessment and environmental ethics, and the co-evolutionary
dialectical relationship between the two disciplines. The significance of this relationship
arises from its potential to promote the integration of the objective and subjective human
cultural value spheres from their dissociated state - which, it is argued, largely explains the
current pathology in the human-environment relationship. Since the concept of sustainable
development also seeks to promote such integration, the key question that is threaded into
the research theme is one that aims to establish whether the dialectical relationship between
environmental assessment and environmental ethics is aligned with the key principles of
sustainable development?
Reflection on the initial evolutionary development of environmental assessment brings to the
fore its very strong rational grounding in scientific materialism. In this respect, much of its
focus has been on the objective assessment and prediction of development impacts
pertaining to those sensory aspects of the bio-physical environment that have physical
location - a procedure eminently suited to investigation and communication in value-free
scientific it-language. In response to the imperative to accommodate social issues and the
multiple subjective values that humans attach to the environment, environmental
assessment has undergone significant evolutionary change, which is evident in the
emergence of approaches that now integrate humans, and their social and economic traits,
into the definition of environment. In this way environmental assessment is now capable of
engaging the multiple subjective I-languages of human society and making dialogue possible
with the objectivity of it-language employed in its traditional methods. This is reflected in the
emergence of new generation approaches to environmental assessment, such as Strategic
Environmental Assessment (SEA), which engage we-language in order to secure broad
agreement on shared ideals around sustainable development - which can be articulated ;11·
snite of divergent justifications of these ideals.
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Measured against the tradition of human ethics, in which the environment is valued mainly in
terms of its instrumental utility, the aim of environmental ethics, which is to situate the
environment as the object of human moral concern rather than one of mere utility, is
considered to be a revolutionary endeavour. However, an interpretation of developments
within the discipline that mark its evolutionary trajectory, indicate that the discipline has yet to
deliver the anticipated revolution in value theory. In this respect, environmental ethics is still
at an originary stage, which is characterised by the high degree of experimentation and
uncertainty that exists within the discipline as the effects of unresolved environmental crisis
triggers a divergency of different ideas and value theories intended as responses to this
crisis.
The divergence in value theory is described through reference to a central dichotomy
between competing arguments grounded in entrenched paradigms of instrumental
environmental value, on the one hand, and 'new-paradigm' claims pertaining to either the
intrinsic value of the environment or calls for radical cultural and institutional change in
human society, on the other.Whilst the entrenched value paradigms are relatively familiar in
terms of their close relationship with human ethics, it is concluded that the 'new-paradigm'
claims are largely 'slogan-driven' at present, and cannot be defended, in the paradigmatic
tradition, on the basis of tested and viable fundamental principles. The high degree of
reductionism implicit in the many initiatives concerning, for example, the notion of intrinsic
environmental value is a major contributing factor that explains their failure thus far to attract
an allegiance that is indicative of their potential paradigm status. Paradoxically, such
attempts at reductionistic and monological representations of value systems, are viewed as
having a number of parallels with the reductionism of neoclassical economics, which the
discipline of environmental ethics seeks to replace.
It is concluded that the evolutionary trajectory of environmental ethics is currently moving
towards a practical philosophy, based on environmental pragmatism, which is
accommodating of moral pluralism. Enlightened anthropocentrism, is one form of such
philosophy, which is dialogical in the dual sense of its rejection of monological accounts of
human valuation of the environment, and its differentiation from the individualistic values of
conventional ethical systems. It assumes that it is a worthy cause for human culture and
consciousness to be perpetuated in the long term and that it is this justification that can
persuade current human generations, perhaps from a variety of value positions, to maintain
the integrity and health of ecosystems on which human life and consciousness depends.
The dissertation clearly differentiates between the paradigmatic qualities of environmental
assessment and the contrasting non-paradigmatic qualities of environmental ethics. In this
situation, where there would seem to be little potential for discovering a direct dialectical
relationship between the two disciplines, the rationale for incorporating the evolutionary
progression of environmentalism as a dialectical intermediary, to reveal an indirect
relationship between the two disciplines, is apparent. Mediated by developments in
environmentalism pertaining to the crisis of participation and survival, the revealed dialectical
relationship manifests as a close alignment between the new generation approaches to
environmental assessment and the pragmatic ethics of enlightened anthropocentrism. Such
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alignment is evident in the similar evolutionary trajectories of both disciplines, as these have
been directed by the broadly acknowledged imperative of sustainable development. In this
respect, it is concluded that there has been a shift away from the narrow monistic
approaches that characterized early developments in both disciplines (the narrow scientific
objectivity of environmental assessment; the search for a monistic theory of value in
environmental ethics) towards an acknowledgement of the autonomy of multiple
environmental values - the holders of which can, nevertheless, find convergence about the
shared ideals of sustainable development. It is concluded that both disciplines have
promoted the integration of the dissociated subjective and objective human cultural value
spheres, and in this way they have the potential to contribute to an arrest of the pathology in
the human-environment relationship. The enabling condition for this is the priority of we-
language, used to articulate shared sustainability ideals.
Whilst the imperative of sustainable development has clearly served as a catalyst in terms of
the forged dialectical relationship between environmental assessment and environmental
ethics, uncertainty concerning what this concept implies in practice places into question the
significance of its supporting principles as a context within which alignment between the two
disciplines is shown to exist. Considering certain contested core ideas of sustainable
development, it is concluded that both new generation approaches to environmental
assessment and enlightened anthropocentrism fit the concept's radical definition, which is
described in the dissertation. Importantly, this offers the potential to integrate the subjective
and objective human cultural value spheres, not only at a conceptual level, but also in
practice. The alternative, which is a continued allegiance to the conservative model of
sustainable development, leaves the world more or less in its current pathological state.
The radical model of sustainable development and the related taxonomies of environmental
assessment and environmental ethics reject conservatism, and open up the possibility for
the emergence of a new intersubjective moral disposition concerning human perception and
valuation of the environment. This is unlikely to manifest as a narrowly defined new ideology,
based on a single conceptualisation of sustainable development, but will be successful only
if it is continually open to dialogue and the accommodation of different values and positions
pertaining to sustainability - particularly in the multiple contexts in which these arise.
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1.1 INTRODUCTION
Society faces a suite of environmental problems that could become a significant barrier
to continued human evolutionary advancement. There are various perspectives on what
needs to be done to halt what might be termed this current pathology in the human-
environment relationship and these range from responses directed by the assignation of
rights to the non-human natural environment to anthropocentric responses driven by
economic imperatives. A conceptualisation of an appropriate evolutionary trajectory in
the human-environment relationship, which largely encompasses this range of
perspectives, is very clearly articulated in Aldo Leopold's land ethic (Leopold, 1991),
which is discussed later in the dissertation. Interpretation of the land ethic suggests that
such a trajectory must be shaped by principles (shared ideals) that promote both human
well-being and the integrity of the biotic community (the enabling context for human
well-being) into the indefinite future. It also suggests that although these principles may
have their grounding in a diversity of positions pertaining to the value/valuation of the
environment, they reflect a commonality in purpose that finds its locus within the
relatively novel concept of sustainable development (Norton, 1991: 187-204).
Since the early 1970s two initiatives have evolved in response to the environmental
problematic as this has been variously articulated by the environmentalist movement.
The practice of environmental assessment [environmental impact assessment (EIA)
and its derivatives], which is a key action-forcing element of environmental policy, is a
response to the practical agenda of environmentalism that arguably has a strong
anthropocentric perspective in terms of approach to, and rationale for, dealing with
environmental issues.' This perspective differs from the purpose of environmental
ethics, which is to address the practical agenda of environmentalism via delivery of a
new moral theory that will ethically enfranchise nonhuman natural entities and nature as
a whole (Callicott, 1990: 99). Although linked by their common purpose (the resolution
of the environmental problematic), EIA and environmental ethics would seem to be
1 For example, O'Riordan (1986: 4-6) views EIA as a tool that enables the economic break-even point to be determined
at which marginal investments in environmental enhancement balance marginal costs to human well-being; i.e.
a firm grounding in 'strong' anthropocentrism.
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directed differently by their respective groundings in anthropocentric and
nonanthropocentric (or biocentric) appeals to environmental value. Whilst this apparent
dichotomy in underpinning value theory suggests a degree of conceptual
incommensurability between the two disciplines, this might not manifest in practice if the
Leopoldian principles, which accommodate and link - through long term relationship -
the interests of humanity and the integrity of the biotic community, are valid.
This dissertation has as its research intent the investigation of the individual
evolutionary trajectories of environmental assessment and environmental ethics and,
more importantly, the co-evolutionary dialectical relationship between the two
disciplines. Departing from the assumption that sustainable development offers the
potential to arrest the current pathology in the human-environment relationship - the
concept has attracted sufficient allegiance to suggest its promise in this respect - the
key question that is threaded into the research theme is one which aims to establish
whether this dialectical relationship (in essence, a Leopoldian enabling condition) has its
grounding in the key principles of sustainable development? Conversely, the question
can also be asked if, and how, a continued dialectical relationship can help us
implement the principles of sustainable development. The relevance of these questions
will emerge from the discussion in Sections 1.2 and 1.3, which points to the need for
such (constructive) dialectical relationship in order to integrate the currently dissociated
objective and subjective aspects of human understanding and valuation of the world - in
order to halt the pathology in the human-environment relationship.
To set the context for the investigation that is described in the chapters that follow, this
introductory chapter is structured into four main parts.
In Section 1.2, a narrative is provided which briefly tracks some key developments in
human evolutionary advancement and the influence of changing societal worldviews
(how humanity perceives the environment and acts in it) in directing this advancement.
I
The position of priority of scientific materialism in Western society - the foundation that
this provides to the prevailing rational worldview (eg. Waller, 1980) - emerges from this
narrative, and will be shown to manifest as a deep entrenchment in scientific rationality
Michael Bums Chapter 1, Introduction, Page 2
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and social utilitarianism which are perceived to be the key drivers of human progress
(Rees, 1988: 275). The evolution in human-environment relationships which lead to this
juncture will be described as a trajectory marked by changes that reflect shifts in
dominant worldviews linked to the different epochs of human development; i.e.
technological or developmental epochs that have advanced in stages from foraging to
industrial, and worldview correlates that have shifted, also in stages, from archaic to
rational. The interpretation of this evolutionary narrative is drawn largely from Wilber's
(1996, 1998) philosophical discussion of the links between the objective, modern
empirical world and the subjective world of human consciousness from which, for
example, the motive for environmental ethics originates. This component of the
introduction to the dissertation will provide much of the context in which EIA will later be
shown to have its locus in the linguistic dominance of objective scientific method. It also
provides the context for later explanation of the limitations that the rational worldview (its
language, in particular) imposes on the purpose of environmental ethics, which is to
develop a new trans-rational environmental ethic; i.e. a shift from utilitarianism to a
relationship based on an allegiance to new moral considerations, still to be defined.
The dominant cultural paradigm will be shown to contrast the diminished importance
attached to the subjective human value spheres (eg. moral sentiments concerning the
environment, its aesthetic appreciation, etc.), which (it will be argued) should be more
strongly integrated into the prevailing worldview. In this respect, the objective language
of science will be shown to dominate the other subjective languages according to which
perceptions and valuation of the environment are articulated. The attention directed in
Section 1.3 at the significance of the objective it-language of science, and the
subjective/inter-subjective 1- and we-languages of society is intended to provide a
context for discussion of the historic limitations of EIA resulting from barriers preventing
effective dialogue with environmentalism. In terms of current developments, the
important shift that will be described later is the primacy now afforded to we-language in
the new generation approaches to environmental assessment and management. The
significance of such language (we-language) also emerges in the investigation of the
evolution of environmental ethics and the co-evolutionary dialectical relationship
between this discipline and environmental assessment. As implied in the opening
Michael Burns Chapter 1, Introduction, Page 3
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paragraph of this chapter, we-language is the medium through which a critical
commonality in purpose around achieving sustainable development can be secured
through application of both environmental assessment and a pragmatic form of
environmental ethics.
Since there is extensive reference to paradigms and paradigm claims throughout the
dissertation, Section 1.4 provides an overview of Thomas Kuhn's interpretation of their
role with respect to revolutionary and normal advancement of human understanding of
the world. In this section, attention is also focused on Kuhn's interpretation of the
incommensurability of competing paradigms since this could suggest an incoherency or
absence of evolutionary contact between environmental assessment and environmental
ethics - due to their different respective groundings in rational and trans-rational
worldviews. Whilst the weak initial dialectical relationship between environmental
assessment and environmental ethics will be explained through reference to the
failure/deficiency of their early monological languages, the strengthening current
relationship will also be described through reference to the dialogical opportunity which
both disciplines now invite (in, for example, visioning as an element of the new
generation approaches to environmental assessment, and the accommodation of moral
pluralism in environmental ethics). The discussion presented in Section 1.4 will provide
an important context for interpretation ofthe changes in co-evolutionary relationship and
degree of commensurability that now exists between environmental assessment and
environmental ethics.
The concluding section of this chapter (Section 1.5) describes the investigative method
employed in the dissertation.
1.2 STAGES OF HUMAN TECHNO-DEVELOPMENTAL EVOLUTION AND
CORRELATIVE WORLDVIEWS
The earliest relationships between humans and the environment were those created by
foraging (hunter-gatherer) societies that emerged between a million and four hundred
thousand years ago. These societies are credited by Wilber (1996: 47) as having
Michael Burns Chapter 1, Introduction, Page 4
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achieved the original breakthrough creativity that enabled humans to emerge out of a
given nature - the biosphere - to begin the construction of a noosphere and the
evolution of subjective mind out of objective neture.: Through the noosphere
conceptualisation of the world it is argued that in becoming differentiated from their
evolutionary predecessors (primates, apes), humans acquired a state of consciousness
that shaped an emerging subjective worldview - one that transcended mere
sensorimotor perception - which empowered humans to direct their course of evolution.
According to Reed (1989: 56), this separateness of humans from the objective world
and the autonomy of the mind also provided humans with the potential to recognise
values in nature."
The first primal human perception of the environment is defined by Wilber as an archaic
worldview - one that permitted a narrow (albeit broadening) range of external
environmental and internal stimuli (consciousness, the mind) to shape an understanding
of the world (Wilber, 1996: 74, 172). Given the early evolutionary state of human
consciousness, such perception would still have been largely directed by sensation and
impulse - sensorimotor stimuli that would not have included, for example, well
developed ecological principles as a grounding for the relationship between humans
and their environment. Although without recourse to such principles, the human-
2 Since the anthropocentric implications attached to the concept of noosphere and the ecocentric concept of biosphere
occupy polarised positions in the prevailing debates within the field of environmental philosophy - positions
that emerge elsewhere in this dissertation - it is appropriate to briefly discuss these concepts here. The notion of
biosphere originates from the work of Vladimir Vemadsky, which focused on explanation of the Earth's
biogeochemical cycles (Vernadsky, 1945: 1-12), and it is from this base that the modem definitions of the
biosphere have emerged; eg. the definition provided by Polunin (1984: 198) that the biosphere is 'an integrated
living and life-supporting system comprising the peripheral envelope of planet Earth together with its
surrounding atmosphere so far down, and up, as any form of life exists naturally'. The concept of biosphere has
assumed a particularly powerful role in defining humanity's relationship with nature and is central, for example,
to Aldo Leopold's land ethic described in Section 3.4.2 (Leopold, 1991). The concept of noosphm originates from
the work of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin whose interest in humanity from a global evolutionary perspective
manifested in the view that human consciousness is capable of controlling the direction of future planetary
evolution. Teilhard termed this evolutionary phase the noosphere (Teilhard de Chardin, 1961: 180,181) -which
represents a 'special environment or medium for humanity, consisting of the systems of organised thought and its
artifacts among which humans move and have their being' (Serafin, 1988: 128).
3A contrary ecophilosophical view, described elsewhere in this dissertation, is that to deal with such di./fmntiation requires
expansion of the concept of the human self to include nature in order to address the current pathology in the
human-environment relationship (Fox, 1986: 67). The latter argument is based on the premise that human
beings are the equals of (not superior to) other species comprising the biosphere (Marietta, 1988: 251). It will
also be shown to contradict the view of the Earth (Gaia) as a se!f(not human-)regulating(ed) system comprising biota
(including humans) and their environment (Serafin, 1988: 121).
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environment relationship (from a perspective of human impact on the state-of-
environment) would have manifested as a benign interaction (human use of
environmental surplus) attributable to a lack of human means to intensify this impact as
opposed to an inherent or evolved ecological wisdom.
The continued development in human cognitive capacity, and an expanding
consciousness, would direct human evolution away from a tribal foraging system
towards one based on agriculture. An archaic worldview - one largely dominated by
sensation and impulse - would prove limiting to the evolution of human society towards
a trans-tribal state and a corresponding higher degree of evolutionary order.
Transcendence of this situation would occur through the emergence of horticultural and
agrarian societies, each of which would prove more capable of escaping the limitations
and problems inherent in preceding human evolutionary states (Wilber, 1996: 48, 50).
The advancement towards an agrarian societal system - with the plough as a symbol of
this epoch in human techno-developmental evolution - signalled a dramatic change in
human-environment relationship." Humans no longer 'gathered what nature offered' but
began 'manipulating' nature. Enabling this mode of production was a shift in human
consciousness framed by what Wilber describes as magic and, later, mythicworldviews
(Wilber, 1996: 172-173). A magicworldview is explained as one according to which the
environment is perceived through reference to images and symbols which humans
create in order to derive meaning of the world - attempts to express and control the
abundance of the environment and the forces affecting human life (Wilson, 1998: 250).
However, with continued evolutionary development of the human consciousness, the
inadequacy of magic to order the environment would be exposed and this would
correlate with the transition from horticulturalto more advanced agrarian societies. This
occurred around 4000-2000 BeE and agrarian practices would remain the dominant
mode of production until the industrial revolution (Wilber, 1996: 52). A correlated mythic
4 The meaning of evolutionary advancement as it is used here draws on Wilson's (1998: 107) definition of 'progress', which
implies the 'production through time of increasingly complex and controlling ... societies'. The human
attainment of high intelligence and culture is viewed as an important phase in the evolutionary progression of
life on Earth.
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worldview would provide definition to this human-environment relationship and in this
respect it was the Gods who were perceived to be the controls of nature and also,
therefore, human developmental performance (Atkins, 1995, 124); i.e. egocentric
prayer, rather than egocentric magical power, would largely provide meaning to the
agrarian human perception of the world. This mythic worldview would also strongly
underpin the early (pre-Darwinian) phase of the industrial revolution, when the
perceived God-appointed state of human dominion over nature would persist as a
dominant Western worldview. 5
In a way that foragers never could, agrarian society with its mythic worldview had the
potential (and exercised this potential) to significantly transform the environment -
mostly to human evolutionary advantage, although in some instances with repressive
consequences." Most significantly, however, the advancement of agrarian farming
practice created a situation of food surplus that released sectors of human society to
pursue activities other than production (Wilson, 1998: 164). Specialised societal classes
emerged; cultural development accelerated; art and religion were practiced;
mathematics, writing and advanced methods of warfare were invented; and binding
social order was established at a truly trans-tribal scale that opened the way for the
emergence of the modern nation-state. Moral thinking also continued its emergence as
an evolutionary outgrowth of the overall process of this advancement of the human
consciousness (Leavenworth, 1970: 133-143).
Archaic, magic and mythic worldviews would run their course of evolutionary usefulness
to human society. However, it would ultimately be realised that nothing magical or
mythical would favour continued human evolution without corresponding growth. This
growth would occur through the transition from agrarian to industrial modes of
production and a dramatic change in worldview from a mythic towards a rational
5 Section 3.2.1 makes further reference to this mythic worldview, specifically with respect to the God-appointed status of
dominion of humans over nature.
6 The Mayan culture provides an example of the collapse of an advanced agricultural society that had transcended primal
foraging only to later become dissociated from the biosphere - the rainforest ecosystem - which, once depleted as
a result of intense human impact, could no longer sustain the Mayans ('Wilber 1996: 67).
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conceptualisation of the environment. In response, the greatest divide in the
evolutionary advancement of humanity opened between pre-scientific and the rational
science-based cultures that emerged. The instruments and knowledge that science was
able to deliver released humanity from the cognitive limitations that constrained the
advancement of early cultures (Atkins, 1995: 123). This was directly enabled by the
sustained contemplative endeavours that humans were able to engage in at the time of
the Renaissance and, thereafter, during the Enlightenment, which sought to demystify
the world and liberate the human mind from the restrictions created by earlier
worldviews. Knowledge replaced mythic imagination in a phase of evolution in human
consciousness that heralded the beginning of modernity - an era that is characterised
by Wilber (1998: 41) as having its definition shaped by major development trends within
the domains of philosophy, art, science, cultural cognition, personal identity, political
and civil rights and technoloqy.Ï
Cartesian dualism - the view that mind/spirit and body exist as two separate substances
- and its reductionistic aim of seeking correct and logical representation of the objective
world based on sensory nature as the ultimate reality would emerge as a dominant
philosophy of modernity (Drengson, 1980: 226). The stage was thus set for subsequent
scientific enquiry into this dualism - a challenge which was defined more clearly by the
raison d' etre for modern science, whereby knowledge became regarded not as an end
but as a means, expressed and applied through technology, by which the human mind
was directed towards assuming power over the material world (Austin, 1985: 204). The
legacy of the industrial revolution is evidence of the role that science has played in
terms of equipping humans with this power and the epistemological foundation for
attracting a new allegiance whereby previous traditions of thinking, values and
worldviews have been abandoned. Thus, the positivistic orientation of modern science
displaced/undercut the preceding paradigm that enabled its emergence and served to
reveal an orderly and intelligible universe (Drengson, 1980: 225; Atkins, 1995: 124). The
7 The great branches of learning, including the natural sciences, social sciences and the humanities, emerged out of the
Enlightenment vision of unity of knowledge (Wilson, 1998: 39).
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subsequent breakthroughs in knowledge that were achieved, particularly in the physical
and biological sciences during the ts" century, contributed greatly to the liberation of
the human mind and it would represent the West's greatest contribution to civilization
(Wilson, 1998: 5, 13, 21, 39).
Wilber explains that the achievements of modernity have their originary location in the
differentiation that was achieved between the human cultural value spheres - i.e.
differentiation of art-aesthetics from politics-morals-religion and empirical-science - and
the attribution of autonomy to each (Wilber, 1998: 11). Religious and civil authority were
de-mystified and precedence was given to the ethic of free enquiry (Wilson, 1998: 39).
Whilst pre-modern cultures (foraging, horticultural, agrarian) possessed forms of art,
morals and science, these were largely undifferentiated and, as a result, one sphere
(often the politico-religious sphere) could control and dominate what happened in the
others. Advancement, for example, in the ecological sciences did not occur in pre-
modern cultures because they lacked this differentiation. Modernity's rationa/worldview
would change this situation and the transcendence of the previous limitations to human
evolutionary advancement would be overcome as a result. This would shift ethnocentric
values towards universal or global values, and the potential for humans to adopt the
person-planetary perspective that Marietta (1988: 250) believes is essential for avoiding
pathology in the human-environment relationship was thus created. The trans-tribal
evolutionary process initiated in post-foraging societies was able to continue its
trajectory towards an increasingly higher state of human societal order through the
emergence of this modern worldview.
Having contributed so effectively to the achievement of the differentiation of the human
value spheres, Wilber argues that the impact of scientific materialism has extended too
far, resulting in their dissociation (Wilber, 1998: 13, 52). Science, art, philosophy and
other subjective aspects of human understanding and valuation of the world have
become distantly separated. Material knowledge has become separated from values
(Drengson, 1980: 225), and the rational worldview has asserted its primacy and self-
sufficiency in this respect (Callicott, 1986: 301; Skowlimowski, 1981; Atkins, 1995: 125).
Informational content of scientific language has become dissociated from its emotional
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content (Wilson, 1998: 67); objective reason has become emphasised at the expense of
subjective emotion and, according to Ehrenfeld (1978: 133-174), this precludes an
integrated synthesis of these two aspects of human consciousness. The evolved
emotional human value sphere (i.e. the complex elements of human consciousness,
excluding the rational element upon which the modern worldview is based), which can
justifiably claim to have survival value, are not seen to match the dominance of reason
(Ehrenfeld, 1978: 142).
The science of the Enlightenment, which promised to deliver a complete objective basis
for moral reasoning based on an understanding of the physical functioning of the
human mind, could not deliver (Wilson, 1998: 66). The envisaged leadership of science
and its promise of directing the way to a unity of knowledge failed (Wilson, 1998: 35,
40). In the place of such promise, scientific reductionism, which proved so effective
(seemingly omnipotent) in advancing human evolutionary consciousness, proceeded in
its own positivist direction [assuming that the only certain knowledge is the exact
description of what is perceived with the senses (Wilson, 1998: 40, 66)] and invaded
and dominated the spheres of art and morals, denying in the process their relevance to
alternative or integrated explanations of the world. The greater the authority attributed
by modernity to scientific materialism and its achievements in terms of explaining the
objective exterior world, the less significant has become the authority of the interior
human apprehension - moral wisdom, introspective perceptions and aesthetic-
expressive realities.
1.3 PATHOLOGY IN THE HUMAN-ENVIRONMENT RELATIONSHIP
EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF THE DISSOCIATED LANGUAGES OF IT, I
AND WE
From the preceding discussion it emerges that modernity has become established upon
the firm base of scientific materialism, which seeks to explain 'external' objective
realities that can be located, reduced and quantified through an empirical mode of
investigation (Drengson, 1980: 226); i.e. it assumes a lawful, material definition of the
freestanding reality of the world (Wilson, 1998: 6, 65). With this view, the earth is
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disclosed as an object which manifests as a stockpile of energies and resources and
according to which meaning, purpose, values, or moral/ethical precepts are not found
as objective aspects of the universe (Foltz, 1984: 335; Klemke, 1981: 169; Midgley,
1995: 137).8 Such rational disclosure of the world is articulated through use of
monological it-language, which has been used, in a constructive sense, to differentiate
objective reality from both the individual whim of subjective human preferences and the
collective view/ideology, for example, of religion and politics (Wilber, 1996: 120).
Description of the world by means of it-language is the one most susceptible to precise
description; however, it is not considered to be the only realm of human cognizance of
their environment and it is in this respect that it-language has also become largely
dissociated/alienated from the interior I-language of the human consciousness
(Tallmadge, 1981: 353). The latter is articulated in first-person accounts and is
understood through dialogue, not scientific reductionism and language that
characterises, for example, the repertoire of physics (Midgley, 1995: 138).9 In fact, the it-
language of objectivist-reductionistic science denies in essence the validity of the
interior I-language.
Scientific materialism has created a monological global framework of industrial,
economic, informational and other systems that have made possible the development
of human skills at a scale previously unprecedented. This advancement is described by
Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1998: 2) as being greater than at any time since the beginning of
the agrarian epoch of human development. However, what has remained outside such
advancement is the meaning and value of the environment that humans seek and which
make them whole (Haught, 1986: 146; Caldwell, 1963: 139). Scientific materialism more
than adequately describes what the world is, not what it ought to be from multiple
human perspectives; i.e. science succeeds without philosophical justification (Atkins,
1995: 129), and tends to rebel against the restrictions imposed by prevailing culture
8The rational explanation of human consciousness (within which the issues of values, moral behaviour and ethics have
their locus) is that it is no more than a mere 'resultant' - an outcome of movements in the matter-energy
continuum that (theoretically) can be specified through scientific procedure (Haught, 1986: 143).
9 The language of science is monological - a single person talking by him/herself. Science does not require that there is
dialogue with the object of investigation in order to derive its empirical data (\X'ilber, 1998: 37).
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(Dyson, 1995: 1). In this respect, modernity is remarkable not only for its breadth of
knowledge but also for its narrowness of (rebellion against) value judgements (Holmes
Rolston, 1982: 150).
The dominance of it-language employed in scientific materialism has caused the
intersubjective experience of human life and experience of the environment to be
undermined and to become subjective in the pejorative sense (Drengson, 1980: 223).
The animate has proved incapable of finding resolution in terms of the inanimate
(Haught, 1986: 147). Reason (the essence of the objective, rational worldview), with its
rich capacity for dialogue, ethics and mutual recognition, and, as stated by Snoeyenbos
(1981: 234) its capacity to generate a vision that acknowledges the importance of a
functional environment necessary for long-range human welfare, has become dry and
abstract and finds no normative structures within the human-environment relationship
(Holmes Rolston, 1982: 150).
As stated by Atkins (1995: 131), the rational worldview assumes that there is no aspect
of knowledge about the world where sentiment (values, ethics) can provide a better
base than is possible through objective, value-free science. However, it is inconceivable
that this view can practically find all-encompassing application in the complex, far-
ranging systems of social relations and human value systems, which cannot, for
example, be reduced to elements of physics (Midgley, 1995: 139). Missing, is the
integration of scientific knowledge with the currently dissociated moral and other
spheres of human value and there is a need for a double-aspect account of the inner
and the outer, the subjective and objective (Nagel, 1986: 4). Without this, dissonance
between the affected human value spheres (science vs the art-aesthetic value sphere;
science vs ethics including, for example, the moral endeavour of valuing nature) is the
inevitable consequence.
It will later be argued that the dissonance, that exists between objective it- and
subjective I-language presents a particular barrier to the effectiveness of EIA and its
potential to arrest the pathology in the human-environment relationship. Since EIA
attempts to reveal objective truths about predicted environmental impacts of human
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development, mainly through reference to scientific it-language, its inadequacy
becomes apparent when it attempts to deal with situations that resonate with the 1-
language of multiple and contradictory subjective human preferences. Its objective,
value-free scientific methods cannot respond adequately to the intersubjectivity that
constitutes human society (its heterogeneity, its multiple expressions of environmental
value) and in its early evolutionary state, instead of making its contribution to effective
dialogue, it remained part of the objectivity-subjectivity dialectic (vide Drengson, 1980:
230). It will also be argued that a similar barrier has existed for the advancement of
environmental ethics largely as a result of the dissociation between the it-language of
scientific materialism that comprises some of the entrenched paradigms of
environmental value and the generally trans-rational 1-and we-language dialogue that
characterises much of the other ethical discourse within the discipline - particularly with
respect to the 'new-paradigm claims' pertaining to the valuation/value of the
environment.
Paradigms, and what will be described as 'new-paradigm claims', explain in part the it-,
1-and we-language dialectic that exists between and within the practice and discipline
of environmental assessment and environmental ethics. A related incommensurability
between competing paradigms would also seem to explain the dissociation of the
human value spheres and the absence of the integration that is considered necessary
in order to halt the pathology in the human-environment relationship. Before proceeding
with a description of the investigative approach that is used in this dissertation to
establish the potential of environmental assessment and environmental ethics to arrest
this pathology, some discussion ofthe theory of paradigms is therefore appropriate. In
the following section, aspects of Thomas Kuhn's paradigmatic explanation of the
process of advancement of human understanding of the world (eg. through scientific
discovery) are described in order to provide a context for later explaining the origin,
evolution and co-evolutionary relationships between environmental assessment and
environmental ethics.
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1.4 KUHNIAN THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS APPLICATION TO
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
To explain the evolutionary patterns and relationships within and between the
disciplines of environmental assessment and environmental ethics, reference is made in
the chapters that follow to Thomas Kuhn's theory pertaining to the role of paradigms in
explaining the advancement of knowledge and understanding of the world. It will be
proposed in Chapter 2 that Kuhn's understanding of the history of intellectual
advancement can explain the process whereby the advent of EIA has enabled the
advancement of sustainable development ideals through the accommodation of
environmental concerns in development decisions; i.e. a revolutionary paradigm-shift
from the situation of narrow economic determinism in decision-making which
characterised the pre-EIA era. Whilst Kuhnian theory is less useful in terms of
explaining the divergence and polarisation which exists within the field of environmental
ethics (i.e. due to its weak paradigmatic character)." it will nevertheless be proposed in
Chapter 3 that this pattern fits to some extent Kuhn's description of the 'disorganised'
activity, universal criticism and uninhibited proliferation of ideas that can characterise a
discipline during the interval preceding the emergence of a unifying paradiqrn." This
situation is aligned with Sessions' (1995: 97) view concerning the application of Kuhnian
theory to the field of ecophilosophy.
Kuhnian theory is also used in Chapter 4 as an investigative medium (analytical logic) to
determine the evolutionary coherency in the respective origins and development of
environmental assessment and environmental ethics.
Although the relevance of Kuhnian theory to the different elements of the dissertation is
expanded in later chapters, it is appropriate to provide a review in this introductory
10 The weak paradigmatic character of environmental ethics is attributed by Weston (1996: 147) to the early stage of
development of the discipline, when it is to be anticipated that new values pertaining to the environment are
just beginning to be culturally constituted and consolidated (see Section 3.1).
11 Unlike physics and other fields within the natural sciences, modem sociology can rarely be explained in terms of
paradigms (Chalmers, 1982: 91). Whilst not entirely a sociological endeavour, the disorganised state of
environmental ethics can be explained in terms of the absence of a unifying paradigm.
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chapter of the theory's central tenets as well as some points of critique to which it has
been exposed. The review presented here is based largely on Kuhn's (1970a)
publication, The structure of scientific revolutions, which contains the most persuasive
account of the author's theory and his response to criticism leveled at a first edition of
this publication (Kuhn, 1962). The review is also based on Kuhn's later publication, The
essential tension (Kuhn, 1977) and interpretations of Kuhnian theory which are provided
by Krige (1980), Chalmers (1982), Oldroyd (1986) and others. Reference is also made
inter alia to Toulmin's (1972) critical analysis of certain of Kuhn's arguments - which
highlights some of the key challenges to which they have been exposed. Aspects of
Toulmin's interrogation are presented here with the purpose of providing a backdrop
against which a tempered interpretation of Kuhn's views - pertaining specifically to the
incommensurability of competing paradigms - is incorporated into the final chapter of
the dissertation. Here, the aim of investigation will be to define a locus for the diverse
value positions in environmental ethics within the new generation approaches to
environmental assessment. To this effect, it will be argued that there is an important
area of convergence to be discovered within the shared ideals to which different
environmental values give common expression - in spite of the polarizing arguments
which point to an apparent incommensurability between 'competing' value systerns."
Kuhnian theory explains the occasions and causal processes which determine the
significant events and profound conceptual transformations which mark the history of
advancement in human knowledge (Toulmin, 1970: 39).13 Such events, it is argued,
tend to occur in a revolutionary rather than linear or heuristic pattern, involving dramatic
shifts in advancement, which occurs in a succession of tradition-bound periods
punctuated by non-cumulative breaks (Kuhn, 1970a: 208; Shapere, 1964: 383;
12 The issue of incommensurability between competing paradigms is a concept that has been largely distorted by the
misreading of Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn does not imply that competing theories are incomparable, but that the
choice between them cannot be entirely based on theory-neutral rules and data. Transitions between paradigms
(approaches to solving problems) must be made typically through dramatic switches in allegiance,but not to the
extent that the rationality of science is thereby impaired (Wilber, 1998: 31).
13 Robin Attfield (pers. comm.) questions the usefulness ofKuhnian theory, suggesting that reference to the advancement
of science makes no sense because there are no criteria according to which advancement can be determined.
Whilst Kuhn's largely non-rationalist arguments could be compromised by his (rationalist) reference to
advancement, Newton-Smith's (1981: 3) analysis of Kuhnian theory suggests that the term 'change' (rather than
advancemen~ adequately deals at least with this point of criticism.
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Wilson, 1998: 63). In this respect, Kuhn's ideas are grounded to some extent in the
views of R.G. Collingwood who proposed that the course of intellectual history can be
defined as a series of rigid divisions into separate phases controlled by incompatible
constellations of absolute presuppositions; i.e. that intellectual progress does not result
from a universal and uniform method (Collingwood, 1940: Choiv-vi; Toulmin, 1972: 99,
121). Kuhn adds to this by positing an explanation of the occasions, processes and
procedures whereby an older theory (a basic set of collective concepts) are displaced
by an incompatible new one and thus create the discontinuity which exists between the
divided phases of advancement in knowledge.
Kuhn argues that the practice of science has two clearly differentiated typologies that he
describes as normal and revolutionary science. Normal science is defined as research
that is based upon established significant scientific achievements that a particular
community accepts as providing an adequate foundation for its further practice; it is
cumulative, but delivers no novelties of fact or theory (Kuhn, 1970a: 10, 52). This form
of enquiry is dominated by acknowledged laws, theories and sets of established first
principles which collectively provide general methodological prescriptions, standards
and instrumental techniques which promote coherent traditions of scientific research, or
puzzle-solving (Chalmers, 1982: 91; Oldroyd, 1986: 320). Such traditions are thus
shaped monistically by the influence of an overall master-theory or paradigm that is
capable of satisfactorily resolving the most pressing challenges within a particular area
of research (Kuhn, 1970a: 20).14
According to Kuhn, paradigms represent a 'strong network of commitments -
conceptual, theoretical, instrumental and methodological' which map out the directions
for success in scientific enquiry and provide the enabling techniques which guarantee
such success (Kuhn, 1970a: 42).15 They provide models of research conducted
14The paradigmatic label which Kuhn attaches to normal science draws on the Wittgensteinian definition of aparadigm as
representing a mold that shapes and directs thoughts inpredetermined directions (Toulmin, 1972: 107).Whilst
the use of the term mold implies a high degree of definition/ rigidity, Kuhn acknowledges that it is not possible
to spell out all necessary and sufficient conditions under which activities might fit within the definition of a
paradigm (Chalmers, 1982: 93). This deficiency (inter alia) exposes Kuhn's explanation of the paradigmatic
character of normal science to criticism (eg. Shapere, 1964: 388).
15 Whilst he is critical of Kuhn's views of the exclusivity and restrictions which paradigms impose on the practice of
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according to shared rules and standards that define a coherent research tradition
applicable to special classes of problems yet to be solved (Kuhn, 1970a: 23-24).16
These paradigmatic attributes secure the commitment and consensus of a scientific
community that is necessary for the continuation of particular research traditions which
are perceived to be more attractive than any competing mode of scientific activity
(Kuhn, 1970a: 11, 19).
In effect, paradigms are worldviews. They define the way in which a scientific
community perceives the world, describe what is seen, and determine where and how
things are looked for (Newton-Smith, 1981: 118). Such perception is determined not
only from the basis of accepted theory, but also from a wider range of beliefs, and
attitudes (Kuhn, 1977: 294; Newton-Smith, 1981: 107). In his analysis of Kuhnian
theory, Oldroyd (1986: 321,323) describes how scientists are trained within and work
according to the edicts of paradigmatic worldviews and how this 'training' introduces a
solid level of acceptance over the fundamentals from which a paradigm is constructed.
To understand the origin of Kuhn's views relating to the paradigmatic nature of normal
science requires an explanation of their deeper grounding in arguments such as those
articulated by Quine (1963; 1969), who challenges certain dogmas of empiricism. Quine
argues that the construction of knowledge will always be "tainted" relative to the
languages of communities and their theories or paradigms which define the ways in
which they understand the world (Quine, 1963: 42; 1969: 81). Likewise, Kuhn (1970a:
145) suggests that there can be no scientifically or empirically neutral system of
language or concepts and it is in the context of this role of community language that
Kuhn's explanation of the paradigmatic nature of normal science and the knowledge
which it generates finds support in Quine's argument (Quine, 1969: 87).17Supporting
normal science Feyerabend (1970: 201), for example, acknowledges that the process of creating knowledge does
need the guidance which an accepted theory can provide; i.e. science cannot start from nothing and be explored
at random.
16 Karl Popper is generally critical of Kuhn's paradigmatic characterisation of normal science; however, he suggests that
there typically does exist in various scientific disciplines an organised structure that provides scientists with a
'generally accepted problem situation into which his own work can be fitted' (popper, 1970: 51); i.e. in this
sense, science does have a somewhat paradigmatic character.
17 A particular appeal of applying Kuhnian theory, specifically to explain the origin and development of environmental
assessment, lies in the importance which Kuhn attaches to social considerations (i.e. the role of communities) in
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this view, Norton (1995: 47) concludes that although science attempts to create more
precise vocabularies in order to disaggregate values and facts as they become
interpenetrated in discourse, such language cannot ultimately achieve pure description;
i.e. every choice of vocabulary to describe one facet of the world requires the exclusion
of other facets of reality.
Once socialised into a paradigm, practitioners of normal science do not question its
fundamentals; i.e. a paradigm is trusted implicitly and normal science does not have as
its aim the refutation of current theory (Krige, 1980: 22; Watkins, 1970: 27; Williams,
1970: 49). Thus, the allegiance which a paradigm attracts differentiates this form of
science from a pre-paradigm situation - which tends to be marked by constant debate
over fundamentals (Chalmers, 1982: 92). Normal science presupposes that a paradigm
provides the theoretical basis and method for the solution of the puzzles posed within it
as well as the criteria that indicate when the goal of puzzle-solving has been achieved
(Kuhn, 1977: 167). According to Kuhn the anticipated outcome of such science is
assured by the paradigm according to which it is practiced and in this way normal
science is able to progress efficiently (Oldroyd, 1986: 322; Toulmin, 1972: 101;
Watkins, 1970: 27).18 The cost of such efficiency, however, is the constraint which
paradigms impose in terms of the lack of novelty which (paradigmatic) normal science is
able to deliver (Shapere, 1964: 384).
Puzzles that cannot be resolved in terms of the conceptual and instrumental techniques
that a paradigm provides are viewed as anomalies rather than falsifications of the
paradigm, and rarely place into question accepted laws and methodological principles
(Kuhn, 1970a: 77; Chalmers, 1982: 92; Newton-Smith, 1981: 107). Most anomalies are
ultimately resolved through normal means, for example, through revision of a
paradigm's instrumental standards (Kuhn, 1970a: 186; 1977: 174). The parts of nature
the conduct of scientific enquiry (Kuhn, 1977: 295, 296; Oldroyd, 1986: 319). It will be suggested elsewhere in
this dissertation that such considerations are relevant to EIA, which assumes its paradigmatic character largely
through the allegiance of the communiry of EIA advocates and practitioners which it has attracted.
18 Whilst the paradigmatic nature of normal science might guarantee rapid progress in the area of research which it
defines, Oldroyd (1986: 322) states that the knowledge gained through such research does not necessarily
explain the way things are in the world.
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which do not satisfactorily fit the model of solution which the paradigm provides tend to
be ignored or suppressed because they are subversive of the basic commitments
demanded of normal science (Kuhn, 1970a: 5, 24); alternatively, they are dealt with
using ad hoc hypotheses (Oldroyd, 1986: 321-322). However, where the resolution of
an anomaly is important, the failure of normal science to resolve this - following
exhaustive application of both the concepts and instruments which a paradigm provides
- may strike at the fundamentals of a paradigm, thereby introducing a situation of crisis
which can mark the beginning of revolutionary discovery and a break in the tradition-
bound activity of normal science (Kuhn, 1970a: 6; 1977: 173; Chalmers, 1982: 94;
Drengson, 1980: 227).
Kuhn explains that as the scale of scientific crisis increases and attempts to resolve it
become increasingly more radical, the inflexible rules of the reigning paradigm become
progressively loosened by the extra-ordinary philosophical and metaphysical disputes
that arise within a scientific community in the quest for a resolution (Kuhn, 1970a: 90).
In contrast to its once tacit acceptance, the adequacy ofthe paradigm (its methodology,
etc.) is questioned and as an awareness of its constraining character develops, its
guiding influence over the practice of normal science becomes weakened as a
consequence (Newton-Smith, 1981: 108). It is in this situation that a proliferation of
competing views on the resolution of the crisis emerge, that there is recourse to
philosophy and debate over fundamentals and ultimately, that revolutionary science
occurs - analogous to political revolution, whereby a new ideological paradigm displaces
a previous one through dramatic change - which brings about sudden and irreversible
advancement in terms of resolving the crisis situation (Kuhn, 1970a: 91 ).19 Out of the
pluralism of several possible alternative paradigms one will eventually emerge - a
Darwinian victor (Wilson, 1998: 57) - which is not only incompatible, but is
19 Whilst accepting that intellectual advancement can occur in discontinuous transitions between incommensurable
systems of thought, Krige (1980: 11) questions whether revolution - a process that is dramatic, sudden and
sometimes perceived to be rationally inexplicable - must necessarily drive such transition. According to this
author, transitions can be slow, requiring considerable effort for new theoretical concepts to be developed and
to gain acceptance; i.e. that transformations are rationally intelligible. Similarly,Toulmin (1970: 41) argues that
revolution (political or otherwise) never involves an absolute and outright breach of continuity of the kind to
which Kuhn makes reference; eg. Newtonian physics, although displaced by an Einsteinian one, still retains
some validity at the periphery of the new paradigm.
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incommensurable with the one it replaces (Kuhn, 1970a: 102). The new paradigm,
having advanced in its status from being 'interesting', 'suggestive' and 'persuasive' to its
ultimate status of 'compelling' will achieve general acceptance and will introduce and
direct a new era of normal science which is practiced according to a new set of
intellectual and manipulative scientific 'equipment' (Kuhn, 1970a: 91; 1977: 226; Wilson,
1998: 64).20 As the struggle with an anomaly is resolved in a revolutionary mode of
scientific discovery, new perspectives of the world are revealed (Kuhn, 1977: 175). The
transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new tradition of normal science is not merely a
cumulative extension of the old paradigm. It represents a reconstruction of the field from
new fundamentals that changes the most elementary theoretical generalisations
relevant to the affected area of science, its methods and applications (Kuhn, 1970a:
85). This having been achieved, the function of normal science in the post-revolutionary
era will be to both consolidate the theoretical generalisations which the paradigm
introduces through the development of new methodological rules and to widely extend
its power of explanation amongst the community whose allegiance it has secured
(Oldroyd, 1986: 322; Toulmin, 1972: 112).
A switch in paradigm allegiance occurs for a variety of reasons, including a connection
with some social need, the ability of a paradigm to solve a specified kind of
problem/anomaly (both old and new, which are not resolvable within the context of a
previous paradigm), value systems and, therefore, the preferences of individuals with
regard to paradigm choice. According to Kuhn (1970a: 121) the transition to a new
paradigm occurs 'not by deliberation and interpretation, but by a relatively sudden and
unstructured event like the gestalt switch'; i.e. 'it is the abandonment of critical discourse
which marks the transition to a science' (Kuhn, 1970b: 6).21A new paradigm is not
20 Kuhn's interpretation of how a new paradigm reshapes an intellectual framework, through its re-statement and re-
formulation of fundamental concepts, is similar to Koyré's (1968: 19-20) views in this respect.
21 Newton-Smith (1981: 112) describes the essential characteristics which Kuhn attributes to good scientific theory which
a paradigm offers; i.e. characteristics which (in part) determine theory choice. A theory should be accurate,
consistent, have broad scope, be simple and fruitful in terms of new phenomena that it reveals and explains. Kuhn
explains that although these characteristics - some of which may be internal to a particular theory - may
influence theory choice, they do not constitute rational algorithmic elements in this respect; i.e. in themselves
they are insufficient, and non-rule governed judgment (influenced by individual preferences, for example) plays
an important role (Newton-Smith, 1981: 115-116,122).
Michael Burns Chapter 1, Introduction, Page 20
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Co-Evolutionary Relationships Between Environmental Ethics And Environmental Assessment
adopted by a scientific community through logically compelling or rule-governed
(rational) argument since Kuhn argues that the discontinuity and conceptual incongruity
that exists between the fundamental premises of competing paradigms does not permit
this (Newton-Smith, 1981: 110). The fundamental questions which candidate paradigms
pose, their standards and metaphysical principles are thus incompatible (Kuhn, 1970a:
150), and according to Oldroyd's (1986: 323) and Chalmers' (1982: 96) interpretation of
Kuhnian theory, two competing paradigms cannot be simultaneously valid since they
will be mutually lncomprehenslble.f Debates over paradigms are characterised by an
'incompleteness of logical contact' between proponents of competing paradigms, and
converts to a new paradigm share no theoretical concepts with scientists whose
intellectual loyalties are committed to its predecessor (Kuhn, 1970a: 109). As a
consequence, scientists in different paradigmatic camps can neither communicate with
one another about disagreements nor seek common theoretical topics for debate or
research; i.e. the concepts of one theory cannot be compared since they cannot be
expressed in terms of the concepts of a competing theory (Newton-Smith, 1981: 10,
148).
Kuhn (1970a: 206) argues that the manner in which paradigm allegiance is ultimately
secured indicates that scientific revolution does reflect a coherent direction of
ontological development. According to Shapere (1964: 383, 389) Kuhn thus challenges
the positivistic argument that science is cumulative - that earlier sciences are derivable
from later. Supporting Kuhn's argument in this respect, Paul Feyerabend, in his criticism
of the position which science is assumed to hold in terms of its capacity to generate
knowledge, states that what counts as the truth (for one scientific community, as
opposed to another community) is determined more by what the respective
communities aI/ow than by either the relationship between different theories about the
world or the 'advancement' achieved through science as it is practiced according to
22 Chalmers (1982: 136) finds a similar (albeit qualified) interpretation of incommensurability offered by Paul
Feyerabend, who argues that there are situations where it is not possible to logicallydeduce some of the
consequences of one theory from the tenets of its rival for the purposes of comparison (Feyerabend, 1970:
219). Feyerabend's views in this respect are somewhat more restrained than Kuhn's and indicate that
incommensurability arises only under conditions when certain universal principles upon which an existing
theory is built are suspended by those supporting a competing theory (Newton-Smith, 1981: 10,142).
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successive paradigms (Oldroyd, 1986: 323, 326). Aligned with this interpretation, Quine
(1963: 41) argues that there is no universal linguistic structure; observation language
can be arbitrarily adjusted by different scientific communities to project meaning derived
either analytically (independent of matters of fact) or synthetically (grounded in fact)
according to circumstance (Quine, 1963: 25, 27, 41); i.e. alternative, sometimes
incommensurable, explanations of a particular situation may be offered by different
scientific communities.
Kuhn's view that the course of evolution in human understanding of the world is marked
by discontinuous transitions between incommensurable systems of thought is also
shared, to some extent, by Foucault (1974a).23 In The order of things, Foucault
describes the extent to which fundamental codes of human culture on the one hand -
such as those determining language, techniques and values - and scientific theory and
philosophical interpretation on the other, function within historically determinable spaces
that lead humans to derive, over time, multiple (incommensurable) interpretations of
how things are/should be ordered (Foucault, 1974a: xx-xxi). The potential thus exists for
order either to be defined in discontinuous and fragmented ways or, conceivably,
continuously and graduated, according to different systems of coherence. With this
understanding, Foucault, in his study of the archaeology of the human sciences,
describes the major discontinuities which define the history of the theory of knowledge
in Western culture (Foucault, 1974a: xxii). Providing further support for Kuhn's views,
Foucault (1976; 1974b: 150) also provides an interpretation of the discontinuity evident
in the history of progress in medical science as a specific illustrative example.
It is Kuhn's notion that rational exploration between the boundaries and relationships
between old and new paradigms is not possible which is severely challenged by several
authors. In this respect, Toulmin (1972: 103) questions whether scientific advancement
ever produces the radical discontinuities that Kuhn describes and whether the depth of
23 In his earlier work, of which The order of things (1974a) is exemplary, the notion of discontinuity is emphasised much
stronger than in his later "genealogical" and "ethical" works.
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conceptual change is ever sufficiently great (and immediate) as to preclude rational
transitional enquiry. Toulmin suggests that in highly organised sciences, new theoretical
propositions are always extensively discussed and intensively argued over, reasoned
about and criticised prior to their accreditation by interested and affected scientific
communities. According to this author, the transition between two scientific positions
can be guided by rational argument even in the absence of common theoretical
concepts; i.e. rival paradigms or presuppositions are rationally commensurable
(Toulmin, 1972: 103, 126; Newton-Smith, 1981: 7).24It is argued that proponents of new
theories defend and sanction these through compelling argument in order to attract the
allegiance of a scientific communlty." To do this, a theory-neutral common language
and broadly accepted procedures must be employed to facilitate debate, rational
analysis and comparison of the alternative theoretical propositions (Popper, 1970: 56-
57; Chalmers, 1982: 139; Newton-Smith, 1981: 121).26 On this basis Toulmin
concludes that competing paradigms cannot be perceived as rigidly discontinuous
worldviews and that the apparent intellectual discontinuities (which might well manifest
at a theoretical level, since different conceptual systems may often be based on
incongruous principles and axioms) conceal a deeper methodological continuity which
can exist between paradigms (Toulmin, 1970: 44; 1972: 106).27 It is thus argued that
24 Feyerabend (1970: 202) argues that for one theory to be accepted as being better than another that it might replace
requires a degree of commensurability between the two theories. TIlls requirement aside,Newton-Smith (1981: 7),
supported by Chalmers (1982: 138), makes further reference to Feyerabend's argument which suggests that
rival theories are not compared only through rational enquiry and that it is inevitable that subjectivityenters the
process of comparison and theory choice. In this respect, non-rational persuasion will apply in cases where
theories are truly incommensurable (Feyerabend, 1970: 219).
25 Like Toulmin, Scheffler (1967: 79), for example, states that whilst the architects of a new paradigm may attribute this
discovery more to an intuitive, gestalt re-organisation of perception than a consequence of deliberation or
interpretation, it does not follow that rational analysis and interpretation will not form part of the defence and
criticism of a new paradigm by the scientific community whose allegiance it might ultimately secure.
26 By Kuhn's own admission, adherents of opposed views can 'recognise each other as members of different language
communities and then become translators' (Kuhn, 1970a: 202); i.e. contrary to his original thesis [and contrary
to some of his critics (Kuhn, 1970a: 199)],Kuhn, in agreement with Popper (1970: 56), suggests that scientists
with different worldviews can engage in rational discussion; i.e. mutual incomprehension between scientists of
successive generations is never more than partial, and as a consequence, "translation" enables persuasion and
thereafter, conversion to a new paradigm becomes possible (Kuhn, 1970a: 203,204).
27 Popper (1970: 55) argues that constant and fruitful discussion can and must exist between advocates of competing
dominant theories.
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paradigm-switches are never as complete and as incommensurable as Kuhnian theory
suggests.
Kuhn's non-rationalist explanation of the discontinuity in intellectual progress clearly
places him in a position largely at odds with the positivist conception of science whereby
the movement towards 'truth' occurs through the emergence of ever more true facts and
corroborated theories which are rationally substantiated through the application of
objective methodology and justification (Newton-Smith, 1981: 9, 111, 121; Mouton,
1993: 54). Kuhn's explanation that paradigm switches occur in the absence of logically
compelling argument obviously attracts rationalist critique on the basis of the relativism
which it implies (Shapere, 1964: 393). Whilst this issue emerges elsewhere in this
dissertation, it is raised here since it is Kuhn's challenge of scientific positivism which
predictably sets his theory up to be challenged in turn. In this respect, Toulmin (1970:
45; 1972: 114) questions the significance of revolution as a descriptor for scientific
advancement, suggesting that Kuhn's interpretation of scientific progress should be
perceived as one which recognises a spectrum of conceptual and theoretical
advancements. Whilst recognizing that some of these advancements may occur outside
the application of either formal logic or inductive principles and could thus be
considered more "revolutionary" than others, Toulmin argues that instead of a
revolutionary explanation of change, an evolutionary account can better describe how
an intellectual state is progressively transformed (Toulmin, 1972: 116, 122); i.e. the
reluctance to accept the concept of revolution is informed by the degree of rational
continuity that this author detects in the historical record of science.": 29
28 Responding to this evolutionary account of scientific advancement, Kuhn (1977: 175) argues that the mode of
discovery covered by this definition is typically anticipated and sought in advance, demanding no radical
adjustment or adaptation of traditional concepts and instrumental method. Normal cumulative discovery thus
differs from revolutionary discovery which departs from such tradition.
29 Challenging the concept of normal versus revolutionary science, Feyerabend (1970:207; 1981: 160)argues that Kuhn's
ideas are false in the sense that there has never been a period of normal science in the history of thought; i.e.
scientific anomaly occurs frequently and the proliferation of theory which occurs in response to such anomaly
is a continuous phenomenon which is located outside the context of only occasional revolution; i.e. there is
simultaneity and interaction between the normal component of science and the philosophical criticism which is
instrumental in driving theoretical transitions (Feyerabend, 1970: 212). The author finds more palatable a
continuist theory of scientific advancement offered by Irnre Lakatos, who suggests that science advances
heuristically in the sense that a sequence of theories leads to novel predictions in an evolutionary, rather than
revolutionary, fashion - whereby one theory (or hypothesis) is gradually replaced by another in what Lakatos
refers to as an evolving research program.
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In a somewhat different line of criticism to that offered by Toulmin, Krige (1980: 12-13,
31,218) questions whether paradigm change occurs with the rapidity implicit in Kuhn's
explanation of the role of 'revolution' as the motor of scientific advancement. The author
argues that changes in paradigm allegiance occur in an asymmetrical fashion, in that
rejection of the old and acceptance of the new do not occur simultaneously: Whilst the
foundations of a new paradigm might be laid rapidly following the rejection of the old, it
takes time for the new to become fully articulated and thereby replace the old.
According to the explanations of scientific advancement, developed for example by
Popper and Lakatos, an entire established order is not rejected in one fell swoop - as
posited by Kuhn (Krige, 1980: 70, 214, 219).30
Moving beyond the debate around his thesis of scientific advancement through
revolution, Kuhn's views on the role of normal science are also challenged by the
Popperian understanding of science which perceives this endeavour to be a deeply
critical process and a defining characteristic of science - a position which represents the
antithesis of the scientific indoctrination which is captured by Kuhn's paradigmatic
model of normal science (Popper, 1970: 53; Toulmin, 1970: 40; Oldroyd, 1986: 324).31
If the dogma implicit in this model is to find some credence, Toulmin (1972: 111)
suggests that this might be found in the sociological context of scientific tradition. In this
respect, the magisterial authority of leading theorists can be shown to attract scientific
discipleships, whose activity might be constrained by the requirement of sanction from
the school within which it takes place (Scheffler, 1967: 77; Toulmin, 1970: 40).
30 Krige (1980: 37) explains that as a new system emerges from an old order, it carries with it - for a time at least - some
surviving elements of the previous paradigm which betray its heritage. Whilst in agreement with Kuhn
regarding the discontinuities that mark the history of scientific advancement, Krige explains that it is this carry-
over of paradigmatic residue (which is ultimately discarded) which provides the spurious appearance of strong
continuity in scientific advancement. This so-called 'Marxist' theory of revolutionary change sees the new as
struggling to differentiate itself from the old in which it is initially embedded, but from which it ultimately
breaks to create discontinuiry (Krige, 1980: 39).
31 According to Popper (1963: Chapter 3) the right to challenge is an important determinant of a truly scientific procedure.
This view is in stark contrast to the apparent dogma captured in Kuhn's definition of normal science, which
suggests that paradigms provide unquestioned principles according to which scientific practice takes place. Whilst
recognizing the power of divergent and critical thought in science - a pre-requisite for revolutionary scientific
advancement - Kuhn (1977: 226) suggests that convergent (paradigmatic) thinking in science is essential to make
effective the practice of normal science and, ultimately, pave the way for the comparatively rare occasions of
revolution.
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However, Toulmin (1972: 105, 111, 117) argues that this must be seen as distinct from
the intellectual authority of scientific theory, the validity of which is determined through
rational interrogation and not through force of institutional authority; i.e. that in the
conscious reasoning mind, argument and discussion are the motors of scientific
advancement. 32
Building on the context provided by the above understanding of Kuhnian theory, the
investigative approach adopted in this dissertation will be described next. This will
reveal the extent to which constructive change in the human-environment relationship is
being effected on the one hand, through the application of environmental assessment in
its post-revolutionary, 'normal' phase of practice, and on the other, through the new-
paradigm claims arising from within the discipline of environmental ethics.
1.5 INVESTIGATIVE APPROACH USED IN THIS DISSERTATION
The investigative approach that is used in this dissertation to establish the potential of
environmental ethics and environmental assessment to arrest the pathology in the
human-environment relationship is outlined in this section. The approach will be shown
to have continuity with Kuhnian theory as a mode of explanation of the
(revolutionary/post-revolutionary) advancement that environmental assessment has
made in terms informing development decisions - compared with earlier approaches to
decision-making, based mainly on narrow economic determinism - and the application
of such theory (its relevance and limitations) to the discipline of environmental ethics. It
will also be shown to maintain continuity with the previously described (linguistic) theme
of it-, I and we-language, with an emphasis on the need to elevate the significance of l-
and, more importantly, we-language in the dialogue that informs decision-making
around sustainable development, which will be described as an alternative to the
present pathology in the human-environment relationship.
32 In his criticism of Kuhn's belief in the non-rational advancement of science, Krige (1980: 26, 29), like Toulmin, argues
that for scientific development to lie beyond the bounds of rational intelligibility is to question the rationality of
science itself and to undermine the epistemological and social authority which it enjoys.
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Understanding the role of environmental assessment and environmental ethics in
promoting sustainable development requires insight into their respective origins and the
trajectories that mark their evolutionary courses of development. It also requires the
investigation of co-evolutionary relationships that reveal dialogical opportunity - as
opposed to the objective monological basis of scientific materialism [to which, it is
claimed, EIA is aligned (O'Riordan (1986: 4-6)] and/or theoretical monism in
environmental ethics - to promote the ideals of sustainable development through the
integration of the currently dissociated human cultural value spheres. In this respect, the
integration that is proposed deals with the linkage between the rational sphere of
scientific objectivity (the platform of EIA) and the subjective value spheres from which
much of the dialogue in environmental ethics emanates.
Chapter 2 opens with an analysis of the revolutionary origin of environmental
assessment, which will be shown to arise from a situation of anomaly and crisis which -
in the Kuhnian sense - are typical precursors of paradigm shifts and the non-cumulative
advancement of human understanding of the world. The anomaly that has triggered the
emergence of environmental assessment as a new paradigm for directing development
decision-making will be shown to have its source in the failure of crude economic
expansionism - development policy of the 19th century and the first half of the zo"
century - to guarantee continued growth of the Western world economies. At the time,
such growth was placed under threat as colonial frontiers could be pushed back no
further in pursuit of new production opportunities and consumption costs began to
outweigh production benefits. Through reference to the failure of several environmental
policy initiatives (statutes etc.), the emergence of further anomaly - created by
continued environment-related threats to the economy - will be shown to have lead to a
situation of crisis, which manifested most clearly in the adverse effects of pollution on
human well-being during the post-war era (extending from the late1940s into the
1960s). The 'normal' responses applied to resolve this crisis will be described in terms
of a failure to effect any change in the situation, thereby opening the way to 'abnormal'
intervention through major reformation in development decision-making and re-
orientation concerning environmental values. Revolution will be shown to have resulted
from the signing into effect of the US National Environmental Policy Act (also,
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equivalent initiatives in other developed countries) and the emergence of environmental
impact assessment (EIA) as its key action-forcing provision.
Following the discussion of its revolutionary origin, the remainder of Chapter 2 presents
an analysis of the subsequent evolution of EIA and its derivatives, which is described
through further reference to Kuhnian theory and its incorporation into a temporal model
that is used to interpret the post-revolutionary 'normal' advancement of the practice of
environmental assessment. This begins with some reference to the scepticism
according to which EIA was applied initially, which is a response that could have been
anticipated following the emergence of a new paradigm prior to its attraction of a
widespread allegiance. Such allegiance will be shown to have been secured during the
first decade of development in EIA methodology (during the 1970s) as the process of
paradigm clarification and reformulation was worked out; i.e. as 'rules' were developed
according to which the new paradigm could be applied to resolve the
environmental/economic crisis. In this respect, the early EIA methodology will be shown
to have been firmly grounded in scientific materialism and the technocratic vocabulary
of it-language - a situation that would become increasingly challenged as the shift
towards stronger participatory democracy occurred during the following decade
(the 1980s). The response to this challenge is described through reference to scoping as
a key methodological innovation in EIA, which was designed to extract societal values
and concerns (pertaining to development and the environment) as these are articulated
in the multiple I-languages of consulted stakeholders. In spite of this advancement in
EIA process, the potential for it- and I-language dialogue will be shown to have been
limited, rather than enhanced, by the attempted resolution of the animate (human
preferences and human intersubjectivity) through the inanimate technique that is
described.
Chapter 2 concludes with an overview of some new generation approaches to
environmental assessment that take a much bigger contextual perspective of
environment and development than is possible through EIA. The emergence of this
perspective is linked to the global allegiance to the concept of sustainable development
that was initiated since the late 1980s and which continues up to the present. The role
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of these new generation tools in promoting sustainable development through their
potential to engage, in the first instance, the essential we-language that is necessary to
articulate shared views about sustainable development, including moral positions
concerning the environment, that can be discovered in spite of differences in
environmental values, is a theme that is taken up again in the concluding chapter of the
dissertation. Although the rational it-language of science (eg. ecology) that is used in
EIA and other objective analytical modes of enquiry (eg. economics) will be shown to
have an important role in informing the dialogue around sustainable development, it will
be argued that we-language must hold a position of precedence over the other
contributing languages (it- and I-language).
The investigative approach adopted in Chapter 3 begins with a discussion of the origin
of environmental ethics. The focus is on its divergence from the anthropocentrism of
conventional ethics (which guides the interactions between humans) towards an ethic
that seeks to situate the environment as the object of moral concern rather than one of
utility; i.e. an entity of value independent of human preferences and values. In the early
part of Chapter 3, the failure of the discipline to deliver such an ethic (a unifying theory
of value) is described - through reference to Kuhnian theory - as typical of a pre-
paradigm situation in which multiple theories are offered to resolve a crisis which, in this
case, is the same (environmental) crisis to which the origin of EIA is linked.
The (broad) trajectory of the development of environmental ethics is then described in
Chapter 3 in terms of the different themes of environmentalism (the crises of
participation and survival, and the opportunity of emancipation) and the multiple
theories of value that have emerged to support the agenda of the environmentalist
movement. Similar to the approach used to describe the evolution of EIA, a temporal
model that is loosely linked to the various decades since the late 1960s is used to
define the different crises about which environmentalism has been concerned and
which have created the perceived need for a supporting environmental ethic. This is
based on a generational conceptualisation of the environmental problematic (1st. 2nd
and 3rd generation environmental problems). The philosophical responses invoked by
this need, which deal with the convictions that humans have concerning their own value
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and that of the non-human natural world, will be shown to diverge into multiple
arguments that have their grounding in appeals to either the instrumental or intrinsic
value of the environment. In the case of value theories located towards the more
political extreme of mainstream environmentalism, the appeal that is made is for a
radical cultural transformation. Also through reference to Kuhnian theory (and the
distorted use of the paradigm metaphor), the discussion of these various appeals to
environmental value and transformation is structured in a way that deals separately with
those that have a strong/entrenched paradigmatic character (eg. resource conservation
and development, resource preservation) and those that represent what will be termed
'narcissistic new-paradigm claims' (eg. deep ecology).
A critique of theoretical monism - the search for a unified theory to support moral
judgment in every situation pertaining to the environment - is presented in Chapter 3 to
create a context for the alternative that is described as theoretical (ethical) pluralism. At
this point in the chapter a strong preference emerges for Bryan Norton's theory of weak
anthropocentrism (enlightened anthropocentrism)33 as a more defensible philosophy of
environmental value than any of the divergent extremes that are described in the
preceding discussion (Norton, 1984a). This preference is carried through to the
discussion in Chapters 4 and 5 of the dissertation where it will be argued that ethical
pluralism provides the only workable (pragmatic) platform from which to achieve the
policy aims of sustainable development - which the new generation tools for
environmental assessment and management are capable of realizing/promoting. In
contrast to the many monological ethical claims arising from within the discipline of
environmental ethics, which serve to increase the dissociation of the human value
spheres rather than promote their integration, the accommodation of theoretical
pluralism is shown to be a pre-requisite for an effective environmental ethics.
In order to create a context for the interpretation of Norton's pluralistic philosophy on
enlightened anthropocentrism, Chapter 3 provides a review of Aldo Leopold's land
ethic, which appeals to Norton due to the framework that it provides for human
33 Although Norton refers to his philosophy as weak anthropocentrism, the negative connotation that this implies (eg. it is
weak, ineffective) makes the term 'enlightened anthropocentrism' a more attractive descriptor to use here.
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response to and location within their environment. Its influence on Norton's philosophy
of enlightened anthropocentrism lies in the dialogical opportunity that it promotes (i.e. it
encourages dialogue) between holders of divergent value positions, in contrast to the
demand for allegiance to ethical monism (which, by definition, would seem to preclude
dialogue). Particular attention is directed at these dialogical principles and the non-
individualistic value system that constitutes Norton's enlightened anthropocentrism,
since they are used in Chapter 4 as a point of departure to reveal a dialectical
relationship between environmental ethics and environmental assessment.
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the dialectical relationships that have influenced the
co-evolutionary trajectories of key developments within the discipline of environmental
ethics and the practice of environmental assessment. The central structure of the
analysis is provided by the evolutionary course of development in environmentalism,
with the responses that this has triggered in the evolution of environmental assessment
and environmental ethics respectively comprising the supporting structure of the
analysis. In a sense, the trajectory of environmentalism is depicted as an independent
variable that has mediated the co-evolution of the two dependent variables of
environmental ethics and environmental assessment. In the model that is used to define
the structure of this relationship, reference is made to external catalytic forces - 1st. 2nd
and 3rd generation environmental problems - that have contributed to the emergence
and directional shifts in environmentalism over the past three decades. The same
forces, or causal influences, are also used in the model to explain the emergence and
development of EIA and environmental ethics.
In the evolution of EIA, its paradigmatic qualities will be shown to have enabled it to
respond to the agenda of environmentalism only to the extent that its "governing rules"
(see Section 1.4 above) have permitted such response, either within or outside the
expectations of environmentalism. These "governing rules" will be shown to include
values, principles and "language" (see Section 1.3) held in common between
environmentalism and the practice of environmental assessment, which define the
points of contact and dialogue in their evolutionary trajectories. Although not governed
by paradigmatic "rules", the response within the discipline of environmental ethics to the
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agenda of environmentalism, will also be shown as having been determined by common
values, principles and "language" of discourse. Interpretation of the commonalities and
differences in evolutionary relationship between environmentalism and environmental
assessment on the one hand, and environmental ethics on the other, is used to reveal
the co-evolutionary dialectical relationship between the two disciplines.
In the concluding chapter of the dissertation (Chapter 5) it will be proposed that there is
potential for new generation tools for environmental assessment - specifically, Strategic
Environmental Assessment (SEA) - to transcend the barriers created as a result of the
dissociation of the human cultural value spheres through the promotion of greater
subjective dialogue in the assessment process. The proposal is based on the
introduction of a pragmatic ethical platform into SEA, which is described by Norton
(1984a) as weak (or enlightened) anthropocentrism. SEA will be shown to provide an
opportunity to deal with the pathology in the human-environment relationship through
both its capacity to integrate both the subjective and objective aspects of worldviews
that humans subscribe to (vide Wilber, 1998: 202) and its focus on the correct scale of
intervention. This scale will be shown to exceed, for example, the atomism of project-
specific EIA and the associated limitations that such a method has in terms of its
dominant recourse to objective method. Compared to SEA, the narrow objectivity of EIA
will be shown to be an inadequate response to the demands articulated in the form of
multiple objective and subjective human preferences. In this respect, the visioning
component of SEA (i.e. the attention that is given to the dialogue of 1- and, more
importantly, we-language), the incorporation of sustainability principles into the
assessment process, and also the retention of scientific method to quantify and track
movement within agreed environmental thresholds will be shown to be a tool that can
effectively advance us towards arresting pathology and moving us away from
unsustainable development. Underpinned by practical environmental ethics, which is
accommodating of moral pluralism, the new generation approaches to environmental
assessment will be shown to have close alignment with the principles of Leopold's land
ethic, which, as discussed in the introduction of this chapter, seek to promote both
human well-being and the integrity of the biotic community into the indefinite future. It
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will be argued that these are necessary conditions if the aims of sustainable
development are to be achieved.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
It is claimed that environmental impact assessment (EIA) is one of the most successful
policy innovations of the zo" century (Bartlett, 1988: 73-74; Weaver et aI., 1999: 1).34
From its origins in the US following the enactment in 1969 of the National
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), which is the most significant policy instrument
that has served as a catalyst for the emergence of EIA, the practice of environmental
assessment has found application throughout the world. In more than 100 countries it
has become successfully institutionalised either in national policy or in the policies of
funding and international agencies, such as the World Bank, to which many countries
are variously committed (Sadler, 1996: 25). Matching the scale of its global diffusion,
environmental assessment has also become vastly elaborated since its originary form,
thereby ensuring the effectiveness with which it is widely credited (Wood, 1995: 4).
The forces that have created EIA and steered its global diffusion and evolutionary
advancement can only be explained through reference to a revolution." As introduced
in Chapter 1 the model that Kuhn (1970a) uses to explain the structure of scientific
revolutions is, therefore, applied in this chapter as a convenient conceptual framework
to describe the evolution of EIA.
Whether the genesis and emergence of EIA is viewed as a science per se, or whether
the discipline is viewed as a process constructed from fragments of different sciences,
is a debate which does not have to be resolved here in order to legitimise the
34 As stated, for example, by Dalal-Clayton and Sadler (1998b: 3) and World Commission on Environment and
Development [WCED] (1987) EIA has the potential to direct environmentally sustainable development; i.e. to
shift development away from its currently unsustainable track (see the key principles of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development).
35 NEPA's revolutionary qualities have been variously expressed, but not in the same context that is used here. For
example, Milledge and Gallop (1978: 71) describe the act as revolutionary because it deals with problems on a
preventative and anticipatory basis - rather than attempting to reclaim resources from past excesses and abuse;
Thompson (1978: 14) uses the revolution analogy to characterise the roles of different parties in EIA
(environmentalist patriots, extremists, guerillas, the EIA practitioner), etc. The new paradigm of environmental
assessment and management that has been introduced by NEP A transcends these definitions through its
switched focus toward a new emphasis on long-term maintenance of environmental quality - away from narrow
economic determinism.
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applicability of Kuhn's model." In this respect, many supporters of the thesis that Kuhn
posits as explanation for scientific revolutions find value in the model, not so much in its
illumination of science than its explanation of developments in other fields (Kuhn,
1970a: 208).37 Oldroyd (1986:320, 323), Drengson (1980: 224) and others also make
reference to several precedents where Kuhnian theory has been used as an
explanatory medium in fields of enquiry other than science; eg. political science,
economics, education, theology, art.
The following interpretation of how the structure of scientific revolutions applies to the
evolutionary history of EIA begins with a characterisation of what Kuhn describes as
anomaly and crisis, as these emerge as constraints to the practice and advancement of
'normal science', and typically serve as precursors to the radical re-gearing which
occurs through scientific revolution. The discussion includes an analysis of the
resistance to revolution that often emerges at the point where an irreversible shift is
demanded in terms of allegiance to a new guiding paradigm (i.e. one which deals more
effectively with anomaly and crisis than a preceding one). This is followed by a review of
the consolidation in the normal practice of environmental assessment and the
articulation of the new paradigm in environmental policy that has occurred during the
post-revolutionary era.
2.2 ANOMALY AND CRISIS: PRECURSORS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY
IMPACT OF NEPAAND ITS CATALYZING INFLUENCE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
The origin of NEPA has a history which is grounded in the philosophies first articulated
by American environmentalists in the is" century (including Thomas Jefferson, for
36 For example, Beattie (1995: 110) argues that environmental impact assessment is not science - in the sense that it is not
typically based on studies involving observation, experimentation and hypothesizing to test and refine
explanations of studied phenomena. However, it can also be argued that EIA often exposes areas of scientific
uncertainty and does in fact cause the construction of hypotheses that focus on reducing uncertainty (thereby
contributing to the scientific knowledge base).
37 Feyerabend (1970: 198) is critical, for example, of social scientists who, through recourse to Kuhn's definition of
normal science, justify their definition of sociology as being a science which is reducible to a paradigmatic form.
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example) who were familiar with the observations and writings of scholars of the
Enlightenment, such as Locke, Descartes, Newton and Linnaeus (Clark, 1997: 16;
Smythe, 1997: 4). These articulations recognised the existence of natural laws
governing the universe, and a belief emerged at this time that there were natural rights
that should be respected by humans. This philosophy was expanded in the 19th century
in the writings and activities of environmental philosophers such as Emerson and
Thoreau, who found deep spiritual value in nature and who emphasised the
incompatibilities they observed between the environmental values to which they
believed humans should subscribe and the trends in commerce and technology at the
time (Smythe, 1997: 5). Although the evolution of these preservationist views was
clearly developing, they were poorly accommodated in American policy of the 19th
century, which remained firmly aligned with economic expansionism.
The inertia in policy development changed toward the end of the 19th century and during
the early part of the zo" century when the respective conservationist and preservationist
efforts of Gifford Pinchot and John Muir shifted the status quO.38 As will be discussed
later in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.1), the anomaly which prompted a policy response at this
time was the realisation that as the frontiers of colonial expansionism closed, and it was
recognised that the supply of natural resources was not infinite, the American economy
would be faced with constraints to growth which would contradict the prevailing policy of
economic expansionism. To deal with this anomaly the US Congress proclaimed a
number of forest reserves and by 1897 these were being formally managed according
to Pinchot's utilitarian conservation philosophy (Nash, 1973: 137). Early in the zo"
century, the campaign led by Muir, whose aim was to secure the designation of national
parks within which consumptive exploitation would be prohibited, resulted in an act of
Congress in 1916 which established the US National Park Service - an act which
created the counterweight to Pinchot's utilitarian conservation policies (Smythe, 1997:
7).
38 The conservation and preservation strategies of Pinchot and Muir are discussed in Section 3.2.1
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In addition to the initiatives of Pinchot and Muir, various humanitarian, utilitarian and
scientific factions campaigned for the protection of wildlife outside forest reserves and
national parks (Fox, 1981: 152). Amongst other environmental laws, this resulted in the
US federal government enacting the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act of 1934 - a
statute that became the principal federal interagency planning requirement prior to the
passage of NEPA (Smythe, 1997: 8). Around the time of these initiatives in
environmental legislation, an anomaly was emerging in the failure of Pinchot's
conservation policy to deliver the sustainable production of commodities based on the
principles of economic resource management (see Section 3.2.1). To deal with this
failure, Aldo Leopold, who was employed by the US Forest Service during the first half
of the zo" century introduced the concept of ecology into the philosophy of
environmental management and used this emerging science as a rational platform onto
which to extend ethical concepts into policy dellberattons." Aligned once again with the
normal practice of policy development, which is designed to respond to anomaly, one of
the first pieces of federal legislation which was grounded in the non-utilitarian
philosophies of Thoreau and Muir, and in the ethical utilitarianism of Leopold, was the
Wilderness Act of 1964 - a statute which signaled a preservationist victory with respect
to the grounding ideals which it espoused (Fox, 1981: 289).
The 1950s and 1960s heralded a time when the further emergence of anomaly in the
adequacy of environmental policy became increasingly pronounced and the beginning
of a crisis in the policy arena was reflected in the unforseen adverse effects of pollution
and other impacts generated in this period of unprecedented technological innovation."
In a developed country such as the US, the new technologies of the zo" century had
certainly contributed to health, material welfare and high standards of living to the
39 Aida Leopold's /and ethic is discussed in Section 3.4.2 It is suggested that at the time of its formulation, the land ethic
represented an embryonic form of the current paradigm out of which new generation approaches to
environmental assessment and management (eg. Strategic Environmental Assessment) have evolved. Kuhn
(1970a: 86) argues that this is often the case with scientific revolutions - whereby the solution to a crisis exists
(but is often not recognised) before a crisis has developed far or has been explicitly recognised. Similarly,
Weston (1996: 146) suggests that, for example, visionary ethical ideas may be available for adoption, but may
not be recognizable or understood given the practices, experiences and other issues alongside of which they
have to be placed.
40 The 2/1d generation environmental problems that arose as a consequence of the unrestrained post-war economic boom
beginning in the iate 1940s are discussed in Section 3.2.2
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benefit of a broad sector of society." However, such advancement was also
accompanied by mounting environmental and human costs, and a sense that
technology had progressed beyond human control (Graham Smith, 1993: 4), particularly
with respect to large-scale technologies that accelerated the concentration of economic
and political power. The environmental problems associated with this situation
highlighted the prevailing level of scientific ignorance, the high decision costs of
technology - which were typically informed simply by questions of feasibility, financial
viability and legal permissability (Graham Smith, 1993: 4) - and the reality that the time
and space scales of anthropogenic environmental change were beginning to transcend
those of most institutions expected to manage the situation (Clark, 1986: 5; Angermeier,
2000: 375). It is, therefore, not surprising that the technological goal of narrowly defined
efficiency that had pervaded industrial society increasingly came under attack (Barbour,
1980: 35).
Extending the tradition of normal practice, the policy response to the crisis was the
introduction of several bills and environmental laws directed at the protection of single
species and discrete environmental elements rather than the management of the full
spectrum of bio-diversity and ecosystem functioning.42 This pattern of response
proliferation is described by Kuhn (1970a: 71) as a manifestation of insecurity caused
by the inability of a paradigm to direct an adequate solution to anomaly and crisis. In the
areas of serious environmental concern, the policies which emerged were often a
compromise position forced by local governments and polluting industries opposed to
the cost implications of such legislation (Caldwell, 1998: 9). Alternatively, benefit-cost
analysis was applied as an economic response - one which appealed to decision-
makers because of the tangible measure of optimised social utility and the quantitative
indices which the technique could derive in terms of fiscal benefit and cost efficiency
(Graham Smith, 1993: 7).
41 Angermeier (2000: 375) argues that technology is no longer just a means to address essential needs (food, shelter), but
that technology acquisition (vehicles, gadgets) has become an end in itself.
42 In the 1950s a series of bills were introduced in the US Congress to reduce waste and abuse of natural resources and
to control air and water pollution. Examples of subsequent legislation include the Land and Water Conseruation
FundAct 011965; the Endangered SpeciesAct 011966; the Wild and Scenic RiversAct 011968; and the National Trails
Act of 1968.
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The result of the above policy initiatives and a persistent reliance on economic
reductionism in decision-making presented itself as an un-cohesive and inadequate
reaction to the arguments presented by notable champions for the environment such as
Rachel Carson and Stewart Udall (eg. Carson, 1962; Udall, 1963).43 The reaction also
failed to neutralise the pressures exerted by environmentalist factions that, in the style
of the civil rights and anti-war movements of the 1960s, were becoming a popular
political force (Barbour, 1980: 121; Caldwell, 1997: 27).44 It did not effectively address
the repercussions of major development schemes insofar as these affected ecological
and community impacts, particularly with respect to the social fairness of resource
allocations, which were the pressing issues of environmental concern (O'Riordan and
Sewell, 1981; Caldwell, 1988).45 Smythe (1997: 11) summarises the following
deficiencies in environmental policy which were articulated at the time, which
constituted an inventory of the developing crisis in environmental policy.
• A propensity to emphasise and value quantitative measures of growth over
qualitative measures of well-being.
• A failure of economic theory to internalise social and environmental costs in
benefit-cost analyses."
• The inadequacy of government institutions in dealing with problems that cut
across political boundaries.
43 Rachel Carson exposed the destruction of wildlife resulting from the use of pesticides and succeeded in creating a
broad public awareness of the environment, leading to changes in US government policy.
44 Barrow (1997: 167) suggests that the media and information revolution, which was underway by the late 1950s, played
a significant part in galvanizing environmentalist action.
45 Using many examples extracted from the history of science, Kuhn (1970a: 52-91) argues that scientific revolutions
rarely occur without the pre-emergence of a particularly pressing anomaly (or combination of anomalies) which
gives rise to persistent crisis that cannot be resolved in the course of what he describes as the 'puzzle-solving of
normal science'.
46 Benefit-cost analysis frequently failed to consider fundamentally different alternatives, tended to focus on easily
quantifiable benefits and costs (ignoring less easily quantifiable parameters), and dealt inadequately with
temporal variations in interest rates and discount rates - resulting in manipulated accounting (Graham Smith,
1993: 7). Benefit-cost analyses that were initially used to establish the balance between the monetary costs of a
project and its anticipated benefits were, therefore, easy to skew toward a politically preferred ratio (Caldwell,
1998: 9). However, as an aggregative technique, possibly its greatest failure was the inability of benefit-cost
analysis to account for ethical distributional aspects of costs and benefits (Carley and Bustelo, 1984: 139-149).
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• A lack of understanding of the fundamental interdependence of human
populations and their environment.
A failure of both governmental and private institutions to take environmental
factors into account as an essential part of planning and decision-making.
A recognition that the US government's narrow, mission-oriented approach to
programmes and projects and the lack of consideration given by federal
agencies to environmentally preferable alternatives were contributing to these
problems.
In effect, the above indictment offailure in environmental policy exposed the practice of
policy development to the threat of disintegration. The elevated position of this crisis
clearly highlighted the severe inadequacies of policy against the background of the
entrenched paradigm of narrow economic determinism that had strongly influenced the
'normal' evolution of environmental policy development up to that point. This provided
the catalyst for 'abnormal' policy intervention to deal with the crisis, and the
expectations and rules of conventional approaches to policy development were
loosened to ensure a resolution to the situation." i.e. a route was opened for a new
candidate paradigm for environmental policy to ernerqe."
Cognizance of the deficiencies in environmental policy was taken by the US Congress
in committee hearings held in the course of 1968 and 1969, the purpose of which were
to develop a strategy to reform agency decision-making and to influence the private
sector, with the hope of transforming and re-orientating environmental values (Barrow,
1997: 168) and to ensure that balanced decision-making would occur in the total public
47 According to Kuhn, as an anomaly becomes more generally recognised by the scientific profession, and the integrity of
normal science becomes exposed to the threat of disintegration, more and more attention is focused on its
resolution. Such attention tends to result in a loosening of the rules of normal puzzle-solving, and begins to
fracture the value of an existing paradigm within the scientific community (Kuhn, 1970a: 84). It is within an
environment of uncharacteristically loosened rules and paradigm fracture that a route is opened for a new
candidate paradigm to emerge (Kuhn, 1970a: 80, 83, 86).
48 In Kuhn's view, the situation of an anomaly which begins to constitute a crisis gives rise to 'abnormal science', which
inevitably violates the paradigm-induced expectations governing normal science (Kuhn, 1970a: 90). More
importantly, it is the dramatically constructive nature of revolutions driven by such abnormal science that
resolves anomalies and opens a different understanding of nature (Kuhn, 1970a: 85). This new understanding
draws the scientific community toward a switch of allegiance to new paradigms and requires the concomitant
rejection of the obsolete.
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interest (Canter, 1977: 1). The outcome of these hearings, which represented the
culmination of a decade of proposals, debate and refinement on principles and
institutional arrangements, was the US National Environmental Policy Act(NEPA) which
was designed to integrate environmental, economic and social policy (Caldwell, 1997:
31 ).49 With the enactment of NEPA, the 1970s were proclaimed the 'environmental
decade' (Carpenter, 1981: 175).
The National Environmental Policy Act is constructed upon three main pillars, which
include: a constituted Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) commissioned to ensure
continuity and capability in managing NEPA's complexity and to report annually on the
state of the nation's environment to the Executive Office of the US President; a bill
containing a declarative statement on national environmental policy; and a supporting
'action-forcing' provision compelling agencies to document their efforts to comply with
such policy.5o The action-forcing provision of NEPA, which fitted in well with the
American tradition of rational planning (Sadler, 1996: 26), established the framework for
environmental impact assessment as it has evolved and is practiced today (Clark, 1997:
17), and is considered to be the most influential and widely emulated feature of the act
(Caldwell, 1997: 31). The constitution of the CEQ and the policy and action provisions
of the bill were formally combined into the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
which was signed into effect on 1 January 1970.51
The enactment of NEPA is viewed both as a response to the shift in societal values
toward a greater concern with the environmental consequences of human actions
(Graham Smith, 1993: 8; Lawrence, 1997: 79) and a critical response to American
perspectives toward utilitarian and economic efficiency as these have evolved toward
49 Kuhn suggests that the resolution of anomaly and crisis is seldom attributable to a moment in time. Revolutionary
change is typically an extended process of conceptual assimilation, during which the perception of anomaly
does not necessarily present an expectation of the revolution that its potential resolution promises (Kuhn,
1970a: 55-56).
SO The US Environmental ProtectionAgenry was constituted in 1970 to oversee the impact assessment process (Gilpin, 1995:
115-119).
51 Canter (1977: 4) describes the controversy generated by the provisions for EIA which were incorporated into NEPA
just prior to its enactment - a suggestion that parties who may on the surface have accepted the rhetoric of the
NEP A principles, deeply rejected the mechanism for their realisation.
Michael Burns Chapter 2, Evolution of Environmental Assessment, Page 41
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Co-Evolutionary Relationships Between Environmental Ethics And Environmental Assessment
the end of the zo" century (Smythe, 1997: 12; Clark, 1997: 17). NEPA was the first time
that US law allowed for development to be delayed or abandoned for the long-term
good of the environment. It represented an irreversible revolution in values in the US
(Barrow, 1997: 169), and signaled a broadening focus of the historic dedication only to
economic growth and development (Barbour, 1980: 189).
Extending Kuhn's theory of scientific revolution, the emergence of the new paradigm in
environmental policy in no way reflected a cumulative pattern of policy development
based on the re-articulation or extension of an historical paradigm structured around
economic expansionism (Kuhn, 1970a: 85). The change in worldview which NEPA
introduced presented a policy reconstructed from new fundamentals, which brought with
it changes in some of the most elementary theoretical generalisations which had
previously been accommodated in policy.52 It required decisive differences in the
methods of solution to environmental, economic and social issues, which transformed
the goals within the arena of economic and environmental policy implementation. As in
the case of scientific revolution, the final stage of policy transformation that NEPA
introduced was sudden and irreversible since the traditional rules of the pre-
revolutionary era could no longer define a playable game and the rules of the new
paradigm that replaced them became immediately applicable (vide Kuhn, 1970a: 90).
The goals which are declared in NEPA, and which capture the theme of the new policy
paradigm, are to:
• Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as a trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations;
Assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings;
52 Questioning whether NEP A presented a policy reconstructed from new fundamentals, Caldwell (1997: 28) suggests
that the congressional votes that passed NEP A were cast under the misconception that the act related
essentially to pollution control insofar as this could benefit the human environment; i.e. a view that
fundamentally entrenched, and narrowly interpreted, anthropocentric values, rather than broader environmental
values, swung the vote.
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• Attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;
• Preserve important historical, cultural, and natural aspects of American national
heritage and maintain, where possible, an environment that supports diversity
and variety of individual choice;
• Achieve a balance between population and resource use that will permit high
standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
• Enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable re-cycling of depletable resources.f
In essence, NEPA's declared goals imply that economic and environmental quality
should be compatible and that the fulfillment of social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations must permit humans and nature to exist
in harmony. In the US, the absence of any equivalent sentiment in the Constitution,
which has a strong anthropocentric emphasis toward property and civil rights, made this
central ideal of NEPA extremely significant (Caldwell, 1997: 32).
The demand for a dramatic switch in paradigm allegiance, which was attached to the
acceptance of NEPA and the concomitant rejection of narrow economic determinism,
brought with it an inevitable uncertainty or skepticism amongst many key stakeholders
required to make this switch.54 For example, President Nixon had opposed the
legislation leading up to NEPA but signed its enactment and lent his support to it for a
while as its popularity became evident (Barbour, 1980: 189). Political support for NEPA
might also have been considered prudent in the initial years following its enactment due
to the unprecedented interest in the environment which led to the United Nations'
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 (Wood, 1995: 3).
53 This summary of the national goals of NEP A is extracted from Canter (1977: 3).
54 In the case of scientific revolution, the acceptance of new theory demands large-scale paradigm destruction and major
shifts in the problems and techniques of normal science. The extended process of assimilatingnew theory tends
to place the scientific community in a position of insecurity - a position which is aggravated by persistent past
failure to solve the puzzles of normal science through application of the accepted and governing scientific rules
(Kuhn, 1970a: 68). Extending this analogy to the political arena, hesitancy to switch allegiance to the new
paradigm in environmental policy that NEP A introduced is perhaps understandable.
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NEPA had little influence at first on federal agency decisions due to an inherent
bureaucratic resistance to change (Barbour, 1980: 189). The action-forcing provisions
of NEPA were initially not seriously embraced by these agencies and a weak
compliance tactic employed by officials was to submit either superficial or
incomprehensible, and often irrelevant, supporting information to defend development
decisions which had already been taken; i.e. the provisions were not employed to inform
decision-making. However, these tactics were generally unsuccessful and the
deficiencies in legal compliance resulted in many public enquiries and/or litigation
actions filed against the affected agencies. 55 Sadler (1996: 27) considers the legal
process and public enquiries, which were features of this era, as having assisted with
the constructive development of EIA. This supports the views of Taylor (1984) who
suggests that the effectiveness of NEPA has been derived from the experience of initial
resistance to EIA and learning from the consequent litigation - an action that fractured
the previously closed process of intra/inter-agency decision-making. Although it might
have been anticipated that EIA would become less effective in terms of achieving the
ultimate goals of environmental policy - as agencies and the courts have respectively
adapted to and approached the limits of legal intervention - this has not materialised.
Thus, the indication is that a firm base of allegiance now exists within the new paradigm
of environmental policy which NEPA has tntroduced."
The extent to which political support for NEPA has persisted since its enactment in the
US is questionable and the evidence suggests that there is good cause for skepticism in
this respect (Caldwell, 1997: 39; Clark et al., 1980: 1). However, whatever deficiencies
might exist in political leadership in the arena of environmental policy, the action-forcing
mechanism of NEPA, which is EIA, has endured for three decades as an extremely
55 Criticism of an apparently narrow judicial interpretation of the act that such litigation actions invoked is contested by
Caldwell (1997: 25) who re-directs such criticism toward those authorities who failed in their responsibilities to
support the declared intent of NEP A.
56 Acknowledging the redundancy of litigation as a key forcing process ofNEPA (a situation which typically applies in
most non-litigative countries, such as South Africa), Taylor (1984: 270) attributes the successful
institutionalisation of environmental values in federal bureaucracies as having emerged from a structure of
behavioral incentives arising within a competitive "market" of multiple and overlapping centres of power.
According to Taylor, this "market" is created by the equal access to the knowledge generated by EIA that is
enjoyed by the external agency critics and the federal agencies. This promotes competitive analysis of such
knowledge and thereby, the achievement of decision-making which is aligned with environmental policy goals.
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relevant policy instrument. In the following sections the focus shifts to the development
history of EIA, both in the US and worldwide, and it is intended that this will provide an
insight into what has been achieved through the NEPA revolution. This historical
analysis is also designed to provide a basis for establishing the co-evolutionary links
between EIA and environmental ethics, which are described in Chapter 4.
2.3 ARTICULATING A NEW PARADIGM: THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
Although the emergence of a new paradigm proves essential to deal with crisis, this in
no way implies that once established, it immediately meets the requirements and
satisfies the interests of the community that it affects. To this end, the new paradigm
becomes an object for further articulation under new and often increasingly more
stringent conditions (Kuhn, 1970a: 23). In the case of EIA, these would manifest as a
demand (based on a strengthening participatory democracy) for resolution of the
deepening environmental crisis.
This section presents an interpretation of the process of paradigm articulation that has
assisted the realisation of some of the goals of NEPA (and equivalent environmental
policy beyond the US) through the continued development of the practice of
environmental assessment. The post-revolution, cumulative pattern in this evolutionary
history, which emerges in the following discussion, is typical of the development
process of all normal science following the establishment of a new theoretical grounding
(Kuhn, 1970a: 85, 139).
Of the many priorities that the practice of environmental assessment has addressed,
one of the first has been to clarify the newly accepted paradigm into a more coherent
version than that provided by NEPA. This section therefore opens with an analysis of
some of the clarification and re-formulation initiatives that characterised the first decade
of the practice of EIA. This is followed by a discussion of some of the initiatives that
were aimed at consolidating and extending the new paradigm during its second decade.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the evolution of environmental assessment
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during its third decade of practice, which is characterised by a number of initiatives
designed to maintain the validity of the paradigm of environmental policy under
increasingly more stringent conditions.
2.3.1 Clarification and reformulation of a new paradigm: the first decade in the
evolutionary development of environmental assessment
Kuhn (1970a: 33) concludes that the initial focus of normal science following a scientific
revolution is typically one which aims to clarify a newly accepted paradigm through its
reformulation, using formal inductive principles, into a logically more coherent and
precise version than the original from which investigation initially proceeds." Although
the goals of NEPA are relatively explicit (see Section 2.2 above), they do not clearly
articulate how they are to be achieved and, as anticipated by Kuhn, an initiative that
characterised the beginning of the era heralded by NEPA was the formulation of
guidelines and directives for EIA that aimed to clarify the new paradigm. In the US these
were published by the CEQ to assist federal agencies to meet NEPA's legal
requirements and they came into effect as regulations in 1979.58 According to Canter
(1977: 4-6) the NEPA directives, upon which the EIA regulations are based, specified
the following:
• That a systematic, interdisciplinary approach should be used to ensure the
integrated use of the natural and social sciences and environmental design arts
in planning and in decision-making that may have an impact on the human
environment;
57 Kuhn's interpretation of the actions of intellectual consolidation which occur within the hounds of a new paradigm are
differently described by Toulmin (1972: 122) as the units of intellectual variation which represent either tentative
conceptual variants or units of ejftctive modification which occur within a discipline.
58 Many parties, including environmental groups, industry and agency officials welcomed the regulations (Carter, 1979:
345) and according to Clark (1997: 20) their effectiveness can be judged by the substantial decline in the
number of NEP A lawsuits filed subsequent to their promulgation. However, an additional explanation is also
offered by Clark (1997: 21) for the decreasing trend in EIA litigation actions. Rather than ascribing this (only)
to the effectiveness of the NEP A guidelines and regulations, he cites the reduced exposure of agencies to litigation
as possible explanation. In this context, there is currently a greater reliance by agencies on less rigorous (and
less public) environmental assessments, which has reduced the number of Environmental Impact Statements
submitted by federal authorities for public scrutiny.
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• Methods and procedures should be identified and developed that will ensure that
unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate
consideration in decision-making along with technical and economic
considerations; and
• The need to prepare environmental statements structured to include certain
basic items, in particular a detailed statement covering five major areas: (i) the
environmental impact (positive and negative; primary and secondary) of the
proposed action; (ii) any adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented; (iii) alternatives to the proposed action; (iv)
the relationship between local short-term uses of the human environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and (v) any
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources that would be involved in
the proposed action should it be implemented.
Although a paradigm provides assurance in terms of resolving problems which are
undertaken in the course of normal science, Kuhn (1970a: 38, 42) argues that puzzle-
solving nevertheless requires rules - or access to shared examples which can serve the
same cognitive function as rules (Kuhn, 1977: 319) - that limit both the nature of
acceptable solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained. Within the NEPA
framework, the directives pertaining to EIA fulfilled this function by providing the
discipline with a solid understanding and confirmation of the changed view that
economic development and environmental quality had to be harmonised. This allowed
the focus of EIA to be directed at bringing the residual puzzles that this paradigm
presented to their various solutions.
In the mid to late 1970s, the above initiatives were supplemented with the publication of
the first EIA textbooks, which according to Kuhn (1970a: 137; 1977: 228) fulfilled a
typical function of recording the stable outcome of a scientific revolution. More
importantly, these texts provided further articulation (clarification, reformulation) of the
new paradigm as it was first tested in practice, and documented the early evolutionary
development of the discipline in order to confirm the points of contact between
paradigm theory and the real world within which its post-revolutionary validity had to be
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expanded. Since a scientific community's identity within a paradigm is typically revealed
in its textbooks (Kuhn, 1970a: 43, 46), these assumed a particularly significant role
during the originary stage of EIA. By studying textbooks and the solutions to puzzles
which they documented, entrants into the functions of EIA research and practice were
introduced to a broad common grounding in the discipline (vide the previous reference
to the role of rules and shared examples); i.e. the tacit knowledge which a paradigm
provides (Oldroyd, 1986: 321; Chalmers, 1982: 93). Importantly, the textbooks on EIA
captured the progress of puzzle-solving, which as described in Section 1.4, is the
central challenge of all normal science (Kuhn, 1970a: 37). In this respect, the
confidence to solve the EIA puzzles of the 1970s was derived largely from the paradigm
itself, which provided the discipline with the criterion to select puzzles which could be
assumed to have sotutlons."
Solutions to some of the most pressing puzzles, arising from impact prediction in the
context of environmental complexity, with which the discipline was presented rapidly
emerged in the form of well defined methods for EIA, which were typically substantiated
through reference to case studies.6o Whilst environmental complexity was clearly
acknowledged in the solutions that these methods offered, especially that created by
humans acting within a dynamic environing context (Munn, 1975: 15-16), they are also
notable for their pragmatism. Successful puzzle-solving was approached primarily
through reducing complexity." One way in which this was achieved was to fragment the
59 Kuhn (1970a: 37) argues that the scientific community acquires with a paradigm a criterion for choosing problems that
can be assumed to have solutions. Other extra-paradigmatic waysof regarding problems are, therefore, typically
not sought out (Kuhn, 1977: 229). Extending this argument into the domain of EIA, the NEPA paradigm
states, for example, that '~mportant historical, cultural, and natural aspects of national heritage should bepreserted and
maintained" (see Section 2.2); i.e. it thus becomes entirely feasible to design and develop solutions which have
the achievement of this goal fixed as an end-point. However, without the guarantee provided by such a
criterion, a solution is unlikely to be sought for such a puzzle.
60 According to Kuhn (1970a: 46), theory is never learnt in isolation from its application. Examples of applications,
therefore, always accompany theory into the textbooks from which the future practitioner of a particular field
of science will learn the trade. The process ofleaming a theory depends largely upon the study of applications,
which explain and provide practice for problem-solving.
61 In the late 1970s EIAs were designed as brief summaries of environmental information - sufficient only to the extent
that a project decision could be made (Bendix and Graham, 1978: vii); i.e. this pragmatic approach was
designed to simplify complexity. This form of reductionism should not be confused with Wilson's (1998: 58)
interpretation of the approach to good science, which is to break apart nature into its natural constituents in
order to find points of entry into otherwise impenetrably complex systems.
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environment into discrete components in order to analyze specific environmental
impacts of actions (Weaver et aI., 1999: 7). Thus, the air environment was distinguished
from the water environment, which was distinguished from the biological and socio-
economic environments, etc. [for example, see Canter (1977: Ch 4-9)]. The methods
also aimed to reduce complexity through the distillation of the practice of EIA into two
main elements: a standardised process; and an array of methods of impact analysis.
These in effect became an extension of the initial rules which first directed the
discipline's course of evolution and, with some modification, have largely influenced its
development up to the present.
Toward the end of the first decade in the history of EIA, a process for best practice in
environmental assessment began to emerge. This provided a logical structure for the
introduction of a variety of EIA methods to supplement and replace traditional
approaches to project appraisal, which had previously focused only on analysis of
technical/engineering issues and the economic values attached to project alternatives,
for example using benefit-cost analysis (Heer and Hagerty, 1977: 150; Sadler, 1996:
27). The emerging methods were either developed for specific application to EIA, or
were adopted and adapted to make them suitable for environmental assessment and
impact prediction (Heer and Hagerty, 1977: 144).62Whilst it is not the purpose of this
chapter to comprehensively describe EIA methods, a brief review of methodology is
necessary in order to define the route taken in the evolutionary development of EIA.
The following discussion is based largely on the review of EIA methods of the 1970s
presented by Canter and Sadler (1997: 11-12).
Check-lists (simple and decision-focused) were one of the first tools to be applied in EIA
and were generally designed to provide an extensive listing of possible areas of project
impact on listed attributes of the environment (air, water, land, socia-economic
characteristics of the environment etc.); i.e. the function of simple checklists was
62 McHarg (1969) advocated the value of proactive and systematic consideration of environmental limits, development
impacts and alternatives, i.e. an approach which is considered to have been the forerunner of EIA (Barrow,
1997: 167). EIA methodology that was adopted from McHarg's planning discipline includes for example, the
technique of graphic overlay of development opportunities and constraints.
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primarily to prevent issues from being overlooked in the assessment process. Some of
the checklist methods were also extremely comprehensive, in the sense that they
provided a high level of descriptive information characterizing the various environmental
attributes which could be exposed to project impacts (Heer and Hagerty, 1997: 160).
Within the checklist category, decision-focused methods, such as scaling and scaling-
weighting checklists [for example, the Batelle environmental evaluation system (Dee et
al., 1973)] evolved as procedures for synthesizing information from impact studies and
were used mainly for trade-off analysis with the ultimate purpose of comparing project
alternatives (Canter and Sadler, 1997: 7). These methods incorporated quantitative
indices into the assessment techniques, which were often computer-aided. Examples of
EIA checklist methodologies applied in the 1970s are described by Jain et al. (1977: 78-
91) and Canter (1977: 199-216).
Inventories and mass-balance calculations of environmental conditions were often used
to support EIA in order to compare anticipated changes resulting from proposed
actions. Inventories were typically used in the context of air and water pollutant
emissions, and solid and hazardous waste generation (Canter and Sadler, 1997: 9).
Anticipated environmental response relative to a quantified baseline condition was
expressed as a percentage change (increase, decrease) or a mass-balance shift within
the resource inventory as this was calculated or expected to materialise as a result of
project actions.
Interaction matrix methodologies also characterised the early evolutionary phase of EIA.
These matrix approaches were generally modeled around the method developed by
Leopold et al. (1971). The methodologies which have been employed since the early
1970s are designed to use matrices created by project actions and environmental
characteristics, which are listed down and across the matrix axes. A mechanism is
thereby created to identify impacts in a cause-effect relationship between actions and
environmental items (Munn, 1975: 53). The impacts are typically scored using a scalar
system (numerical and other category units) to assign ratings of impact magnitude,
importance, probability of occurrence, potential reversibility, etc. Project phasing, as well
as temporal and spatial variations that might characterise different impacts are
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accommodated in more sophisticated matrix methodologies (Canter and Sadler, 1997:
41-44). Network methods evolved together with matrices and were applied to delineate
connections or relationships between project actions and resultant impacts in a manner
which could illustrate primary, secondary and tertiary impact relationships (Canter,
1977: 196; Canter and Sadler, 1997: 10; Clarketal., 1980: 18-19). These relationships
were depicted as impact trees, impact chains, cause-effect diagrams etc.
Since impact analysis comprises an anticipatory procedure, qualitative or conceptual
modeling was used as a method for EIA during the 1970s to project simplified
representations of an anticipated project reality (Munn, 1975: 68). However,
environmental data deficiencies in the 1970s tended to constrain qualitative modeling
attempts to address the linkages between various actions and resultant changes in
environmental components, and modeling methods were really an extension of the
network methods just described. Although the modeling design was largely based on
the portrayal of linear cause-effect relationships, the challenge which was recognised at
the time was to develop models for EIA which could ultimately better explain the
complex non-linear and dynamic relationships which more realistically defined the
environmental cause-effects responses to project actions (Munn, 1975: 68).
If the evolution of EIA during its first decade of practice projects a distinguishable
pattern in the direction which it has taken - using the above analysis of methods as a
gauge - this is perhaps best described as one which has permitted the discipline to
derive solutions to the most immediate challenge which it has faced. This challenge was
to begin the reversal of a deeply institutionalised practice of narrow economic
determinism in decision-making (Sagoff, 1988: 148).63The pattern which is projected is
one which characterises the attempts which have been made to reduce the complexity
of the immediate challenge of EIA firstly, through simplification of the process and
63 Toward the end of the 1970s, some criticism was directed at the failure ofEIA because of the excessive paperwork it
entailed and the concomitant inefficiency and delays that it introduced to project decision-making (Cronin and
Mylroie, 1978: 231). However, Clark (1997: 22), in his analysis of the accomplishments of NEP A, concludes
that EIA revolutionised the consideration by government agencies of the environmental effects of projects and
programmes and that it modified many proposed actions in ways that have reduced or avoided environmental
impacts.
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methods of impact analysis, and secondly, through fragmentation of the environment
into discrete components for the purpose of modeling and communicating a first
understanding of cause-effect retatlonships." This does not imply that the deficiencies
that these approaches introduced into impact analysis were not anticipated; however,
solutions to the puzzles of complexity were not considered to be immediately derivable
and attention was directed at their further articulation, rather than solution."
Perhaps the most important puzzle - which is ultimately fundamental to the successful
implementation of environmental policy - was neither resolved nor well articulated
during the 1970s. The EIA process and methodologies that were developed at the time
did not elevate the serious consideration of the role of social values (eg. pertaining to
intragenerational environmental justice issues around participation in decision-making
and equal access to resources) and conscious or subconscious commitments to the
cost and benefits of environmental values. EIA at best was viewed as a practice which
dealt thoughtfully, but dispassionately with the short- and long-term uses of natural and
human resources (De Santo, 1978: 35, 36). A reluctance to embrace the passionate
dimension of social values is explained by Kuhn (1970a: 37) as an aversion which
normal science typically displays toward problems that do not seem to have solutions
that are derivable within the discipline. Such problems are rejected for reasons such as
their metaphysical nature, their location within the domain of another discipline, as
being too problematic to be worth the time, or not reducible to a puzzle form because
they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools which the
paradigm supplies. Thus, the puzzle of effectively responding to social and ethical
values, as a dimension of EIA, was not taken up seriously, and was left to be resolved
64 De Santo (1978: 36) and Gardiner (1980: 82) state that one view of EIA in the 1970s was that it represented a
cookbook or statistical approach, which when followed, would state whether a project was good or bad. Whilst
this perhaps exaggerates the simplification through which EIA dealt with environmental complexity, it is
accurate in the sense that pragmatism in methodology was perceived to be the best way of implementing a
policy mandate in a situation of acknowledged environmental ignorance.
65 Some of the complex issues with which the discipline ofEIA is currently making progress were first articulated in the
early textbooks on environmental impact assessment. For example, Munn (1975: 165) touches on the topical
fields of both Cumulative Effects Assessment and Strategic Environmental Assessment, by highlighting the
problems of project-level impact assessment that cannot portray the combined effects of a number of projects
which may individually be deemed acceptable.
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in the decades which followed under more stringent conditions than those which defined
the first era of EIA practice (Manheim, 1981: 312; Susskind, 1982: 7).
2.3.2 Paradigm consolidation and extension: the second decade in the evolutionary
development of environmental assessment
In many respects, EIA was considered to be a mature discipline toward the end of the
1970s (Bendix and Graham, 1978). With maturity came the confidence provided by a
strong foundation of growing paradigm allegiance which removed the pre-condition for
new developments and new concepts within the field of practice to be continually
defended from first principles (Kuhn, 1970a: 19-20). During the 1980s EIA could,
therefore, proceed ever more efficiently, from a grounding which enabled its global
scope of application to increase dramatically. These developments of the 1980s are
discussed in the sections that follow.
2.3.2.1 Paradigm consolidation: enhancing the social dimension of environmental
assessment
The record of innovation in impact assessment beyond the 1970s was no longer limited
to the domain of textbooks, but appeared in a form which clearly identified the practice
of EIA as a mature discipline - one in which communication between peers was
achieved through professional and scientific journals (vide Kuhn's (1970a: 20) views on
the importance of exemplars in directing post-revolutionary normal science). In 1980,
the first journal of environmental assessment was published, and it is through such a
medium that the research and development priorities of the 1980s emerged.
Significantly, a trend that would provide the impetus for an important area of innovation
in the development of EIA during this period was defined in the first journal issue, which
alerted the discipline to the priority of integrating social issues into EIA.
At the beginning of the second decade of EIA, Nicholson (1980: 5) argued that the role
of public participation in environmental protection would become increasingly more
strongly linked to the pattern of decentralisation of authority and a shift from
representative democracy toward participatory democracy. The attractive force that this
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political shift exercised over environmental decision-making became inevitable as it was
increasingly recognised that the qualities of nonhuman natural environmental systems
and the character of economic and human community systems were inseparable. The
trend toward participatory democracy introduced the expectation of society that citizens
should be consulted frequently on issues that impact their lives (Susskind, 1982: 7;
Paehlke, 1988: 298). In this respect, the power of EIA to inform environmental decision-
making, and its effectiveness in terms of communicating scientific information of
increasing levels of complexity and perceived significance in terms of human well-being,
made it inevitable that participatory democracy would become infused into EIA. The cue
was thus given for social values to be taken up seriously within the domain of EIA.
Public participation was not a new concept for EIA in the 1980s and had been identified
in the preceding decade as an important element of environmental assessment. Canter
(1977: 222), for example, defined the objectives of public participation as being central
to the securement of the following: information exchange and stakeholder education;
the identification of problems, needs and important values; idea generation and
problem-solving; reaction and feed-back on proposals; evaluation of alternatives; and
conflict resolution. As elaborated by Canter (1996: 587-622), the objectives of public
participation in environmental decision-making have remained fundamentally important
to EIA up to the present. However, taking into account the number of EIA litigation
actions which were issued against federal authorities during the 1970s, it is clear that
these objectives had not been achieved - a situation which Caldwell (1997: 25)
attributes to a lack of commitment to the process of EIA, which was intended to
embrace public participation as a key requirement. Susskind (1982: 7) and Graham
Smith (1993: 8) also note that the early development of EIA took place in an era
dominated by a technocratic perspective on problem-solving and with an emphasis on
bio-physical impacts; i.e. a situation in which the social dimension of impact assessment
was regarded as external to the EIA process.
Considering the imbalance in ability to debate complex technical issues which existed
between private individuals on the one hand and the concentrated political and
economic power of industry and government on the other (Barbour, 1980: 117-118), an
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ineffectual process of public participation in EIA during its early stage of development
might have been anticipated. In the US, public involvement in EIA during the 1970s had
become adversarial, rather than participatory, which resulted in the obfuscation of the
key environmental issues central to project decision-making (Canter, 1997: 2-1).
Guidelines and regulations were therefore issued by the CEQ that introduced the
concept of scoping in order to address this deficiency and to streamline the approach to
EIA (Council on Environmental Quality, 1978; Carpenter, 1981: 185).
Scoping is defined as a process which distills from the broad range of potential
problems which might be identified at the initial stage of an EIA, the priority issues to be
addressed; i.e. it is designed to focus an environmental assessment on a manageable
number of important questions upon which decision-making is expected to turn
(Beanlands, 1988: 33; Wathern, 1988: 9). The analytical process through which issues
are prioritised in the course of scoping, is described by Canter (1997), who defines the
value of professional judgment in this respect and the more structured process of
qualitative review, through which criteria are introduced into the prioritisation process.
Criteria which are used to evaluate issues include questions such as: considerations
pertaining to human health; environmental vulnerability; likelihood of secondary and
cumulative impacts; duration of impact; institutional definition of impact significance;
level of public concern, etc. Scoping is, therefore, designed to set the terms of reference
for an EIA through the identification and clarification of project alternatives and the
definition of the associated direct, indirect and cumulative impacts (Tomlinson, 1984:
186). Central to this process, is the opportunity which scoping provides for public
involvement in the translation of environmental policy into tangible specifications for
individual EIAs; i.e. scoping extracts social values (Canter, 1996: 588) in order to
formulate technical questions to be resolved through scientific enquiry (Beanlands,
1988: 34, 37).
Barbour (1980: 118-121) defines two kinds of special interest groups which are
represented in the politics within which a process such as scoping operates. He defines
these as industry and private interest groups on the one hand and citizens and public
interest groups on the other. Industry and private interest groups tend to operate from a
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position of economic power that secures them a positive affiliation with government
mainly due to the direct impact that their interests have on the economy. In closed or
low visibility situations of decision-making the power of these highly organised private
interests is typically maximised (Andrews, 1980: 228). Such groups are, however, also
exposed to the immediate economic costs of environmental constraints that might be
imposed on them through EIA. Citizens and public interest groups represent the
interests of the wider public, which are mainly non-economic and generally relate to
concerns for environmental quality, and defend values that tend to be neglected by
private interest groups. Since project costs and benefits are not equally distributed
across a community, it became the task of scoping to capture the issues which are
significant to both the potential losers and winners of affected communities. This
required a commitment to procedural and distributive justice in order to maintain the
integrity of the EIA process (Barrett and Grizzle, 1999: 29). However, as Burdge and
Vanclay (1995: 47) explain, this presents environmental assessment with one of its
most complex dilemmas: Since communities are rarely static, the values, beliefs and
behaviours of members tend to shift continually as there is change and turnover in
populatlons." It is therefore difficult to establish whose views are entitled to be
established and which community views (many of which may not be clearly articulated)
are most legitimate. Since sustainability is a key element of the new paradigm in
environmental policy, the question also arises as to how to gauge the values of future
communities, who might not share project benefits but could inherit the costs
nevertheless (Burdge and Vanclay, 1995: 49).67
Methodological innovation in EIA acknowledged that social values are as diverse as the
individuals who constitute society, and recognised the major dichotomy between private
and public interests that need to be balanced in environmental decision-making.
66 Even within 'stable homogenous communities' differences in values and perceptions of community impact differ
between gender and race (Ross, 1985: 179).
67 In their interpretation of sustainability as non-declining welfare, Holland et al. (1996: 42-43) note that actual welfare or
happiness of a population is a function of a number of circumstances which cannot realistically be anticipated
or provided for; i.e. individual psychological disposition, cultural circumstances etc. The authors conclude that
these difficulties are serious when the welfare of the current generation is considered, but that they become
compounded when an attempt is made to provide for the welfare of future people.
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Recognizing the dilemma of understanding the definition of community in EIA, various
scoping techniques were developed in a pragmatic attempt to stratify the broad public
into interest groups and to extract the values and concerns articulated by such groupS.68
An approach to define the sphere of public involvement in EIA is described by Creighton
(1981: 201-202), for example, who suggests the following criteria to objectively define
the boundaries of a public participation programme: geographical proximity (to an action
of concern); economic winners (those who stand to gain from an action); users of the
resource/s (which might be affected by an action); winners and losers in a social
context." and value advocates, who may be geographically distant from the proposed
action. Examples of other definitions of public groups are provided by Wood (1978:
206), who introduces the concept of citizens' committees and neighbourhood
populations, and Canter (1996: 596-598), who identifies labour unions, sporting groups,
business and industrial groups, professional organisations, civic and non-governmental
organisations as some examples of the many public groupings.
The fragmentation of the social environment into discrete components for the purpose
of extracting diverse social values had a domino-effect on the development and
application of compatible impact evaluation methods. The aggregative techniques of the
1970s became less appropriate for impact assessment since they could not reveal to
the public and decision-makers the rationale and judgments upon which they were
based (Bisset, 1980; Hollick, 1981; Lee, 1982). One of the major constraints of
aggregation relates to the attachment of significance to impacts, which presupposes
both scientific consensus on theory and political consensus on value - neither of which
are readily available (Elliott, 1981: 16). In particular, aggregative techniques could not
analyze the distributional and equity effects of proposed actions on affected
. 68 Burdge and Vanclay (1995: 56) argue that a failing of the logical-positivist model of EIA is the assumption that the
social concerns of interested and affected parties who might be consulted in the course of scoping are derived
from a common perspective and common goals. It is suggested that this approach does not accommodate the
diverse social concerns (cultural issues, for example) that are not reducible to a form that is entirely suitable for
scientific enquiry or trade-off analysis in considering alternatives in impact evaluation. Assuming that scoping is
effective in terms of articulating and successfully prioritizing the values of different interest groups, EIA is then
exposed to one of its greatest dilemmas - which centres on the question of how to employ science to address
social values using the tools with which the discipline has equipped itself. TIlls issue was raised in Chapter 1.
69 Holmes Rolston (1994: 218) argues that win-lose solutions become redundant as the concept of sustainable
development is embraced; i.e. that economic growth and environmental protection should go hand-in-hand.
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communities (Westman, 1985: 162; Bacow, 1980: 121). With the infusion of public
participation into EIA, and the introduction of scoping as a key element of the
assessment process, evaluation techniques emerged which disaggregated public
values by indicating how various groups would benefit or lose as a result of the
assessed actions. Examples of such techniques include goals-achievement matrices,
which exposed the benefits and costs of impacts to various stakeholders in a
disaggregated form (McAllister, 1980: 164) and simple trade-off matrices, which
employed physical, monetary and qualitative evaluation units to assist the comparative
analysis of impacts affecting various public groups (Westman, 1985: 159).
The shift in emphasis toward disaggregating public values in impact analysis also
served to raise the level of methodological enquiry in EIA into the interpretation of
impact significance. As Westman (1985: 14) and Elliott (1981: 16) observe, the problem
with arriving at an objective definition of significance is that it is a normative term which
depends on the human values which are both applied and considered in its judgment in
various contexts. However, contrary to the positivist orientation with which EIA has been
labeled (Burdge and Vanclay 1995: 56), the assignment of impact significance has been
retained within the domain of EIA as a key criterion of impact analysis (Beaniands and
Duinker, 1982) and value judgements have not been assumed to be purely political and
external to the EIA process (Westman 1985: 15). For example, within the field of
ecology - as it is applied in EIA - ecological science was appreciated as an EIA tool
through which society can be assisted in appreciating the environment (ecosystems),
not only in terms of utility value, but (indirectly) intrinsic value as well - through its
employment to establish how ecosystem processes function and maintain system
integrity (Sagoff, 1985: 100).
Initially, the interpretation of NEPA was considered to apply only to physical, biological
and economic concerns; i.e. impacts on human populations were not seriously
considered to be a part of the environment (Burdge et al., 1994: 77; Barrow, 1997: 169).
However, quality of the human environment was incorporated as a NEPA provision in
the CEQ regulations that were published subsequent to NEPA's enactment, and this
ultimately led to the introduction of the formalised procedure of Social Impact
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Assessment (SlA). As Kuhn (1970a: 37, 50) would argue, the new environmental
paradigm which NEPA introduced was able to simultaneously determine more than one
tradition of normal science; i.e. whilst EIA was not able to fully reduce the analysis of
social impacts to a puzzle form that could be stated in terms of the discipline's tools, an
alternative location for solving the puzzle had been found within the domain of SlA.
Social Impact Assessment therefore grew out of a requirement to apply sociology and
related social sciences in an attempt to predict the social effects or consequences of
environmental alterations resulting from policy actions or development projects (Burdge
and Vanclay, 1995: 32, 34).70
In EIA, the disaggregation of the social environment from its greater environing context
had arisen in response to what Burdge and Vanclay (1995: 46, 55) describe as the
asocietal mentality of politicians, officials, physical scientists, engineers and many
economists and planners. These authors argue that the mindset derived from this
mentality is the antithesis of the social processes and social scientific theories and
methodologies which differ from the more familiar approaches adopted in the physical
sciences. This could be anticipated, since the history of EIA had presented the
discipline as one constructed upon a logical-positivist model of environmental analysis,
and the analytical reductionism that this introduces was well aligned with traditional
approaches to planning and policy development. This alignment contrasted with social
theory that is able to deal with cultural issues, such as the metaphysical dimension of
spirituality for example, which EIA could not address effectively with the methodology
that the discipline had accumulated along its evolutionary course. As a result of
ideological resistance, SlA tended to be excluded from EIA, which was considered to
70 The social consequences of policy actions and development projects include, for example, impacts which cause
changes to populations, individuals and families, community and institutional structures, community resources,
and political and social resources (Interorganisational Committee, 1994: 23). Other categories of social impacts
include: indicators of individual and community well-being (Branch et aI., 1984); and lifestyles, attitudes beliefs
and values, and social organisation (Taylor et aI., 1990). A range ofSIA methods are applied to predict the social
consequences of development and policy change - for example: the use ofQuant! I!!SocialLife Indicators (Olsen et
al., 1981); and comparative modeling, which extends historical evidence of social response to anticipated situations
(Burdge and Johnson, 1994). A review of some ofSIA methods is provided (inter alia) by Finsterbusch (1981)
and Burdge and Vanclay (1995).
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adequately address social issues." However, these were addressed only in a very
narrowly reduced form, where the focus was mainly on the analysis of anticipated
demographic changes and economic consequences of proposed developments on
affected communities (Burdge and Vanclay, 1995: 55).72
Failure to accept the need for SlA, and a tendency to reject or not take seriously the
results of such assessments, to a large extent marginalised the discipline from
mainstream environmental assessment, at least during the 1970s. However, as the
evolution of EIA entered its second decade, this trend was reversed and efforts were
initiated to begin the consolidation of social issues within a broader definition of the
environment and within a more holistic context of environmental issues addressed in
EIA (Sadler, 1996: 27). An important platform that assisted this process was the
founding of the International Association for Impact Assessment (lAlA) in 1981, which
provided an international forum for communication in the areas of research and practice
of EIA, SlA and other types of assessments (Burdge, 1994: 4).73 Following this,
progress in the development and application of SlA methodology appeared in the
environmental assessment textbooks of the 1980s, published alongside the record of
equivalent developments in EIA (for example: Boskma, 1986; Peters, 1986; Muth and
Lee, 1986 published in Becker and Porter, 1986). Research publications on SlA also
appeared in a similar context within the professional journals on environmental
assessment (for example: Branch, 1981; Ross, 1985; Gondolf and Wells, 1986; Burdge,
1987; Armour, 1988).
71 The general exclusion of SIA from the formalised procedure of EIA does not imply that social impacts of
development projects were ignored in all instances. There are several examples where high profile enquiries
were conducted into the social consequences of development projects. For example, Burdge (1994: 4) reviews
the case of the Canadian Mackenzie Valley pipeline project in which serious consideration was given to the
social impacts on native populations affected by this development.
72 This focus on economic issues was a natural tendency for impact assessment since they are easy to quantify and tend
to display visible rapid changes (Olshansky, 1981: 6).
73 Caldwell (2000: i) observes that the establishment of the IAIA in 1981 represents an extraordinarily rapid
professionalisation of impact assessment (and the incorporation of social assessment into the process) of world-
wide dimensions.
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Since the 1980s, the contribution that SlA could make to environmental assessment
began to receive acknowledgment and a widespread consensus emerged that human
or social impacts should be considered as part of the environment. Thus, SlA started to
become fully integrated into the EIA process and into the greater planning and political
process as well (Burdge and Vanclay, 1995: 60-61). Although EIA and SlA research
during the 1970s had been individually guided by the new environmental paradigm
without reduction to a common set of rules (vide Kuhn, 1970a: 43, 44), research output
within the arena of environmental assessment during the 1980s revealed that what had
been abstracted from the global paradigm did in fact translate into common rules.
These rules demanded greater attention to be directed at environmental consolidation
with a greaterfocus on the social dimension in EIA.74In making this complex transition,
there was also the recognition that an equally complex challenge also had to be
resolved, which was the application of impact assessment at the level of ecosystemic
wholes.
2.3.2.2 Paradigm consolidation: the re-aggregation of ecosystemic wholes
Environmental consolidation during the 1980s was not limited only to the social
dimension of EIA, but is also reflected in ecosystem and landscape level approaches to
environmental assessment (Sadler, 1996: 27). Ecological impact assessment originated
as a specialist field of EIA in response to global concerns pertaining to the risk of
irreversible damage to ecosystem functions that could be essential to human well-being
(Treweek, 1995: 171). The catalyst for such concern at this time was the developing
debate concerning biodiversity conservation and the principles of sustainable
development (International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(IUCN), 1980; World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987).
Whilst the challenge of dealing with environmental complexity remained formidable, EIA
during the 1980s shifted toward a broader, more integrative approach that extended
74 The procedural steps in the Social Impact Assessment model, which are outlined byBurdge and Vanclay (1995:41-42),
are the same as those that are broadly accepted for EIA; i.e. the incorporation of the social dimension into the
definition of environment has introduced a commonality in the rules for environmental assessment.
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beyond institutional and legal parameters of environmental protection, such as
adherence to environmental standards for example. Attention was directed at the
effects of human activities on the overall composition, structure and functioning of
natural ecosystems and at analyzing the consequences of human actions on ecosystem
integrity and productivity (Westman, 1985: 4). Although this might also have been an
objective of EIA during the 1970s, its achievement was constrained by the extension of
a largely descriptive ecological literature into the predictive mode required of EIA
(Westman, 1985: 3); i.e. ecology as an component of EIA could not be employed to
withstand rigorous scientific testing (Bisset, 1988: 59). This deficiency was partly
resolved through the development of several major ecological theories and analytical
techniques just prior to and during the 1970s that began to find application in EIA in the
following decades. Some examples of these developments include: the theory of island
biogeography developed by MacArthur and Wilson (1967) and others; the emergence of
conservation biology as a defined field of ecology; and, as described by Norton (1984b),
ecological systems analysis, which was developed as a predictive tool for modelling the
functioning of ecosystems.
Ecological impact assessment is described as the formal process of defining,
quantifying and evaluating the potential impacts of defined actions on natural
ecosystems, as these exist and are influenced by humans (Treweek, 1995: 172). Such
assessment is contingent upon an understanding of ecosystem composition and
structure and the functional processes which link ecosystem components (habitat
relationships, nutrient cycling, energy flow etc.). The baseline situation upon which the
impacts of proposed actions can be superimposed and evaluated is assessed by
means of habitat surveys, taxonomic classifications etc., which are used to inventorise
ecosystem composition. Structural attributes of ecosystems that might be quantified in
baseline analyses could include variables such as species richness and diversity, whilst
analysis of functional attributes could include productivity, rates of colonisation and
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extinction etc. (Noss, 1990).75Quantification of ecosystem functioning is a complex task
which is rarely achieved in EIA, although modelling can be applied in data-rich and well
researched environments, from which inferential rules can be derived for selected
application elsewhere.
Various analysis techniques are employed in ecological impact assessment. For
example, remotely sensed resource information has been processed using
Geographical Information Systems (GISs) to create overlay series that highlight areas
where the anticipated risk of ecological impact is likely to be greatest, or cumulative
impacts are likely to arise (Fuller and Parcel, 1990).76GIS is also useful for determining
quantitative indices based on spatial attributes which might be related to functional
aspects of landscape ecology, including: fragmentation indices, which are important in
terms of species dispersal distances; patch size analyses; and edge:interior ratio
calculations (Treweek, 1995: 177). Flowcharts and network methods of impact
prediction are commonly used to identify chains and webs of impact and illustrate
knock-on effects from primary impacts (Morris, 1995: 215). In situations where
ecosystem functioning is well understood, modelling techniques have been used to
describe relationships between ecosystem components, processes and impact cause-
effects relationships, which permit the focus of impact analysis to be directed at impact-
ecosystem linkages which are of greatest consequence (Shopley et ai., 1990).
Impact prediction in ecological assessment is generally determined by means of
comparison between an anticipated impacted state (or measured state in the case of
monitoring) and reference standards, such as existing background states or the
threshold states at which species or ecosystem functioning are expected to be
jeopardised (Treweek, 1995: 179). Beyond this positive application of scientific theory
75 A typical failing of ecological baseline assessments in EIA is to define conditions that capture the inherent temporal
and spatial variability of natural systems (Beanlands and Duinker, 1983). Baseline conditions are never static
and change seasonally and in response to natural processes such as ecological succession (Morris, 1995: 211).
Snapshot surveys, which compromise the accuracy of ecological assessments, are often employed in EIA due to
schedule and budget constraints (Morris, 1995: 198, 208)
76 Constraint mapping is a baseline survey technique used to identify all known ecological constraints within a selected
area of search, often using GIS (Morris, 1995: 223).
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and analytical methodology, the assignment of impact significance enters the normative
dimension of ecology, through which moral value judgments determine which, and at
what level of integrity, ecosystem attributes 'ought' to be maintained (Norton, 1984b:
233).77This subjective and inherently political process tends to be grounded in policy-
aims, national legislation or international conventions (Morris, 1995: 200); alternatively,
it might be influenced by socio-economic considerations, or simply reflect the opinion of
the impact assessor (Gilpin, 1995: 7).78
The use of impact analysis methods which can satisfy statistically valid interpretations of
impact significance is generally not possible in EIA due to the lack of scope for sample
randomisation, replication and control surveys (Eberhardt, 1976; Smith et al., 1993).
However, provided analysis limitations are made explicit (Culhane et al., 1987),
quantified time-series impact predictions can be derived and expressed as hypotheses
which can be tested using monitoring data (Duinker, 1987; Buckley, 1991 ).79
Environmental quality models, which use community species composition as a sensitive
indicator of environmental stress (Cairns and Niederlehner, 1993), indices of biotic
integrity (Karr, 1991), habitat suitability indices, and limits of acceptable change are
examples of approaches used in various applications of ecological impact assessment.
Whilst ecological impact assessment is rarely employed to full effect at the project level
of environmental assessment, typically due to the constraints of assessing cumulative
77 Although ultimately normative in the sense that humans attach values of significance to ecological impacts at a first
order level of assessment, a second order level of objectivity is introduced into the assessment process through
the use of various ecological evaluation methods such aspnonry ranking and composite indices (Spellerberg, 1992).
78 Ultimately, the assessment of ecological impact significance is derived from trade-offs between human preferences.
The normative dimension of ecology derives from its power to inform the selection of particular ecological
outcomes as these may be affected by human actions; eg. the selection of different project alternatives and
impact mitigation options. The fluidity between the positive and normative dimensions of ecology introduces
the greatest source of inconsistency in the application and effectiveness of ecological impact assessment
(pritchard, 1993). Even where the aim of ecological evaluation is to identify the intrinsic value of nature
(Gilpin, 1995: 42), it is argued that there can be no value without a valuer (Callicott, 1996);i.e.which introduces
the normative dimension of ecological assessment.
79 Hypothesis generation, testing and re-formulation (insofar as this relates to ecological impact analysis) are consistent
with the approach adopted in Environmental Management Systems (lSO 14001, for example), which aims to
achieve continual improvement in environmental management performance. A management system approach
permits the re-formulation and re-testing of hypotheses that are found to be invalid on the basis of monitoring
data (Buckley, 1991); i.e. remedial action can be employed to mitigate impacts where circumstances permit.
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or long-term effects, it is in the arena of higher order policy and planning initiatives that
this tool for environmental assessment has most potential to inform decision-making. At
the level of regional planning for example, integrated modeling of development impacts
becomes possible, which can take into account the full sphere of development patterns,
cumulative and interactive effects and ecosystem responses (Contant and Wiggins,
1991). Only at such a scale is predictive analysis possible, which can place the impacts
of alternative planning scenarios in the context of existing or expected environmental
conditions, and simultaneously provide a rational basis for translating principles of
biodiversity conservation, for example, into measurable ecological attributes, such as
carrying capacity, minimum viable population sizes, etc. (Treweek, 1995: 186). In this
respect, recent developments in environmental assessment, such as the introduction of
Strategic Environmental Assessment (discussed later), provide greater opportunity for
the more effective application of ecological impact assessment.
2.3.2.3 Paradigm extension through its global diffusion
The anomaly and crisis in environmental policy that triggered the introduction of NEPA
in the US existed at the same time in most Western countries (Sadler, 1996: 26). The
exponential rate of growth in technology and the dominance of narrow economic
determinism within the developed world had created environmental problems of such
magnitude that their resolution was impossible within the bounds of existing policy
mechanisms, and the environment, therefore, became a globally important political
issue (Carpenter, 1981: 176). In the tradition of scientific revolution, since traditional
rules could no longer define a playable game (Kuhn, 1970a: 76, 90), a new paradigm
that proved capable of solving the problems it defined was quickly embraced, and the
tools that it offered (i.e. EIA methodology) were employed with little hesitation as
allegiance to the new paradigm was secured." Kuhn (1970a: 168) argues that such
allegiance provides an essential confirmation of the status of a new paradigm, since the
80 Although NEPA served as the most important catalyst and template for the introduction ofElA in countries outside
the US (Manheim, 1994: 43; Barrow, 1997: 170), several other initiatives accelerated its global institutionalisation.
The first of these, which endorsed a number of principles pertaining to ElA, was the 1972 United Nations
Conferenceon the Human Environment in Stockholm (Gilpin, 1995: 9). Other initiatives launched during the 1980s,
which promoted NEPA's central theme of sustainable development, included the lUCN's World Conservation
Strate/!J and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).
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solutions that it offers must be accepted as solutions by many. EIA, which promised to
become an effective action-forcing mechanism of the new environmental paradigm in
the US, diffused rapidly into the environmental policies and institutions of the developed
world and significantly extended the paradigm's sphere of impact (Wandesforde-Smith,
1980: 53).81
EIA was first applied on a test basis in Canada at about the same time as NEPA's
enactment, and it is now considered to have the most advanced application in this
country (Barrow, 1997: 170, 174).82 At about the same time in Europe (the most
industrialised centre beyond North America) it was recognised that environmental
concerns were inseparable from most other policy areas, and consequently, the
European Economic Community formulated a series of agreements pertaining to
environmental protection (Gilpin, 1995: 74).83 These agreements emphasised
preventive action, particularly about pollution, land misuse and the production of waste,
and by 1977 investigations were initiated into how appropriate environmental impact
procedures might be introduced into the European Community (EC) (Gilpin, 1995: 74).
In 1985 the concept of environmental impact statements was proposed for
consideration by EC members in cases pertaining projects that could cause significant
effects on the environment, and by 1989 the proposal became a requirement for
inclusion in national legislation of member countries (Burdge, 1994: 4).84 In the UK, the
81 The political systems within which EIA has been taken up varies between countries. Some are in the form of
mandatory and enforceable regulations, acts or statutes; others require EIA at the discretion of administering
agencies; and yet others incorporate EIA as unenforceable guidelines, with some form of obligation imposed on
the administering agencies (Glasson et al., 1994: 34). According to Partidário and Clark (2000: 3) more than 80
countries have passed legislation that requires a full accounting of the likely impacts of development decisions.
82 Other countries of similar status to Canada in terms of the advanced application of environmental assessment include
Australia and the Netherlands, whilst Sweden and Norway are also considered to be progressive users ofEIA
(Barrow, 1997: 170).
83 Similar initiatives were adopted by the Council ofNordic Ministers. In 1990, for example, the Council initiated a review of
EIA procedures in order to introduce analysis and assessment of environmental impacts as a natural element in
all sectoral planning and in decision-making at all levels (Gilpin, 1995: 76).
84 A flaw in the European Community directive pertaining to EIA is the recognition that there are certain classes of
exemption; for example, projects that are adopted by specific Acts oflegislation, and projects serving national
defence purposes. The directive is also confined to projects and is not extended to programmes and policies;
however, at the 1992 UN Conferenceon Environment and Development, the European Commission stated the necessity
to extend the EIA principle upstream to the policy-making and planning stages of development (Gilpin, 1995:
76).
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formal adoption of environmental impact analysis was initially viewed as an
unnecessary and/or bureaucratic supplement to existing land-use planning systems,
and was seen to present a risk of retarding development if implemented on a broad
scale." A strategy was, therefore, adopted to first assess the success of environmental
assessment initiatives in other European countries (BreakelI and Glasson, 1981: 15).
However, EIA became legally entrenched in the UK following the publication of the EC
directive, which led to the 1992 enactment of the Environmental Protection Act of 1990
(Wood and Jones, 1992: 115).
National principles for EIA that have been developed in countries such as Canada and
Australia capture the most important elements of the evolutionary advancement in EIA,
in particular an increased emphasis on public participation (Gilpin, 1995: 10). In
contrast, the application of EIA in some countries, such as the UK, carries certain
deficiencies in this respect, particularly relating to the incorporation of public
participation late in the process of environmental appraisal (O'Riordan, 1981: 99;
Barrow, 1997: 182). Similar deficiencies apply in other developed countries beyond
Europe. For example, in Japan effective public involvement is constrained by autocratic
decision-making and the lack of serious enforcement of principles for environmental
assessment due to the precedence of economic growth over concem for environmental
quality (Gilpin, 1995: 134-136; Barrow, 1997: 177; Barrett and Therivel, 1989).
Beyond the developed world, growth in foreign investment and development increased
rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s as developing countries in emerging areas of Asia,
Latin America and, to a lesser extent Africa, exploited their resources and environment
to achieve economic growth (Carpenter, 1981: 187). However, as the undesirable
environmental consequences associated with this development became apparent, the
complicity of multilateral finance institutions, which were involved in various levels of
support underlying this growth, came under the scrutiny of non-governmental
organisations and other concerned parties (Katvis, 1997: 3). Extending Kuhn's theory
85 O'Riordan (1981b: 90) explains the delayed statutory entrenchment of EIA in the UK as an endemic political trait
through which affairs are dealt with in a co-operative manner, which accommodates flexibility and due regard
to the relative merits of each circumstance.
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pertaining to the role of normal science in puzzle-solving, failure in investment policy to
achieve the intended aims of investment in these countries could be largely attributed to
a disregard for the rules introduced by the new global paradigm in environmental policy,
which disqualified the finance institutions from deriving solutions which the paradigm
could provide (Kuhn, 1970a: 38).
Although the world's dominant multilateral lending institution, the World Bank, had
looked peripherally at the environmental impact of development in the early 1970s, and
had issued internal guidelines for environmental appraisal of projects (World Bank,
1974), the introduction of EIA into the early phase of project planning had been difficult
to achieve (Barrow, 1997: 204). As a consequence, many Bank-funded projects failed
due to environmental problems, caused in many instances by incongruencies between
the development rationale and the social and cultural traditions of affected communities.
This failure led to accusations that the Bank had neglected its original mission of
alleviating poverty, and that it had demonstrated a disregard for the environmental
impacts of development-funded projects (Gilpin, 1995: 84).86
During the mid-1970s, US aid agencies were forced to apply environmental impact
assessment procedures to their foreign activities, largely as a result of citizen protest
and in response to legal actions which were instituted against them (Carpenter, 1981:
177). In this context, an executive order issued by the CEQ in 1979 required
environmental assessments to inform decision-making pertaining to actions associated
with US aid which could affect (inter alia) the global environmental commons and the
natural or ecological resources of the participating nations, which might be considered
to be of global importance (Carpenter, 1981: 178, 179; Barrow, 1997: 170; Gilpin, 1995:
118). In 1974, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (DECO)
86 The World Bank is a lead agency of the United Nations. It is comprised of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD) and its affiliates, the International Development Association (IDA), the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). These institutions have
a common objective which is to raise the standards of living in developing countries by channeling financial
resources, in awide range of financing techniques, from the more developed countries to the developing world
(Gilpin, 1995: 84). The IBRD was created by agreements negotiated at an international monetary conference
held at Breton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944, a year before the San Francisco conference creating the
United Nations (Kotvis, 1997: 5).
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investigated the application of environmental impact assessment procedures on a
global scale for bilateral aid projects initiated by member governments, and EIA
guidelines were later issued to this effect (Kennedy, 1985: 285; Barrow, 1997: 205;
DECO, 1979, 1991 ).87 Partly as a consequence of this initiative, the World Bank had, by
the end of the 1980s, formalised a policy of early incorporation of environmental
considerations into the project cycle for funding applications and many of its projects
were re-designed or canceled as a result of the more effective application of EIA (Gilpin,
1995: 84; Barrow, 1997: 204). Taking their cue from the World Bank's public
commitment to apply EIA in project appraisal, other lending institutions such as the
Asian Development Bank, also began to incorporate environmental and social impact
assessment more effectively into their appraisal procedures (Burdge, 1994: 5; Barrow,
1997: 204; Gilpin, 1995: 84; Biswas and Agarwala, 1992: 178-183).
In the absence of political systems in developing countries equivalent to those which
served as the catalyst for the introduction of NEPA in the US, for example, the forces of
participatory democracy and freedom of information laws (Barrow, 1997: 206), change
in environmental policy in these countries was largely effected via international financing
and donor activities (Barrow, 1997: 171 ).88 However, this process was also assisted by
initiatives such as UNEP's extension programmes in environmental assessment
(Horberry, 1983: 98; 1985: 210; Gilpin, 1995: 82-83), which enabled EIA to be widely
promoted by international agencies in their various global activities (Gilpin, 1995: 8;
Biswas and Agarwala, 1992: 168-177). From a situation during the 1970s where only
nine governments of developing countries had formally accommodated environmental
assessment into their policies and governing institutions, virtually all governments of
developing countries have now done so (Barrow, 1997: 206), either through the
87 The OECD succeeded the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, which was set up in 1948 to allocate aid
received under the European Recovery Programme. The objectives of the OECD are to: achieve the highest
sustainable growth in member countries and thus contribute to the development of the world economy;
contribute to sound economic expansion in member, as well as non-member, countries; and contribute to the
expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminating basis (Gilpin, 1995: 78).
88 The requirement of environmental impact assessment by donor agencies is generally viewed as an interim option for
dealing with the environmental issues facing developing countries. For example, Hartje (1985) argues that these
countries need to develop their own integrated assessment systems.
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introduction of new legislation or by strengthening elements of existing practices and
legislation (vide Brown et aI., 1991: 146-149).
Based on the preceding discussion, the distinguishable pattern in the evolution of EIA
during its second decade is one of consolidation, both in terms of methodology and its
global application. In the most significant area of consolidation, EIA ceased to be merely
environmental in the bio-physical sense of definition, but began to address the social
context necessary for holistically informed decision-making. In addition, the impact of
human development on ecosystemic wholes began to receive attention as the
interconnectedness between the bio-physical dimensions of the environment became
increasingly recognised - not only nationally, but globally. During the 1980s, solutions to
scientific inadequacies in EIA were addressed through the introduction of emerging
principles and methods, particularly those derived within the discipline of ecology.
Although not discussed in this section, the attention to scientific method was also
matched by refinement and innovation in the technical aspects of EIA, as evidenced
through the proliferation of impact assessment derivatives, such as risk analysis and
technology assessment, to name but two examples (Graham Smith, 1993: 10-11).
Although the many developments in EIA may be considered as having advanced its
effectiveness during the 1980s, improvement in the science and global application of
impact assessment did little to reform the political processes of resource management
that govern how the information derived from EIA was utilised (Graham Smith, 1993:
11). However, this situation was to change during the 1990s as the global implications
of unsustainable development on human well-being in both developed and undeveloped
countries became apparent, and attention was increasingly focused on the opportunity
to develop new tools and approaches to environmental assessment and management
to reverse this situation.
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2.3.3 Maintaining paradigm validity under the increasingly stringent requirements of
sustainable development: the third decade in the evolutionary development of
environmental assessment
The previous section concluded with a discussion of the global diffusion and replication
of established EIA process and methodology that occurred during the 1980s largely in
response to the actions of individual governments and the individual activities of finance
and aid institutions operating in developing countries. According to Kuhn (1970a: 23-25)
a paradigm is rarely an object for such simple replication. Rather, it becomes an object
for further articulation and specification under new and more stringent conditions that
arise as the paradigm is required to resolve problems with a greater degree of precision
and in an increasingly wider scope of situations.
The period extending from the late 1980s into the early 1990s introduced two initiatives
of global significance in the policy arena, which presented the more stringent context
that would determine the evolution of EIA during its third decade. The first of these
initiatives was a report prepared for the UN by the World Commission on Environment
and Development, which was titled Our common future (WCED, 1987); and the second
initiative was the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Earth
Summit).89 This section opens with a review of the impact which these initiatives have
had in terms of promoting a global partnership between the developed and developing
worlds in terms of allegiance to the new paradigm of integrating environmental,
economic and social policy. This is followed by a review of some of the most important
developments in environmental assessment which are associated with the new concept
of sustainable development as it has been promoted during the 1990s.
89 These initiatives were preceded by the much lower profile World Conservation Strategy initiated by the IU eN in 1980,
which advanced sustainability as a strategic approach to the integration of conservation and development in
order to achieve: ecosystem maintenance; the preservation of genetic diversity; and the sustainable utilisation of
resources.
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2.3.3.1 Global allegiance to the concept of sustainable development
The ideal of sustainable development has long existed as a grounding principle
supporting the paradigm in environmental policy first introduced in the US through
NEPA and later extended through programmes such as the IUeN's World Conservetion
Strategy and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). However, as a
global concept, itwas pushed into centre stage in 1987 in response to the publication of
Our common future, which concluded that a rapid deterioration of the global
environment was threatening life on earth and that decisive political action was needed
to ensure human survival (WeED, 1987).90 In this respect, the core ideas of sustainable
development radically challenge the dominant paradigm in terms of which the world's
economy, patterns of production, consumption and distribution are organised (Hattingh,
2000: 15). The central objective that is proposed in Our common future is the reversal in
environmental deterioration and a sustained increase in the global level of human
welfare - which requires political transformation aimed at the achievement of
sustainable development (Gilpin, 1995: 10). This is defined as "development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their needs" (WeED, 1987: 43).91
Viewed in the light of predicted growth in global population, Brown and Lemons (1995:
1) summarise the following trends in environmental deterioration which Our common
future identifies: the desertification of productive land; global warming caused by an
increase in greenhouse gases; loss of the protective ozone layer due to the effect of
gaseous industrial emissions; and pollution of freshwater resources.f As important as
90 As noted by Gilpin (1995: 9), the possibility of natural resource constraints to human development and population
growth dates to at least the emergence of Malthusian theory. Contained within this theory is the observation
that a geometric relationship explains global population increase whereas the means of subsistence only
increases according to an arithmetic relationship; i.e. population dynamics outstrip the means of feeding
capability if not constrained by vice, misery or self-restraint. Examples of the interventionary models proposed
by Hardin (1968) and Heilbroner (1974), which are aligned with the Malthusian self restraint option, are
discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.2).
91 Although Callicott et al (2000: 28) suggest that this definition does not differentiate between genuine human needs and
superfluous wants, in essence the concept of sustainable development is generally viewed as highlighting the
need to provide for basic human needs and advocating inter-generational equity as an overriding ethic (Dovers,
1990: 299)
92 Modem technology is considered to lie at the root of the problems of unsustainable development, insofar as it is causal
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the scientific evidence upon which the trends in environmental degradation are based,
is the emphasis articulated in Our common future on the interrelatedness of the
problems of population growth, industrial and social development, poverty and the
depletion of natural resources" i.e. it is this interrelatedness of environmental issues
which has raised sustainable development to a position of political priority throughout
the world (Brown and Lemons, 1995: 2).
Since environmental and economic problems are a function of social and political
factors which extend between nations, unilateral solutions which are of an ad hoc and
technical nature cannot be effective (Graham Smith, 1993: 4-5); i.e. sustainability is a
global concept which touches and binds all countries and levels of society which may
individually be intent on achieving internal sustainability (Attfield, 1999: 1, 2, 10). The
philosophy of sustainable development therefore calls for a change in the course of
development, aligned with cross-cutting development programmes built upon the
achievement of integrated environmental, economic and social objectives in an
unprecedented global partnership between the developed and developing worlds
(Brown and Lemons, 1995: 4).94This will need to occur against the backdrop of existing
uneven patterns in the distribution of resources, industrial power and technology, which
divides the two worlds and will need to shift current trends in development practice
which give rise to economic and social division. It also requires allegiance to a concept
quite foreign to the present growth-acclimated world (Meadows et al., 1992: 10). The
urgency of such change is stressed by Daly (1990: 5) who argues that "as growth in the
to the explosion in world population, urbanisation, industrialisation and economies, and to the parallel increase
in pollution and famine (Graham Smith, 1993: 4). The environmental issues and trends in environmental
degradation identified in Our common future are also described in Section 3.2 as 3rd generation environmental problems.
93 The global ramifications of poverty, for example, begin with the local overexploitation and depletion of resources as a
course of necessity for the affected communities of poor countries. As these resources are exhausted, a reliance
develops on resource exports which creates a dependency on the developed world markets (WeED, 1987: 67-
89). This occurs in a spiral of resource depletion that - since all communities share the same earth - ultimately
affects the future of the whole world (Graham Smith, 1993: 4). In his advocacy of a lifeboat ethics, Hardin (1974)
warns of the spiral of resource depletion that accompanies external dependencies to which poverty gives rise.
Hardin's description of the trage4Y of the commons is discussed in Section 3.2.
94 In supporting a tri-axial model of sustainability constructed upon social, economic and environmental objectives, Goodland
and Daly (1995: 307) suggest that enabling conditions such as democracy, human resource development,
empowerment of women and much more investment in human capital will be essential if sustainable
development is to be achieved.
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physical dimensions of the human economy pushes beyond the optimal scale relative to
the biosphere, [thisl in fact makes us [aliI poorer".95
Although the central theme of sustainable development is commonly understood to
imply that environmental protection and continuing economic growth have to be viewed
as mutually compatible rather than conflicting objectives (Jacobs, 1999: 21; Turner,
1988: 5), considerable divergency exists with respect to what the concept of
sustainability involves in practice (Graham Smith, 1993: 3). Our common future provides
no prescriptive rules of action when there are conflicts among environmental, economic
and social goals - a deficiency which Brown and Lemons (1995:5) illustrate when they
query what is to be sustained under the concept of sustainable development: animals?
ecosystems? people? jobs? cultures? ways of life?
Sustainable development is a term that has been used to mean different things and
thus any broadly acceptable definition will always remain elusive (Barrow, 1997: 7;
Barrett and Grizzle, 1999: 25). As a consequence, this has spawned much debate and
a proliferation of theory within and between the disciplines and interest groups who are
party to its implementation. Much of the dialogue on sustainable development is
concerned with distinctions between, for example, different forms of sustainability,
sustainable utilisation, sustainable growth etc. However, Shearman (1990: 1-3) argues
that it is the implied meaning of the concept of sustainability for any given context within
which it is applied which is important, and that debate needs to be focused on the
issues implied by sustainability rather than the issue of sustainability itself. For example,
a concept such as sustainable yield has long been applied in the area of renewable
biological resources, where sustainability implies using the incremental increase without
reducing the total physical stock. In this context, sustainable yield aims to maintain
essential ecological processes, to preserve genetic diversity and to maintain and
9S Present levels of per capita resource consumption in developed countries are judged to exceed the bounds of bio-
physical possibility and cannot be extended to all people of current (and future) generations without liquidating
the capital on which future economic activity depends (Goodland and Daly, 1995: 303); i.e. continuation of
present development and economic policies will both destroy ecosystems and increase poverty and disparities
between the rich and poor (Brown and Lemons, 1995: 4). In contrast, sustainable societies and processes are
capable of being maintained indefinitely and undermine neither themselves, nor the segments of nature on
which societies depend, nor a potentially sustainable world system (Attfield, 1999: 1).
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enhance environmental qualities relevant to productivity (Gilpin, 1995: 9).96 In an
economic context, positions of strong sustainability regard human-made and natural
capital as complementary in most production functions and imply the need to maintain
the two forms of capital intact separately (Goodland and Daly, 1995: 305).97 Further
discussion of the internal tensions within the concept of sustainable
developmenUsustainability will be provided in Chapter 5.
The extent to which the recent evolutionary development of environmental assessment
has been able to respond to the imperative of sustainable development can be judged
by considering some examples of developments in the practice of environmental
assessment since the beginning of the 1990s.
2.3.3.2 Evolutionary response to the concept of sustainable development
The present scale and rate of global environmental deterioration are explained by DalaI-
Clayton and Sadler (1998a: 31; 1998b: 3) as the key vectors which have directed the
evolutionary shift in environmental assessment towards a position of greater influence
in terms of integrating an ecological dimension into plans, programmes and policies and
elevating this on a par with social and economic considerations; i.e. to strengthen the
role of ecological issues in strategic decision-making (Sadler and Baxter, 1997; Tonk
and Verheem, 1998: 1). Impact assessment has always been viewed as a promising
tool to support sustainable development (Barrow, 1997: 6); however, the need has
arisen for the expansion of the scope of traditional approaches to impact assessment
from project scale to policy, plans and programmes, including regional and sector-based
scales of assessment (CSIR, 2001: 2). In this respect, one of the most significant
developments to the global imperative of sustainable development has been the
emergence of Strategie Environmental Assessment (Van der Vorst et al., 1999;
96 In a somewhat different explanation of the concept of sustainable yield, Jacobs (1999: 32) suggests that it is related to
the non-environmental idea of 'sustainable income'.
97 The economic position of strong sustainability contrasts that adopted by proponents of technology as the panacea of
human welfare who subscribe to weak sustainability, where the focus is on the maintenance of total capitalwith an
emphasis on the substitutability of its constituent components of human-made and natural capital (Goodland and
Daly, 1995: 305).
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Devuyst, 2000).98The appeal of the strategic character of SEA is defined by its potential
upstream impact in terms of promoting sustainable development in decision-making
hierarchies and cycles (Brown and Thérivel, 1998: 1; Eggenberger, 1998: 1,3).99 SEA
is proactive in its purpose of informing policies, plans and programmes, unlike project
EIA which is essentially reactive to development proposals (Wiseman, 2000: 164;
Rossouwet ai., 2000; CSIR, 1999; Thérivel et ai., 1992: 23).
SEA provides a mechanism for integrating environmental goals and principles into the
plans, programmes and policies that might shape a multitude of overlapping and
subordinate initiatives (Thérivel and Partidário, 1996: 5). In this respect, SEA is able to
address the cumulative effects that result from multiple actions and stresses cutting
across policy and ecological boundaries. It is also a mechanism for addressing higher-
order questions and testing alternatives such as whether, where and what type of
sectoral or regional development should be promoted given an understanding of the
opportunities and constraints which the social, economic and ecological elements of the
environment impose on development (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 1998a: 34; CSIR,
1999; Wiseman, 1997).100
A set of SEA principles has emerged to capture its essential consistency in purpose
whilst dealing with its diversity of application and thus the need for flexibility in
methodology; i.e. the principles focus more on the goals to be achieved via the
assessment process than any specified requirements pertaining to methodology (Tonk
and Verheem, 1998: 3). It is recognised that to be effective SEA methodologies have to
be integrated with, set in the context of and add value to existing planning (particularly
98 Sadler (personal communication, October 2001) explains that SEA emerged from itsformative stage during the 1970s
and 1980s and entered a formalisation stage during the 1990s. It is currently in an expansion phase.
99 In practice, SEA has been applied most effectively at the level of programmes and plans but has yet to be seriously
applied at the higher level of national policy development. Dalal-Clayton and Sadler (1998a:39) attribute this to
an inherent political and bureaucratic reluctance to embrace a process that has the potential to constrain
opportunism in political decision-making.
100 Although the implementation of SEA is gaining momentum globally, this has not been without problems. In this
respect, Partidário and Clark (2000: 4) refer to the search by practitioners for indisputable justification
arguments for SEA where its scope of application is currently rather undefined and conflicting with other
evaluation procedures such as EIA.
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spatial planning), policy, institutional and organisational processes (Brown and Thérivel,
1998: 5; Eggenberger, 1998: 7). Whilst there is no single methodology that can be
applied to achieve this, a general principle that characterises environmental assessment
at the strategic level requires the identification of sustainability or environmental
objectives/targets (Thérivel and Partidário, 1996: 30). These tend to be broad and
cross-cutting objectives which extend beyond the traditional subject focus of particular
plans, programmes and policies and emerge as new or substitute options which expose
conflicts and clarify interlinkages between objectives (Brown and Thérivel, 1998: 3).101
In this respect, SEA objectives typically define chosen levels of environmental quality or
limits of acceptable change (CSIR, 1999).102Once identified, the objectives are linked
through the SEA process to indicators that are used to test their attainment, describe
the baseline environment, make impact predictions and monitor the effect and
effectiveness of the plan, programme or policy. Within the framework of this general
approach, it is widely recognised that different SEA methodologies are required for
different situations. This is particularly relevant to policy assessment where an
understanding of the key leverage points in the policy-making cycle and the specific
politics of decision-making is fundamentally important to the effectiveness of SEA
(Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 1998a: 39; Brown and Thérivel, 1998: 3).
Sustainability Assessment is another development in the field of environmental
assessment that has emerged in reaction to the global allegiance to the concept of
sustainable development. Like SEA, it is an approach to environmental assessment that
recognises the need for new ways of dealing with sustainability issues - issues that are
beyond the scope of delivery that traditional EIA can offer.
101 Although it is an essential element of SEA, setting environmental objectives or targets is problematic for a number of
reasons. These include the frequent lack of baseline information to which objectives must ultimately be linked
and the impact of external factors which are either beyond the sphere of influence of a policy, plan or
programme or which can only be accommodated through complex political and economic trade-offs (Thérivel
and Partidário, 1996: 32).
102 Whilst it is the aim of SEA to define levels of environmental quality and limits of acceptable change, this pre-
supposes a level of substantiation and predictive certainty that seldom exists (CSIR, 1999).
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A definition of Sustainability Assessment is provided by Devuyst (2000) who describes it
as an approach to identifying, predicting and evaluating potential impacts of an initiative
and its alternatives on the sustainable development of society. Unlike SEA, which is
currently practiced as a method that has found its place of application through testing
and practice, no firm method of Sustainability Assessment has yet been developed and
become established. In this respect, it is not yet employed, in the formal sense, as a
tool for environmental assessment in the same way that SEA is applied. An approach to
operationalise the concept of Sustainability Assessment is proposed by CSIR (2001: 9)
and if adopted, this could result in its elevation to the status of a tool of preference for
guiding the achievement of sustainable development in South Africa. The proposed
approach draws on the Bellagio Principles [Stirling (1999) after Hardi and Zdan (1997)],
and focuses on the following aspects: the appraisal of sustainability is seen as a social
process, not an analytical act; recognition of the intrinsic subjectivity involved in
prioritizing the dimensions of sustainability; acknowledgment of the predictive looseness
that uncertainty and ignorance will always introduce into sustainability assessment;
acknowledgment of the multiple aspects of sustainability; the assignation of priority to
societal participation; and, attention directed at portfolios of options rather than the
quest for a best option.
An important trend in the environmental sustainability discourse of the 1980s, which
expanded in significance during the 1990s to influence the evolutionary development of
environmental assessment, was a shift in focus to the issue of environmental civil rights.
Hartley (1995: 277) traces the emergence of environmental justice onto the platform of
US environmental policy debate to the early 1980s when enquiry was first triggered into
the environmental discrimination suffered by racial minorities (environmental racism) as
well as low-income communities (United Church of Christ, 1987).103
103 The 1982 catalyst incident described by Hartley (1995: 277-279), which resulted in the emergence of environmental
justice as a significant determinant of US environmental policy, was the large scale community mobilisation in
Warren County, North Carolina which challenged an environmentally racist decision to locate a hazardous
waste site in close proximity to a socio-economically disadvantaged community.
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Hartley (1995: 282) attributes the origin of environmental discrimination in society to the
influence of hedonistic utilitarianism and the imbalance that this creates between utility
and justice. According to utilitarian principles decisions must favour those options that
will benefit society to the extent that perceived gains outweigh anticipated losses.
However, this neoclassical economic calculus, which focuses largely on the
achievement of aggregate gain, places little emphasis on distributional issues and
mitigatory processes whereby the winners favoured by such aggregation might
compensate the losers. Compensation rarely occurs in practice (Freeman, 1986: 218),
and the issue of preference substitutability that can theoretically be brokered through
compensation mechanisms (eg. economic upliftment traded-off against increased
health risk), remains a flawed concept (Hartley, 1995: 283). As a consequence,
externality costs tend not to be fully covered, and socially inefficient decision-making
results in discrimination against disenfranchised parties (Sagoff, 1988: 56; Barrett and
Grizzle, 1999: 27); i.e. the pursuit of economic objectives fails to meet the aims of
sustainable development in that basic human needs and environmental protection are
not adequately ensured.'?'
It is generally understood that environmental justice captures the concern for fair or
equitable distribution of environmental goods, services and resources (Warren, 1999:
151). Aligned with this definition, Wenz (1988: 4) perceives environmental justice to be
the distribution of benefits and burdens among all of those affected by environmentally
related decisions and actions whilst Hartley (1995: 287) describes this justice issue as
the fair distribution of environmental quality.
In 1990 the US EPA initiated steps to address the problems of environmental injustice
and proposed recommendations that environmental equity issues should be taken into
account in rule-making processes and agency permit, grant and compliance monitoring
and enforcement procedures (EPA, 1992). In 1994 these were translated into an EPA
104 Environmental injustice results not only from the pursuit of economic objectives. For example,Barrett and Grizzle
(1999: 27) refer to environmental protection initiatives (wildlife sanctuaries - which are insensitive to the
resource needs of neighbouring communities), which disenfranchise communities in terms of foregone
economic growth and depressed standards of living.
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Executive Order whereby US Federal agencies are required to identify and address
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of their
programmes on the historically disadvantaged communities (Council on Environmental
Quality, 1997: 1).
2.4 CONCLUSION
The discussion presented in this chapter has been structured around the revolutionary
origin and subsequent development of environmental assessment, and its status as an
action forcing provision of the new paradigm in environmental policy that was introduced
in the US following the enactment of NEPA. In making the association between NEPA
as a new paradigm and the revolutionary attributes of this new policy, reference has
been made to Thomas Kuhn's explanation of the discontinuous process through which
major advancements in human understanding of the world have occurred. Reference
has also been made to Kuhn's explanation of the post-revolutionary, or normal,
accumulation of knowledge - which takes place within the framework provided by a new
paradigm - to describe and explain the incremental development of environmental
assessment over the past three decades.
It is argued that the emergence of the practice of environmental assessment
represented a major non-cumulative break in past tradition, following many
unsuccessful previous attempts to resolve the environmental crisis as this has
developed over time. The global switch in allegiance from the paradigm of narrow
economic determinism, which NEPA and similar policies in other countries have
displaced, to the promise offered by the new fundamentals of (new) environmental
policy, has been described. Essentially, these fundamentals require that economic and
environmental quality should be compatible and that the fulfillment of social, economic
and other requirements of present and future generations must permit humans and
nature to live in harmony. The allegiance to the new NEPA paradigm is attributed to the
confidence placed in these principles and provisions to effectively deal with
environmental crisis. Environmental assessment, in its policy context, is thus described
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as presenting a fresh opportunity to accomplish what previous policy initiatives have
failed to do. The question posed in this concluding section of the chapter is: how well
has it performed in this regard?
It is clear from the discussion presented in the chapter that in spite of its promise of
dealing with the environmental crisis, environmental assessment, as in the case of any
new paradigm, did not immediately fully meet the requirements of its constituency of
allegiants. It has had to become progressively more clearly articulated than at the time
of its initial introduction; it has had to be made practically impiementabie through the
development of 'rules' that define the scope of application of the new paradigm (i.e.
methods of practice, etc.); and it has had to continually adapt to increasingly more
stringent conditions under which it is applied, as the environmental crisis has deepened
and the expectations of environmentalism have changed accordingly.
Importantly, where process and methodological deficiencies in environmental
assessment have emerged over time, these have been addressed. For example,
environmental assessment it has had to advance from its initial employment of simple
reductionistic methods dealing with individual environmental attributes, to approaches
that recognise the functioning of ecosystemic wholes and global environmental
systems. It has also had to develop approaches that integrate humans, and their social
and economic traits, into the definition of environment. In response to its initial failure to
effectively accommodate stakeholder participation in its processes, environmental
assessment has had to adapt to prove capable of engaging the multiple subjective 1-
languages of interested and affected parties and to forge a workable dialogue with the
objectivity of it-language employed in its traditional scientific methods. This has been
achieved most effectively through the emergence of new generation approaches to
environmental assessment, which employ we-language in order to secure broad
agreement on shared ideals around sustainable development, which can be articulated
in spite of divergent justification of these ideals. It is this development that perhaps
captures the most significant evolutionary advancement in the practice of environmental
assessment, and which makes it truly capable of contributing to the arrest in the
pathology in the human-environment relationship. In this respect, it has promoted the
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essential integration of the dissociated subjective and objective human cultural value
spheres through practically impiementabie method. Through developments such as
these, and others described in the chapter, it is concluded that the responsiveness of
environmental assessment to forcing factors, such as the issues arising from
environmentalism, has permitted it to perform well. It has generally met the expectations
demanded of it - most notably via its new generation methods, such as SEA.
An understanding of the above evolutionary development of environmental assessment
is necessary for the later advancement of the dissertation's central research intent,
which is to investigate the dialectical relationship between its evolutionary trajectory and
that of environmental ethics. Following a similar approach used in this chapter, the
focus of Chapter 3 will now shift to a discussion of the origin and evolutionary trajectory
of environmental ethics.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, Kuhnian theory is used to explain the origin and advancement
of the practice of environmental assessment. However, as an analytical model, this
approach is less useful in terms of explaining the evolution of environmental ethics due
to the discipline's weak paradigmatic character, which is exemplified by its failure thus
far to deliver a novel, viable ethical basis for informing environmental policy and
decision-making. In this chapter it will be shown that a state of polarisation exists
between arguments defined by anthropocentric (weak, strong) and nonanthropocentric
appeals to environmental value - a situation aggravated by competing theories based
on monism and pluralism, respectively. Other dichotomies that compound the lack of
consensus within the discipline also exist, including calls for a radical cultural and
institutional transformation as a response to the prevailing environmental crisis.
Weston (1996: 148) suggests that the above situation is typical of the co-evolutionary
relationships that develop between both competing philosophies and philosophy and
practice, when fairly incompatible initial theories are developed and a wide range of
attempts to articulate their practical implications emerge as the cultural process of
working through new sets of possibilities runs its course. According to Weston (1996:
147), environmental ethics is still at an originary stage, where new values pertaining to
the environment are just beginning to be culturally constituted and consolidated.
Through reference to the evolution of human ethics, Weston explains that the
emergence of new ethical ideas does not manifest as simple one-way linkages between
causes and effects, but can be expected to occur through a complex, evolving, systemic
process. It is this inherent slowness of ethical deliberation to establish closure and
finality on final moral foundations, which is a key enabling attribute of modern
philosophical ethics. Thus, the present era of uncertainty and experimentation (i.e. the
process of exploration and generation of metaphor, rather than the derivation of
analytically concretised ethical categories), which Weston believes characterises the
situation in environmental ethics, ought to be anticipated and welcomed (Weston, 1996:
139). This uncohesive state, in which there is a divergency in views as to what should
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constitute an environmental ethic, closely resembles what Kuhn (1970a: 91) would
describe as a pre-paradigm situation, where multiple views and competing schools of
thought are offered to resolve anomaly and crisis without reference to any accepted
plan or emergent theoretical structure (Oldroyd, 1986: 320).
As will become apparent from the narrative in this chapter, rhetorical argument and a
challenge of tradition - which opens up new possibilities rather than narrows the debate
towards a single theory of value - is a reasonable expectation as the discipline of
environmental ethics evolves through multiple and often incompatible values and
practices. This is predictable in terms of Kuhnian theory as the effects of unresolved
environmental crisis, which are described in the early sections of the chapter in terms of
three generations of environmental problems that are unfolding, triggers a proliferation
of different theories and versions of theory that are intended to resolve the crisis (vide
Kuhn, 1970a: 71). It is a response that can be anticipated, as insecurity develops within
a prevailing paradigm's community of allegiance. In the context of this study, the
outcome of this insecurity is described as the different themes of environmentalism that
have evolved, and the multiple theories of environmental value that have emerged to
support the practical agenda of these movements (Hattingh, 1999: 68). As a
consequence of these developments, the character of the governing paradigms (eg.
utilitarianism, deontological value theory) can be expected to begin to lose their clarity of
/
support for decision-making, and an unstructured, competitive situation - such as exists
within the discipline of environmental ethics - may be expected to arise between
different schools of thought about dealing with the crisis at hand.
Ultimately, a set of values and first principles for a unifying environmental ethic might
emerge and become culturally consolidated; however, evolutionary change towards this
situation is likely to be a protracted process (Weston, 1996: 151; Hattingh, 1999: 68).105
In the interim, environmental management practice and policy development require
105 Some philosophers (Hargrove, 1989: 8) argue strongly against the ideal of finding a single set of coherent principles
that should inform our decision-making. Value monism, they argue, displays various problems, one of which is
that it does not correspond to the way in which we make moral decisions. Instead of using a single principle
(value monism), they argue, we should rather use a variety of values relevant to the context within which we
have to resolve moral problems (value pluralism).
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support in terms of recourse to a pool of value theories and philosophical principles that
can inform decision-making. Not all of the value theories that have emerged from within
the discipline of environmental ethics appear to have such practical application at
present, and in this context, some of these will be described as 'new-paradigm claims'.
Such claims, it will be argued, distort Kuhn's understanding of paradigms, since
paradigms assume their validity through a grounding in acknowledged laws, sets of
established principles, etc., while the 'new-paradigm claims' are culturally constructed in
an arbitrary manner through social negotiation. Cast in a more practical mold, and
where the validity of the proffered value theory has a relatively strong paradigmatic
character, enlightened anthropocentrismwill be described towards the conclusion of the
chapter. It will be argued that this currently provides a more defensible and useful basis
for informing management and policy decisions than, for example, the
nonanthropocentric appeals to environmental value and the radical forms of
environmental philosophy that are discussed in the mid-sections of the chapter.
However, before the dissertation turns to these issues, it is necessary to further
elaborate on the originary stage of environmental ethics by contrasting its development
with the conventional paradigm of human ethics as it is found in utilitarian and
deontological value theories.
3.2 THE EMERGENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AS A RESPONSE
TO CRISIS IN THE PARADIGM OF HUMAN ETHICS
3.2.1 Value theory in the tradition of human ethics
Ethics is defined as the domain of enquiry that is directed at attempting to answer the
questions: 'What is right? What is good? What deserves respect?' in a context that
transcends relative cultural and individual positions (Brown, 1995: 39). Overtime, many
theories and systems have been proposed to provide different premises in ethical
reasoning around these fundamental questions and, in the tradition of most Western
philosophical systems, human interests - also in relation to their environment - have
served as the dominant measure of value in ethical deliberation. In this respect,
traditional value theory and a rational social order founded on science and technology
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are perceived to have effectively served the interests of humanity in terms of the ethical
and political ideal of individual human freedom which they have promoted [most
significantly, since the social-religious suppression of the 16thand 1ih centuries (Leiss,
1972: 45-71)].
Utilitarianism currently serves as the dominant ethical basis to free-market and welfare
economics theory. Given the global positions of dominance that these politico-cultural
and economic paradigms enjoy, it also typically provides the philosophical grounding for
environmental policy considerations, including those pertaining to sustainable
developrnent.l'" Citing Sher's (1979: 7) reference to J.S. Mill's definition of 'utility' or 'the
greatest happiness principle', Pierce and VanDeVeer (1995: 19) describe utilitarian
theory as a prescription that 'what is right, is to act so as to bring about the greatest
possible balance of good consequences over bad consequences for all concerned'. The
right act is that which brings the greatest utility compared with any other alternative and,
expressed in this way, utilitarianism as a philosophical system may be perceived as the
democratisation of ethical values (Hargrove, 1989: 208). Since policy is typically based
on considerations of costs versus benefits in terms of human preferences, its
development in practice tends to be grounded in rule utilitarianism, which holds that
those rules should be followed that bring about the greatest good for all concerned.
A second commonly encountered ethical justification entrenched in the dominant
politico-cultural paradigm is the belief that certain actions are intrinsically right orwrong.
Here it is assumed that rightness/wrongness is determined by higher standards than the
consequences of a particular action and that these standards either assign rights to
individuals to take certain actions or specify the duties of individuals (eg. with regard to
future generations in the case of sustainability arguments) to refrain from particular
actions. These are defined as natural rights and duties (or deontological) theories and
are encountered in policy discourse in reaction to the limits of utilitarian theory (Brown,
1995: 43). According to traditional Western philosophy, only humans have natural
106 Sustainable development is discussed further in Chapter 5 as a 'contested concept', where the tension in practical
interpretation of the concept will be shown to exist between its grounding in different perceptions of
utilitarianism - 'strong' versus 'weak', 'conservative' versus 'radical' etc.
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rights, distinguished as they are, according to the philosopher Immanuel Kant, from
'things' on the basis of the ability to reason and a capability to pursue conceptions of the
good. According to this argument, persons have rights because of their worth as rational
beings, whereas the worth of 'things' is relative only to the ends of persons (Pierce and
VanDeVeer, 1995: 17); i.e. 'things' do not have rights and accordingly, do not require
moral consideration. According to Kant's argument, humans can derive absolute rules
of morality - for example, with respect to duties that take cognizance of others in society
- based on reasoning alone, and that by following the rules that everyone is bound by,
humans act morally. It also follows from the above that non-human 'things' have no
intrinsic value; they only have instrumental value in so far as they relate to human
interests. Accordingly, it is only on the basis of the instrumental value of the non-human
natural environment that natural rights theory can assign duties to humans not to
destroy the usefulness of the environment for humans (Infield, 1979: 241). In this
context, Kantian philosophy is evident, for example, in the Bill of Rights of the South
African Constitution, which defines the duties of government inter alia to ensure that the
environment is not harmful to a person's health or well-being, to secure ecologically
sustainable development and use of natural resources.
Reference is also commonly made within conventional ethical approaches to justice
theory, mainly with respect to distributive aspects pertaining to environmental goods
and services (Brown, 1995: 44). Since policy decisions are based largely on some form
of benefit-cost analysis, which is typically an aggregative process that rarely identifies
losers and winners, this deficiency is often resolved through recourse to distributive and
other theories of justice (exchange, social, restitutive justice).
Religion has also provided a traditional ethical basis for policy and provides normative
rules that define relationships between humans. In the case of, for example, Judea-
Christian morality, religious relationships are also defined in terms of humans and their
environment - notably, with respect to their God-appointed dominion over the earth.
Whilst open to radical interpretation (eg. that humans may do whatever they want with
the non-human natural environment), the more reasonable understanding of such
dominion is one of a duty to benign stewardship (Fox, 1995: 6), whereby humans, in
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utilizing the environment for different ends, are commanded to care for it, and ensure its
sustainability, since it belongs to God. An important aspect of such morality is the
understanding that stewardship is not based on the attribution of intrinsic value to the
environment, but is determined by the acknowledgment that the environment is God's
property (Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995: 16). Other religious traditions (eg. Buddhism,
Taoism, Hinduism) also present ethical bases for debates around environmentally
sustainable development and have attracted considerable attention with respect to their
strengths and weaknesses in this respect.?"
In spite of the depth of tradition through which the above paradigms in human ethics
have been worked out, an increasing awareness of the environmental consequences
resulting from the consumption and production effects of human use of the earth's
natural resource base has increasingly led to calls for a reformulation of the foundations
of value theory. The inability of human ethics to deal with the situation of environmental
crisis will now be described through reference to the various conceptualisations of
environmental problems that have emerged since the mid is" century and, more
specifically, in the course of the last thirty years since the emergence of environmental
ethics. A generational conceptualisation of the environmental problematic described by
Norton (1991a: 62, 207, 213), which is incorporated into the discussion, defines the
temporal development of the environmental crisis with which environmentalists have
been concerned in terms of their r, 'j'ld or ;jd generation character. The discussion is
also based on Robyn Eckersley's analysis of modern ecopolitical thought since the
1960s, which she structures around three progressively integrated themes described as
the crisis of participation and survival respectively, and the opportunity of emancipation-
which have a loose temporal association with the last two or three decades (Eckersley,
1992: 7-31). Whilst the generational conceptualisation remains largely anthropocentric
in its grounding, Eckersley's thematic analysis evolves from an early anthropocentric
107 Arguments promoting environmental stewardship, but which are cast in a secular, as opposed to religious context,
are offered (inter alia) by Attfield (1983), who shows that stewardship does not imply human domination over
nature. However, utilitarianism is an adequate ethical theory provided it is perceived as being
nonanthropocentric, whereby the aim should be to maximise the satisfaction of interests of all livingindividuals;
i.e. an emphasis on interspecific justice.
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grounding in conventional human ethics towards a biospherical egalitarianism calling for
a radical cultural transformation in human society.
3.2.2 Environmental crisis as a challenge to human ethics
3.2.2.1 First generation environmental problems
The environmental problems that were recognised since the mid is" century up to the
middle of the zo" century are captured under the definition of t" generation problems
and essentially relate to the human use of the earth's resources, depletion of non-
renewable resources and specific threats to particular species or spectacular natural
areas (Norton, 1991a: 213). Their conceptualisation is founded upon concerns which
arose from exploitationist colonialism in north America and the careless attitude which
prevailed at the time towards the use and wastage of resources, particularly as the
frontiers of expansionism closed and this brought with it a realisation that the supply of
environmental resources was not infinite.
A belief in the God-appointed dominion of man over nature and the Lockean view of
man's relationship with the state of nature (and how this relates to property rights etc.)
explains much of the colonialist attitude to the American wilderness to which they had
access. Since raw natural resources were viewed as uncontrolled by man and valueless
until human labour was mixed with them, the wilderness was conquered in an
atmosphere of opportunity and expectation (Callicott, 1994: 60; Norton, 1991a: 77). All
scarcity that existed at the time was scarcity of humanly useful goods and services.
Raw materials were not scarce and the process of physically transforming these
materials for human use was generally not perceived to be excessive or wasteful.
As the frontiers of expansionism closed, a realisation emerged that the social trend of
exploitation and the pursuit of individual profit would leave the nation in a degraded
state and would constrain sustainable economic growth. It was at this time, towards the
end of the 19th century, that Gifford Pinchot emerged as a central figure in American
environmental politics. Pinchot realised that economic growth could no longer be
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supported through the exploitation of resources at its frontiers. His political tactic to
protect renewable natural resources, such as timber, was to lobby for and secure the
retention of forest reserves in public ownership - a move which appealed to and
received support for its populist egalitarianism (Norton, 1991a: 79); i.e. the aim was to
keep the playing fields level for all economic participants, not only for a few powerful
players. The essence of Pinchot's environmental management policy, which was
derived from this appeal, was termed "conservation" and its aim was to maximise "... the
use of natural resources for the greatest good of the greatest number for the longest
time" (Pinchot, 1987 cited in Norton, 1991a: 23).
Pinchot's conservationist views were derived from a strong utilitarian perspective ofthe
environment's instrumental value for humans and were firmly grounded in the ideals of
economic aggregation ism. They were based on the premise that to be practicable,
environmental management had to yield economic rewards (Callicott, 1994: 62; Norton,
1991a: 23-24). Accordingly, the environmental policy which he introduced was aimed at
the sustainable production of commodities derived from renewable natural resources,
based on principles of economic and ecological resource management (Sagoff, 1985:
99). According to Sagoff (1988: 154) there is strong political support for such
conservationist policy among utilitarian liberals who perceive the value of environmental
resources in the context of their worth to humans.
Conservation policy failed in practise due largely to its ecological naivety and was
flawed by a lack of understanding of the limitations of the environment's capacity to
deliver to a growing population the sustainable opportunity of production that it
promised. Failure to recognise the environment's limitations in this respect resulted from
an atomistic, scientific management approach that focused on the conservation of
single species, for example, rather than on the holistic management of ecological
systems. In its political context, Pinchot's conservation policy was also logically flawed.
In this respect, the logical impossibility is exposed of achieving both Pinchot's moral
goal of egalitarianism, which is "to maximise equality in the assignment of basic rights
and duties" and his moral goal of utilitarianism, which is "to maximise the good for the
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majority of mankind". The two independent variables of total number benefited (the
greatest number) and utility (the greatest good) cannot be maximised slrnultaneously.l'"
During the early part of the zo" century, the failure of conservation to adequately
address 1st generation environmental problems was strongly criticised by the
preservationist movement championed by John Muir.109 This movement acknowledged
the need for humans to exploit nature but criticised the extent of exploitation and the
degree to which nature's instrumental value for human utility was promoted by
conservation policy. In particular, there was concern about exploitation that encroached
into areas or affected particular species that were perceived to be of special
significance. Preservationists like John Muir also popularised a pantheist theology
derived from philosophies such as those developed by Spinoza, Thoreau and
Emerson.110 Muir's pantheism perceives the existence of God in nature and attributes
the non-human world with a spiritual quality deserving of human respect and offering a
utility to humans in terms of their need for spiritual fulfilment. This call by
preservationists for higher human consciousness and the valuation of nature according
to enlightened utilitarianism, spiritual instrumentalism and metaphysical qualities
extending beyond human valuation, however, had little impact in terms of influencing
environmental policy in the course of the first half of the zo" century. Nevertheless, co-
ordinated protest by environmentalists did achieve occasional success in terms of
halting development and this served to secure the appeal offered by this faction of
environmentalism to a broadening constituency aligned with the fundamental axioms of
preservationism.
108 Herfindahl (1972: 172) presents a similar critique of the aims of Pinchotist conservation by questioning the logical
impossibility of simultaneously maximizing its three defining variables, which are: the greatest good, the greatest
number and the longest time. Focusing on the limitations of predictive capability when dealing with complex
natural systems, Ehrenfeld (1978), citing an example of fisheries management, points to the variety of
unexpected (usually devastating) consequences that flow from 'maximum sustainable yield' management
policies.
109 John Muir and a number of his associates founded the Sierra Club in 1892 and the movement has persisted since that
time (Devall, 1991: 247).
110 Muir rejected monotheistic religion and the idea of human dominion over nature (Norton, 1991a: 19). In the tradition
ofSpinoza, Thoreau and Emerson, he attributed value to the nonhuman natural world in terms of its spiritual
utility to humans.
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3.2.2.2 Second generation environmental problems
The post-war economic boom beginning in the late 1940s and the unrestrained
Keynesian economic growth of the 1950s pushed environmental concerns off the
political agenda over this period (Norton, 1991a: 61; Martinez-Alier cited in Ravaioli,
1995: 57; Durning, 1992: 30). However, the affluence in some sectors of society
resulting from the economic boom initiated a social process through which public
interest became increasingly focused on quality of life. Earlier conservationist concerns
about efficient development and use of material resources, which were linked to the
production of goods and the supply of services, were replaced by concerns about
consumption-related impacts affecting human health and quality of life (Hays, 1987: 3-4,
22-26). In the developed countries of the West, the concerns of environmentalists were
triggered during the 1960s by the explosive growth of the human population,
deforestation practises and public perceptions of the environmental effects and risks
associated with careless practises of waste disposal (causing air and water pollution, for
example), pesticide usage and nuclear power generation (Devall, 1991: 247). Concern
also arose not only for individual species and particular areas, but also for entire
ecosystems. For example, environmental risks associated with pesticides were viewed
in the context of their impact on ecological systems, via trophic links; the impact of
waste disposal into streams was viewed in the context of the environmental
consequences for entire catchments etc.
The publication of Silent spring, authored by Rachel Carson in 1962, was a landmark
event in terms of its catalyzing effect in developing public expression to a previously
sensed unease about the delayed and subtle character of so-called ~d generation
environmental problems (Carson, 1962; Mitchell, 1985 cited in Norton 1991a: 62).
Publications, such as Barry Commoner's The closing circle (Commoner, 1971) provided
further impetus to the upsurge in environmentalism and this culminated in Earth Day
1970 - an occasion which marked a peak of public concern for environmental issues in
the modern era and one which achieved considerable political impact (Norton, 1991a:
63).
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The somewhat obtuse and largely unchallenged definition of the theme of the
environmental problematic during the 1960s and early 1970s, which was provided by
American political theorists and policy-makers, was one of a crisis of participation
(Eckersley, 1992 : 8-11). Rodman (1980: 65) ascribes this to a perception that
environmentalism was collectively linked to the civil rights movement's concern for
grassroots democratic participation in societal decision-making around issues pertaining
to equitable access to environmental goods (urban amenity, for example) and protection
from environmental harm, such as the effects of pollution (Paehlke, 1988: 292, 304;
Marietta, 1982: 153).111 Environmental laws drafted during the late 1960s and early
1970s did not reflect an acknowledgement that there could be ecological limits to the
Western vision of post-war economic growth but were designed to address
environmental problems through improved planning and technological solutions to deal
with the voiced environmental crisis. The interpretation by political commentators that
environmental protest of the 1960s was associated with New Left participative politics
was limited only to the social context of the protest. Whilst the agenda of the New Left
was concerned with environmental quality in so far as this related to decentralisation
and self-management of power and resources, this was not closely aligned with the
concerns of the 'true' environmentalist movement that had its roots in the
preservationism of John Muir, for example. Labour, socialist and liberal welfare activists
by and large rejected environmentalism due to the socially regressive consequences of
legislation arising from the movement's protests, which included high commodity prices
and unemployment resulting from the regulation and closure of polluting industries.112
There were few major theoretical innovations in social and political thought in the 1960s
and early 1970s that arose specifically as a response to an understanding of the
concerns of environmentalists. Rather, the tendency was to accept these concerns as
III The inequities in environmental protection that were first identified by academic and civil rights communities in the
1970s only fully emerged onto the platform of broad public discourse in the 1980s (Hartley, 1995: 277). An
overview of the history of the environmental justice movement is presented in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.3.2).
112 The tension between demands for environmental reform on the one hand and for distributive justice and economic
security on the other has persisted since the late 1960s and is one of the social dichotomies which exists
between the middle class champions of environmentalism and the industrial working class who exist in an
awkward alliance of dependency with the investors of capital in industry.
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aspects of the wider pursuit of distributive justice and democratic planning. Certain
elements of the 1960s participative politics were, however, embraced by factions of the
environmentalist movement. In this respect, a notable influence was the socialist
theorizing of Herbert Marcuse, who traced the problems of industrial society to the
dominance of instrumental or technocratic rationality. Although the emphasis of his
socialist theory relates to anthropocentric human liberatory ideals, Marcuse's criticism of
industrialism was adopted, for example, by theorists such as Murray Bookchin who
expanded this to emphasise the importance of consciousness change and the adoption
of alternative worldviews to the prevailing neo-classical economic paradigm. In addition
to such calls for a consciousness change, the general response by environmentalists to
the Z'd generation environmental problems was one which abandoned Pinchotist
ecological reductionism and which increasingly drew upon systematic ecological
contextualism (Norton, 1991a:213). The ecology movement that arose around this time
presented a fundamental challenge to conservationist policies and to the prevailing
utilitarian philosophy by defending a non-utilitarian conception of humanity's relationship
with nature (Sagoff, 1988:154).
Although pertinent in the sense of social environmentalism, the theme of participation in
societal decision-making and an emphasis on anthropocentric environmental equity
presented a generally misconstrued character to the main concerns of
environmentalists during the 1960s and early 1970s. Consequently, this obscured the
problem of ecological limits to growth. However, the significance of this was to recede in
the course of the following decade (mid 1970s into the 1980s) when the
conceptualisation of environmental issues emerged as one in which the problems facing
humanity were perceived as constituting a crisis of survival. As described by Eckersley
(1992: 11-17) this perception was widespread following the publication in the early
1970s of the Club of Rome's (1972) the Limits to growth and Ecologist magazine's
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Blueprint for survival (Goldsmith et ai., 1972).113 These publications drew attention to
the global scale of environmental degradation resulting from population growth and
excessive resource consumption and emphasised the tenuous link between the fate of
humanity and the increasingly evident fragility of the environing conditions for survival
created by the earth's biological support systems. 114,115
Although the oil crisis of 1973-74 raised awareness in industrialised countries of the
very real constraints on economic activity posed by a diminished supply of an 'essential'
natural resource, the neo-classical economic response to the general environmental
situation did not acknowledge this as being symptomatic of a crisis of survival.
Environmentalist's concerns relating to 'limits to growth' were dismissed as being
excessively alarmist and, in response, industry simply offered technology and pricing
solutions as mechanisms for alleviating the environmental externalities of economic
growth - a response grounded in what Ehrenfeld (1978: vii) describes as humanistic
faith in the "omnipotence of our species". These solutions were opposed by
environmentalist factions who shared a common scepticism towards economic self-
regulation and a reliance on technology to solve environmental problems; however, the
113 The Club of Rome comprised a group of distinguished industrialists, scientists, economists, sociologists and govenunent
officials from 25 countries. In a study co-ordinated by the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnoloJ!Y, the group was
tasked with the development of a model to forecast a future economic and environmental scenario for the
earth. The Umits to growth, which was published in 1972, contained a synthesis of the study findings (Club of
Rome, 1972). These suggested that with the world population growing at a rate of about 2 percent per year and
industrial output rising by 7 percent annually, the world's physical resources would be exhausted in the next few
decades. As a consequence of this, a predicted crash in the human population was expected to result by the year
2100.
114 Almost 30 years following the publication of The limits togrowth, and with the GNP of the world economy higher than
it has ever been before (Holland et al, 1996: 49), economists would argue that history contradicts much of the
study prediction. For example, supPlY technoloJ!Yhas greatly increased access to crude oil reserves that have been
found to be considerably greater than originally estimated. Use technoloJ!Yhas also increased the energy
conversion efficiency for crude oil, which has resulted in: (i) a decrease in absolute oil consumption in the US,
for example, by 15 percent in the 15 years following the 1973 oil crisis; and (ii) a dramatic decrease in oil price.
These trends for crude oil (and the reserves of other physical resources) lend support to the conclusion that
technology has strongly influenced the supply-demand relationship to the extent that crisis has been avoided
(pilzer, 1990: 33-37). From an economic perspective, natural capital does not consist of actual physical stocks,
but the realised or realisable value of such stocks (Holland et al, 1996: 48). Since more value is realisable from
less physical stock due to technological innovation, the economic argument is invoked that levels of natural
capital can be maintained at non-diminishing levels (Holland et al, 1996: 48-49).
115 Ruse (1994: 7) suggests that the global attention which The limits togrowth attracted had more to do with an interest in
the refutation of its predictions than an acknowledgement of their validity.
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factions differed with respect to their views on the nature of intervention and control that
was called for.
One interventionary model is described by Garrett Hardin in his essay Tragedy of the
commons (Hardin, 1968 in Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995: 330-338). Part of Hardin's
thesis is one in which the finiteness of the earth's resources is recognised as a
constraint to the exponential rate of human population growth. Hardin suggests that a
legitimate authority can legislate to promote temperance with respect to human
response within recognised boundaries of a finite environing context (Hardin, 1968 in
Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995: 334). In his view, this holds greater potential in terms of
its likely effectiveness than an appeal to human conscience and responsibility for such
temperance. The concept of coercion is introduced by Hardin as an alternative to the
prohibition of actions and behaviours that contribute to the environmental crisis.116
Provided such coercion is "mutually agreed upon by the majority of the affected people",
Hardin believes that the case which liberal politics might have against the introduction of
such control diminishes (Hardin, 1968 in Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995: 337); i.e.
rational human beings will consider some injustice or loss of certain previously enjoyed
privileges, liberties and freedoms to be preferable to environmental ruin and the
concomitant risks which this poses for humanity. The argument used here is similar to
that invoked by Attfield (1999: 3, 8) in his analysis of the acceptance he anticipates in
liberal democracies for the persuasive curtailment (rather than coercion) of harmful
freedoms (eg. restrictions on the freedom to emit greenhouse gases or to have large
families) which might be tolerated in order to enhance other more valued freedoms -
116 A reluctance to embrace the concept of prohibition or temperance might be anticipated within the context of liberal
politics due to the fascist implications suggested by such authoritarianism. In this respect, Sagoff (1988: 150-
151) describes the role of the liberalist state - which is to protect the rights of individuals within civil society -
not to impose moral goals or ethical views. Hardin's concept also conflicts with the views, for example, of
biocentric ethicists and deep ecologists whose supporting philosophy is the antithesis of the dominant social
paradigm. Taylor (1981 in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994: 127) in his analysis of biocentric ethics describes the
desired change in human consciousness as one that should be guided by an attitude of respect for nature, not
coercion. The actions of deep ecologists are guided neither by calls for (or coerced) temperance nor by dutiful
intentions to follow moral laws. Quoting Arne Naess, Seed et al. (1988 in VanDeVeer and Pierce, 1994: 226)
suggest that they are guided by the ultimate norm of se!! realisation and a source of joy and sensitivity towards the
richness and diversity of all life.
Michael Burns Chapter 3, Evolution of Environmental Ethics, Page 96
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Co-Evolutionary Relationships Between Environmental Ethics And Environmental Assessment
such as access to a healthy environment and the benefits this introduces in terms of
quality of life.117
Although Hardin's philosophy is criticised for the authoritarian intervention which it
advocates, it is perhaps more controversial for its neo-Malthusian social injustice which
it is perceived to espouse - specifically discrimination against poor nations and their
denial of access to resources which the rich are encouraged to 'selfishly' enjoy.118 To
counter this sense of injustice that his call for temperance invokes, Hardin (1974: 561-
568) uses the metaphor of a 'lifeboat' to illustrate the choices facing humanity with
respect to the distribution of the earth's resources. He argues that, similar to a lifeboat,
the earth has a capacity to ensure the survival of a maximum number of people; if this
limit is exceeded, 'the boat sinks' and all perish. In Hardin's view, nations have no
automatic right of shared access to resources. The right of access has to be earned
through temperance in areas such as population growth, closure of the environmental
commons to uncontrolled abuse and the sustainable use of resources. Contrary to
humanitarian impulses, Hardin's 'lifeboat ethics' argues against hand-outs by rich
nations to support poor nations in their environmental crisis. He illustrates how this form
of assistance perpetuates intemperant behaviour by the assisted, which promotes the
ruin of the global commons and ultimately places the survival of humanity as a whole at
risk. Nations which are successfully managing their way out of their own crisis of
survival are advised to govern their actions by the ethics of a functioning lifeboat by not
inviting on board the ruin which accompanies the equitable, but undeserved sharing of
resources.
117 Attfield (1999: 3) notes that whilst liberal societies are supposedly neutral between ideas of the good, freedoms -
which are integral concepts of the good - often conflict with one another thereby invoking favour of particular
ideas of the good over others.
118 Thomas Malthus argued that the human population increases exponentially whereas the capacity to increase food
supply increases only arithmetically. Environmental checks, such as disease and famine keep down the rate of
increase, whilst human rationality which education promotes (i.e. restricted to the social upper classes who see
benefit in having small families) provides the alternative check on population growth. The extension of the
Malthusian argument is that social welfare encourages the maintenance of low standards of living and a high
rate of reproduction amongst the poor (Merchant, 1992: 32).
Michael Burns Chapter 3, Evolution of Environmental Ethics, Page 97
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Co-Evolutionary Relationships Between Environmental Ethics And Environmental Assessment
A tougher model of intervention than the 'mutual coercion' advocated by Garret Hardin
is proposed by Robert Heilbroner in his publication An inquiry into the human prospect.
This inquiry addresses the fundamental issue of human survival in the context of having
to establish a steady state society [and economy (cf. Meadows et al., 1992; Daly, 1990)]
through a reduction in the size of the human community and the institution of a
monastic organisation of society (Heilbroner, 1974: 161). Whilst Heilbroner is an
advocate of democracy and individual liberty, the imposition of external constraints on
human behaviour by a centralised, authoritarian government is reluctantly viewed by
him as an essential requirement to enable the transition towards the desired steady
state society. Heilbroner concludes that people do not willingly give up enjoyed
privileges, even though these might be in conflict with the interests of the larger social
and biotic community to which they belong; this therefore requires political intervention
of the kind which he proposes.
Some critics of the interventionist models of Hardin and Heilbroner question whether the
required sacrifice (for example, foreclosed privileges and erosion of the democratic
principles of liberal politics) brings with it a price that is too high (eg. Sagoff, 1988: 150).
Altruistic criticism centres on the insensitivity that the models show towards resolving
classic societal injustices (discrimination against the poor), which would persist without
resolution along the routes to 'survival' that the models advocate (eg. Barnet, 1980:
297-298, 302). Critics also question the capabilities of centralised government to
enforce the kind of constraints on human behaviour that would seem to be required to
resolve the environmental crisis (Eckersley, 1992: 24). Given the recent collapse of the
Marxist institutions of control and authority, such criticism is not without justification.
Alternative models of decentralised institutional authority, supported by stronger, not
weaker, democratic principles are offered by these critics as options which hold greater
promise in terms their potential effectiveness to achieve the same goals as the
interventionist models (Paehlke, 1988: 305, 308).
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3.2.2.3 Third generation environmental problems
The perception of the current environmental crisis is discussed by Norton (1991a: 207-
214), who expands his description of the shifting patterns of problems with which
environmentalists have been faced over time to one which captures the growing
significance of the threats which modern industrial societies pose to future generations.
Norton defines the current human actions and decisions which constitute these threats
as ;jd generation environmental problems and describes the incremental development
in their scale of effect from the relatively indeterminate consequences to which they
have given rise thus far to the geographically widespread catastrophic effects on a
multitude of human beings, which are anticipated once critical environmental thresholds
are exceeded (Norton 1991a: 207-214).119 He refers to several examples of ;jd
generation environmental problems (ozone depletion, acid rain, etc.) but focuses on the
effect on global warming, arising from the combustion of fossil fuels, to illustrate the
inter-generational character of this class of environmental problem. Norton's views on
these emerging environmental problems are substantiated by commentaries such as
the UN Global Environmental Outlook (GEO, 2000) which describes the threats to
human (and other) life as a result of, for example, the increased severity of natural
disasters and the destabilisation of the global nitrogen balance caused by agriculture
and the combustion of fossil fuels, which could make freshwater supplies unfit for
human consumption (UN, 1999).
The accelerated loss of biological diversity resulting from present decisions and actions
[most notably attributable to the effects of human technology (Angermeier, 2000: 375)]
is expected to have irreversible and detrimental consequences for future generations.
As described by Wilson (1992: 248) there have been at least six periods in palaeo-
history when massive species extinction have occurred in response to natural climatic
change associated with the terminations of glacial cycles; eg. some 73 percent of the
119 A contrasting view on 3mgenerationenvironmenta/problems is provided by Simon in Myers and Simon (1994: 55) who
argues that such concerns are likely to be transient issues in the environmental debate that will be "barely
worthy of consideration 10 years from now". Pillars to Simon's argument include the proven failure of the
Limits to growth scenario to materialise - which points to the potential of human ingenuity to mitigate
environmental problems, for example, through economic and technical adjustment (Myers and Simon, 1994:
59).
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genera of large mammals and birds that lived in the late Pleistocene are now extinct.
Although this episode of biodiversity collapse is attributable in part to natural climatic
warming, a compelling explanation of the scale of recent collapse in biodiversity is
linked to the impact of global human dispersal beginning some 12 000 to 11 000 years
ago when Palaeo-Indians colonised America, Polynesians the Pacific, Indonesians
Madagascar and, in recent centuries, the colonisation of the New World by Europeans
(Wilson, 1992: 247). The most significant contemporary human impacts which are
causing biodiversity collapse at a previously unprecedented scale are attributable to the
rate of technological evolution which is much more rapid than genetic evolution.12o
Angermeier (2000: 376) argues that this is causing the transformation of ecosystems at
a rate that exceeds the adaptive capability of the affected biota.
Flyvbjerg (1993: 12) describes the effects of :id generation environmental problems as
life-threatening to the extent that changes in the global ecology are happening as a
consequence of a large number of small, incremental choices, and that future
continuance of life is no longer a given but is subject to question. The effects that
materialise in future are expected to harm large numbers of people over geographically
broad areas and the ethical question of transferring inter-generational risk therefore
becomes relevant. Norton (1995a: 50-53) introduces the concept of a diachronous
ethical scale to analyse actions giving rise to inter-generational transfer of risk and
argues that when the risks incurred in the present fall mainly upon future individuals
(who do not share the present benefits), a contextual approach to decision-making must
replace standard analytic methods which are typically used to inform decisions relating
to intra-generational risk. The concept of contextual environmental management is
essentially based on ensuring the health of the larger, autonomously functioning
environmental context within which humans exist as one element of the greater
biosphere.
120 Based on Holling's (1992) scalar and hierarchical interpretation of the organisation, controls and dynamics of
ecosystems, Norton and Ulanowicz (1992: 244-249) and Norton (1995a: 51) describe the anomaly within
hierarchy theory that is evident in the effects of human activityon their sustainingenvironment. According to
these authors, "most applications of hierarchical organisational structures emphasise that control and
constraints flow down spatiotemporal systems, with larger and slower-changing processes constraining the
behaviour of individuals at lower levels". At present, however, it is human activity that drives changes in
ecosystem states and not vice versa.
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Although the authoritarian interventionist solutions proposed by Hardin and Heilbroner
to the suite of 1st. a= and 3rd generation environm'ental problems were widely rejected,
the process of rejection initiated a search by a growing number of environmentalists for
an alternative cultural transformation in human society which could foster an effective
response to the environmental crisis. The ecologically oriented theorists who support
the current theme of an emancipatory opportunity in the environmental problematic
consider the resolution of the crisis since the 1980s to be one which is fundamentally
dependent upon this transformation (Eckersley, 1992: 17-21). Solutions that are
promised by technology and institutional intervention are viewed by emancipatory
theorists as cultural elements that bind rather than liberate humanity from its crisis.
These theorists challenge the paradigms according to which society attributes value to
technologies (and science) that ultimately threaten life and life-sustaining processes
beyond the immediate and short-term gains that they offer. For example, Shrader-
Frechette (1982: 37) argues that - in the context of environmental impact assessment -
society's decisions and actions should be guided by asking the right questions. She
illustrates her argument through reference to a frequent failing of EIA, where the
process is based only on the consideration of alternative technologies. Her point is that
the questions which must be posed should not relate only to choices of technology but
should, preferentially, consider social and political options to address particular societal
needs (Shrader-Frechette, 1982: 38).121The deep ecologist Arne Naess, responds to
questions pertaining to society's current drive for economic growth and high levels of
consumption by asking the counter-question whether this drive ultimately fulfils essential
psychological human needs like, for example, security and love (Devall and Sessions,
1985 in VanDeVeer and Pierce, 1994: 220). Whilst acknowledging that destitution (the
antithesis of consumer society) carries with it huge environmental risk, Durning (1992:
23, 36), like Naess, questions whether the comparative affluence of societies of the
developed world brings with it a commensurable degree of happiness, suggesting that
the relationship between growth in consumption and personal happiness is weak.
121 A similar point was made two decades earlier by Rachel Carson in her prophetic statements on the environmental
risks of pesticide usage. She challenged the need for chemical technologies that were being developed at the
time and proposed the use of non-technological biotic alternatives to chemical pesticides (Carson, 1999: 29,
226).
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Importantly, emancipatory theorists shift the debate from the question of how human
needs should be satisfied, to the process through which views of our needs are formed.
Cultural transformation that is advocated by emancipatory theorists requires the
revitalisation of civil society and the institution of different political philosophies from
those that have dominated in modern times. Emancipatory theorists consider the
liberalist political ideal of democratic, individual freedom and the values which are
derived from individual wants and preferences to be inconsistent with their advocacy of
communitarianism, supported by shared public values providing definition to community
identity, character and aspirations (Sagoff, 1988: 147). They are also critical of the
questionable liberalist axioms of inalienable property rights and participation in the
laissez faire economics of the free market system that they believe are causal to the
environmental crisis (Leeson, 1979). It is their view that one of the main failures in the
system of liberal politics was initiated with the ending of frontier expansionism, when the
axiom of property rights (and the concentration of capital and power which this derives
for a privileged few) rendered the co-axiomatic liberalist ideal of economic and political
freedom largely illusionary to the mass of ordinary working people (Eckersley, 1992:
24 ).122 This situation was less critical during the era of frontier expansionism when
expanding stocks of wealth provided more opportunity for distributive justice (albeit a
modest form of justice) to prevail. However, since this time there has been an inevitable
intensification of the gap between the rich and poor which now makes the creation of an
122 Shrader-Frechette (1985a) reviews Locke's labour theory of property in the context of the critique that is levelled
against the liberalist axiom of property rights. She highlights a critical proviso that Locke makes, which is that
the process of property appropriation should leave "as much and as good ... in common for others" (Shrader-
Frechette, 1985b in VanDeVeer and Pierce, 1994: 434). Liberalist philosophy with respect to property rights,
which has a Lockean justification, failswhen it does not adequately deal with this proviso. Shrader-Frechette's
point is that Lockean philosophy towards property rights is perhaps less flawed than the liberalist grounding in
this philosophy, which ignores one of its key provisos.
The liberalist axiom of property rights is also debated by Goodin (1990)who focuses on the presumption that
property rights must necessarily be at odds with preservationist duties. Goodin argues that property rights do
not always prevail over these duties and that such rights are neither sacrosanct nor particularly strong in each
and every case (Goodin, 1990: 435 ). Where a conflict does exist between the rights of property use and
preservationist duties is the case involving goods that diminish with use and for which there are no close
substitutes to intemalise the cost of diminishment. Here, a trade-off between the values of use and preservation
is necessary; however, Goodin argues that in such cases preservationist duties should have primacy and should
be superceded only on the basis of convincing moral argument (Goodin, 1990: 441).
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egalitarian society (a pre-requisite for emancipatory cultural transformation) a
paradoxical impossibility for liberalism.
The egalitarian ideals of democratic socialism, which aim to limit the inequalities of
wealth and power produced by liberalist free market forces are also not exempt from
critique by emancipatory theorists. This critique centres on a concern that the socialist
model of wealth redistribution brings the poor into the market only as passive
consumers rather than self-determining producers (Eckersley, 1992: 24). In this area of
criticism, there is probably some agreement with Garret Hardin's "lifeboat ethics" which
emphasises the hazards of welfare politics (Hardin, 1974 in VanDeVeer and Pierce,
1994: 380-381). The critique which is levelled at the Marxist alternative to the
distributive justice of democratic socialism is more severe - not in terms of the social
ideals of this philosophy (which, as has already been stated, have collapsed in practise)
but in terms of the pervasive and serious environmental impacts of industrialism that
emancipatory theorists view as a failing which is common to both liberalist capitalism
and Marxist 'state capitalism'. Above all, it is the position of human domination over
nature and the transformative, instrumental value of the non-human world that is
exploited for human utility that makes Marxism and the other dominant political
philosophies incompatible with the ideals of emancipation.
The cultural and institutional transformation that emancipatory theorists call for requires
the earth's advanced nations to suspend the rate of increase in standards of living
according to present values and to forfeit many of the material comforts which are
currently enjoyed (or envied by aspirant developing countries). It is argued that these
comforts, and the values from which they are derived, are not only in excess of, but are
often in opposition to basic biological needs (Stone, 1974 in Pierce and VanDeVeer,
1995: 120) and, according to Naess, they are contrary to human psychological needs as
well (Devall and Sessions, 1985). Emancipatory theorists propose that new cultural
paradigms must be fostered that will allow society to transcend the anthropocentrism of
participatory politics and the liberalist acquisitive ideals of quantitative improvement of
life towards a metaphysical reconstruction of relationships with the earth's broader
community and the qualitative improvement and meaning to human life that this will
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bring (Leiss, 1972; Castoriadis, 1981: 7-22). The drive for such transcendence, which is
epitomised by the deep ecology of Arne Naess, proposes a new conception of
humanity's relationship to the rest of nature and an associated change in human
consciousness - a consciousness that will not only contribute to the solution of the
material problems of the earth, but will liberate humanity from the controlling and
stultifying effects of current attitudes towards property and nature (Stone, 1974 in Pierce
and VanDeVeer, 1995: 120).
For emancipatory theorists, the desired political philosophy to support an ecologically
sustainable post-liberal society stems from a 'discovery' of the human-ecological
interconnectedness brought to public attention in the 1960s by Rachel Carson's
publication Silent spring (Carson, 1962), but which did not gather momentum until late
1970s and early 1980s. This has set in train significant theoretical innovations and the
political repercussions of these are only just being worked out (Weston, 1996: 147). The
most significant of these has been the attempt by emancipatory theorists to revise and
incorporate the principles of individual and community autonomy into a broader
ecological framework. As will emerge from the discussion that follows, the metaphysical
reconstruction which this requires of humanity remains somewhat of a narcissistic ideal,
in that it has yet to attract a strong paradigmatic allegiance in Western politics and
policy based on the promise it offers to resolve the environmental problematic (vide
Section 1.4). Accordingly, emancipatory theory would seem to be somewhat removed
from the immediate practical imperative of working within the prevailing cultural
paradigm in order to address the pathology in the human-environment relationship as it
exists now.
3.2.2.4 Environmental crisis: A catalyst for the emergence of environmental ethics
Clearly, the developing environmental crisis as described above, and the agenda of
environmentalism, which is evolving in response to this crisis, has neither found
resolution nor been adequately served through recourse to the paradigm of traditional
human ethics. Whilst the environmental problematic might initially have been regarded
as a mere anomaly in terms of the failure of 'normal' ethics to provide the conceptual
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and instrumental tools appropriate for its resolution (vide Kuhn, 1970a: 77), the
exhaustive, yet ineffective, application of these supporting theories and philosophies is
beginning to place into question the promise offered by human ethics to resolve what is
now perceived to be a crisis. Through application of Kuhnian theory to the situation of
environmental crisis, the fundamentals of the prevailing paradigm of human ethics
would seem to be open to question (vide Kuhn, 1970a: 6), and the possibility now exists
for a break in the tradition-bound activity of problem resolution; i.e. the way has opened
for new candidate paradigms to emerge and displace the prevailing ethical paradigms
from their position of priority. Developments within environmental ethics are a
manifestation of this possibility, which has been triggered by crisis.
Flowing from the developing environmental crisis there have been calls for a
reformulation of the foundations of value theory, which range in degrees of movement
away from the modernist view of progress, with its conservative 'business-as-usual'
assumptions of scientism, technocratic managerialism and economic growth, towards
the radical transformation of society and its current grounding in the liberal democratic
understanding of the good life (Brown, 1995: 39; Marietta, 1982: 154). Essentially, these
calls seek to replace traditional ethical arguments and the general recourse to the
prevailing philosophical systems - eg. utilitarianism, theories pertaining to natural rights
and duties, and justice theories - with a new environmental ethics.
In the early 1970s philosophers began a search for a moral theory that would ethically
enfranchise non-human natural entities and nature as a whole. It was anticipated that
such an environmental ethics would deal not with human use of the environment, but
would represent a primary ethics of the environment; i.e. an ethics that would situate the
environment as the object of moral concern rather than one of mere utility (Callicott,
1979: 71-81; Holmes Rolston, 1975: 93-109). The challenge that was taken up within
the newly constituted discipline of environmental ethics was radical in its formulation
and, as observed by Passmore (1974), it promised to be a major departure from, and
would be inconsistent with, established Western philosophy and tradition (Hargrove,
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1989: 3).123 If successful in its intent in this respect, the discipline would deliver a new
moral theory independent of the rules of governance affecting traditional human
relations (Stone, 1988a: 139).
The trajectory in the evolution of environmental ethics will now be described through
reference to the diverse paradigm claims that reflect the extent of testing and
experimentation in the development of new theory within the discipline of environmental
ethics. Some of these claims, which are perhaps inadequate in terms of their promise to
resolve the environmental crisis, will be shown to be set quite clearly within the context
of traditional value theory and are characterised by their advocacy of evolutionary
change. Others will be shown to be somewhat narcissistic, in the sense that whilst they
may ultimately offer some promise to resolve the environmental crisis through
revolution, they have yet to confirm the validity of their underpinning fundamentals to
the extent that they can secure widespread allegiance and find application, for example,
in the current endeavours of environmental policy development.
3.3 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: A DISCIPLINE OF DIVERSE PARADIGM-
CLAIMS
3.3.1 Paradigms: a dead metaphor for environmental ethics?
The growing pool of value theory in environmental ethics is typically constructed around
arguments supporting the various convictions that humans have pertaining to their own
value and that of the nonhuman world. Sagoff (1991 in Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995:
173) describes the dominant forms of argument as having either an instrumental
(paradigmatically strong) or moral (often narcissistic) rationale or grounding.124
123 Passmore (1974: 186f£)argues that conventional morality is sufficient to justify ecological concern. What is required,
he holds, is not so much a new ethic as a more general adherence to a familiar ethic; i.e. whereby damage to
ecosystems should be interpreted as injury to persons - one of the primary moral offences in traditional moral
teaching.
124 In the Land ethic, Leopold (1991) characterises this dichotomy within the realm of the relationship between humans
and the nonhuman world as the A-B cleavage,where A is associated with the valuation of land in terms of its
anthropocentric human utility and B is associated with an understanding of the land as a biotic whole,
possessing a value which exceeds anthropocentric utility (Leopold, 1991: 258-259). The discussion of Aldo
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Instrumental arguments, that are usually labelled as being anthropocentric in character,
are constructed around the deep-rooted tradition of assignment of value to the
nonhuman world insofar as this satisfies human preferences [individual and social
preference values (Holmes Rolston, 1988: 254-255)] and meets human needs. Criteria
such as the special relationship between humans and God and a unique consciousness
or rationality are typically offered as justification for the requisite status for the attribution
of intrinsic value to humans, and that failure to meet the criteria extended in this
argument relegates the nonhuman environment to the status of instrumental value only
(Fox, 1995: 151). Instrumental value theory is, therefore, grounded in the axiom that
humans are intrinsically valuable in and of themselves whilst the nonhuman world is
valuable mainly insofar as it is of instrumental value for the achievement of human
ends; i.e. the environment is perceived as merely a secular object, a pool of resources
to be used to satisfy human needs and preferences (Drengson, 1980: 231). Moral
arguments pertaining to the value of the nonhuman world capture the obligations that
arise from a nonanthropocentric sense of reverence, affection and respect for
nonhuman natural entities. Such arguments reject the axiom that the nonhuman world
has value only insofar as it is of utility value to humans, and promote the attribution of
intrinsic value to at least some members or aspects of the nonhuman world (Fox, 1995:
162). Intrinsic nonhuman value theory is, therefore, grounded in the axiom that nature
itself is worthy of value and is not valuable merely because of the benefits it confers on
humans.
The discipline of environmental ethics is quite predictably populated by a strong
contingent of counterculture advocates of the postmodern paradigm in which intrinsic
value theory and radical forms of environmental ethics find their context. In this respect,
it is the counterculture view that conventional paradigms - the loci of instrumental value
theory - are simply one of many possible interpretations of reality, and that they are no
more binding than any other paradigm. Through a distorted interpretation of Kuhnian
theory, the argument posited is that paradigms are culturally constructed, not
discovered, and that the authority of the currently dominant paradigms pertaining to
Leopold's land ethic (vide Section 3.4.2) refers to the opposing perceptions of man the conqueror versusman the
member of the biotic community as one paradox that creates the A -B cleavage.
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value theory are thereby severely diminished, leaving room for any number of valid
'new-paradigm' theories and positions - including those pertaining to environmental
ethics - to emerge and command an allegiance. The prevailing rational worldview is
thus considered to be arbitrary [supposedly based on theoretical speculation and
guesswork (Wilson, 1998: 56)], relative, socially constructed, interpretive (it does not
reveal anything fundamental about reality), power-laden, ideologically skewed, and non-
progressive.
As stated by Cheney (1989: 118), truth according to the 'new-paradigm' argument is
simply the result of social negotiation. Wilber (1998: 27 -28) characterises this distortion
of Kuhn's definition of paradigms - a mode of problem-solving that is firmly structured
around acknowledged laws, sets of established first principles, standards and
instrumental techniques - as the narcissistic view that any theory can represent a valid
universe of perception and explanation from an empirically independent base - which,
as a consequence, avoids exposure to testing of its merits. A 'new-paradigm' claim
cannot be tested since the abstract theory remains divorced from evidence and is,
therefore, placed in an incommensurable position relative to any other theory. The
narcissistic view is that since 'new paradigms' are allegedly not required to be grounded
in facts and evidence (they are created), they are not tied to the authority, for example,
of the prevailing rational worldview (vide Paehlke, 1988: 291). Devall and Sessions
(1985: 227) illustrate this narcissism through reference to Arne Naess' view on deep
ecology, which he (Naess) states is 'only his version ... and that many versions need to
be worked out'.
The traditional demand for validity claims, which has always provided the grounding for
entrenched paradigms of environmental value, is not yet evident in these 'new-
paradigm' theories. They represent what Wilber (1998: 33) defines as ideas - i.e. they
are "creative affairs" [vide Drengson's (1980: 240) advocacy of deep ecology] - and
demands for revolution that tend to be disconnected from the counter demand for
evidence, truth and injunction. Alternatively, where they may warrant paradigm status,
their promise of arresting the pathology in the human-environment relationship attracts
only a narrow sphere of allegiance due, it will later be argued, to their reductionism and
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monological moulding, which differs little, for example, from the reductionism of
traditional economic theory, and, therefore, commands limited appeal.
The potential for tension within the discipline of environmental ethics is thus apparent
from the divergence that has developed in value theory and, as a consequence, the
quest for a unifying theory of environmental value is proving to be elusive. It can be
argued that it will remain elusive for as long as there is the distortion of Kuhn's
understanding of paradigms and the (perhaps unconscious) abuse of this metaphor by
'new-paradigm' claimants within the discipline. No unified theory of value will emerge for
as long as competing paradigms are stated in terms of monistic claims,
incommensurable with competing views, with no invitation for dialogue. In a situation
where competing claims exist in a competitive, dissociated state, there is little scope for
the essential integration of the dissociated human cultural value spheres, which, in
many respects, find their loci in the diverse theories of environmental value that have
been developed.
Based on the extent of distortion of the paradigm concept, its usefulness for application
within the discipline of environmental ethics is diminished. Perhaps it is a dead
metaphor in this context? Nevertheless, if it can be acknowledged that there are certain
views of the world that are grounded in concrete injunctions and socially assimilated
practice, and that these can be distinguished from the proliferation of views about which
there is currently no clear consensus, it is possible to classify the pool of emerging
theory within the discipline of environmental ethics according to a paradigm/new-
paradigm differentiation. In the sections that follow, this classification is employed to
differentiate between what may be termed entrenched paradigms of environmental
value and 'narcissistic new-paradigm' claims in this respect. This relates specifically to
the previously described dichotomy between anthropocentric instrumental value theory
and nonanthropocentric intrinsic value theory, which characterise the polar extremes of
a wide spectrum of differing forms and combinations of value theory (Eckersley, 1992:
33). The discussion that follows briefly traverses this spectrum, beginning with the most
extreme form of entrenched economistic instrumental value theory and concluding with
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an overview of the pool of 'narcissistic theory' located at the nonanthropocentric and
radical extremes of the spectrum.F"
3.3.2 Entrenched paradigms of environmental value: Instrumental value theory
The metaphysical qualities of humanity's relationship with God provide a questionable
ethical basis to the argument that differentiates between the intrinsic and instrumental
values of humans and the nonhuman world respectively. However, Baxter (1974, in
Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995: 382) suggests that in reality it is human rationality that
defines the way people perceive their dominant position over the nonhuman world, the
value of which has no normative definition except by reference to the needs and
satisfactions of humans. In Baxter's view, the human dependency on the instrumental
value of nature and the pursuance of self-interest through the efficient use of resources
guarantees the existence of the nonhuman world in a variety of humanly optimal states
(Baxter, 1974: 382). The managed states of the environment, and the goods and
services which the environment provides in such states, therefore reflects the extent to
which trade-offs are made by humans in satisfying preferences which are derived from
the selective allocation of the earth's stock of resources to various end uses.
Unrestrained exploitation and expansionism is the archetypal form of entrenched
economistic instrumental value theory. It is based on the instrumental value of the
nonhuman world that is derived from its physical transformation and it is measured
primarily in terms of an economic currency (Fox, 1995: 152).126While expansionism
remains possible within environmental frontiers that are perceived to be limitless, the
physical transformation value of the environment is equated with economic growth
which in turn, is considered to represent 'progress' (Daly, cited in Ravaioli, 1995: 58).
This value theory is based on short-sighted economic determinism, has little synchrony
125 The term 'radical' is used to define movements such as deep ecology, ecofeminism, social ecology and bioregionalism,
which share the assumption that mainstream environmentalism and environmental ethics are inadequate in the
sense that they provide only superficial understanding of the causes and structure of environmental problems.
They demand complete transformation, not only of hum an consciousness with respect to the environment, but
also behaviour and societal structures (Hattingh, 1999: 70).
126 Also described as frontier economics (eg. Boulding, 1966).
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with any greater environmental context and does not take into account the interests of
future qenerattons.!" Paradoxically, value is generated by creating scarcity; i.e.
depleting and degrading resources increases their measured value - ultimately disabling
humanity, the economy and the functionality of ecosystems on which they rest (Colby,
1989: 9). Human ingenuity and technological fixes are relied upon to deal with the
longer-term environmental externality costs that accompany the perceived benefits of
economic growth and progress.
One of the reactive, and by now well entrenched, positions in instrumental value theory,
which arose in response to unrestrained exploitation and expansionism, is defined as
resource conservation and development.128 It is also based on the value which is
derived from the physical transformation of the nonhuman world; however, it
demonstrates a long term focus through its sensitivity to the limits that are set by the
finiteness of the earth's natural resources and is grounded, therefore, in the dual axioms
of management for maximum sustainable yield and waste minimisation (Fox, 1995:
153-154). Eckersley (1992: 35-36) explains the general acceptability ofthis value theory
which arises from the fact that it has an anthropocentric grounding that seeks "the
greatest good for the greatest number", including future generations. This is achieved,
theoretically, by reducing waste and inefficiency in the exploitation and consumption of
nonrenewable natural resources and ensuring a maximum sustainable yield in respect
of renewable resources. The efficient maximisation of yields and the sustainability of
resource use emerge from the development and conservation aspects that are
respectively promoted by the theory (Fox, 1995: 154). Although certain of the
incongruencies associated with Pinchotist conservation have already been discussed in
Section 3.2.1, a criticism which many environmentalist factions reserve for this form of
value theory is that it promotes a 'total-use' approach whereby nothing is left in its
natural condition (Eckersley, 1992: 35).
127Advocates of economic expansionism argue that depletion of natural resources is inevitable and that the economic
growth that accompanies this is essential if there is to be an accumulation of human-made capital (substitutable
for natural capital) which can benefit future generations (Barrett and Grizzle, 1999: 25).
128 The popularisation of the modem doctrine of conservation and development can be traced to Gifford Pinchot's
environmental management philosophy (vide Section 3.2.1).
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A second - also now well entrenched - reactive position that arose in response to
unrestrained exploitation and expansionism is captured by the definition of resource
preservation, which Fox (1995: 154) describes as the third main form of instrumental
value theory. Here, the axiological emphasis is on the maintenance of patterns of
existence of species, systems and biophysical processes and on the moral
responsibility to minimise the physical transformation of nature in order to assure its
value for human utility. Although resource preservation is classified here as a form of
instrumental value theory, Passmore (1974: 73, 111) regards it as axiomatic that true
preservationist arguments rest upon attributions of intrinsic value to nonhuman nature;
i.e. that preservation is about saving natural things for their own sakes and that
preservationists who use anthropocentric arguments are not true preservationists.
Whereas resource conservation, which is stated as the anthropocentric action of saving
natural resources for consumption, Passmore interprets preservation as having a
nonanthropocentric and non-utilitarian focus on saving such resources from damage
and destruction. Norton (1986a: 212-213) is critical of the philosophical distinction that
Passmore and others make between conservation and preservation based on
anthropocentic versus nonanthropocentric motives, rather than acknowledging the
important nuances of environmentalist objectives. Norton argues that the distinction
between anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric motives loses importance as
emphasis is placed on the longest term values humans place on the protection of
biological diversity - irrespective of the different motives they have for such protection.
Several anthropocentric arguments have been presented for the preservation of the
nonhuman natural world. For example, Godfrey-Smith (1979: 310) argues for the
preservation of nature on the basis of its importance: as a stockpile of genetic diversity
for agricultural, medical and other purposes; for scientific study; for recreation; and for
aesthetic pleasure and spiritual inspiration. Sessions (1989) also describes the
instrumental value of resource preservation in terms of the life support and
psychogenetic functions which are derived from the nonhuman world, where: life
support functions include the free goods and services which are essential for the
healthy physical survival of humans (for example, clean air and protection from ultra-
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violet radiation) and; psychogenetic functions relate to the values which humans derive
from the range of contexts and experiences that the nonhuman world offers (eg. the
importance of un-managed places as a refuge from the heavily managed aspects of
human existence). Linked to these values is the symbolic instructional value (eg. the
value of species in nature as examples of survival), which the natural world offers to
humans (Norton, 1986b: 13; Ehrenfeld, 1978: 184). In this respect, it is argued that
species that survive in living, un-managed natural systems ought to be preserved
because they provide powerful symbols of human freedom. Other instructional values of
natural systems include the models of efficiency, cooperation and harmony that they
represent.
Early initiatives of American preservationists such as John Muir set a precedent for the
reservation of wilderness areas to be excluded from development and conservation
management (Section 3.2.1). Eckersley (1992: 39) suggests that the campaigns for
wilderness preservation, more than any other environmental activism, have presented
the greatest philosophical challenges to the dominant social paradigm of human
domination over nature, thereby forcing theorists to confront the question of moral
standing of the nonhuman natural world. In this respect, John Muir's pantheist
worldview, around which he constructed his preservationist values, still persists to some
extent within the metaphysical dimension of contemporary intrinsic value theory.
However, the development of ecological knowledge since Muir's time has caused a shift
in emphasis from the ecstatic pantheism which he associated with places and things of
outstanding natural beauty to a more holistic pantheism which is sensitive to all of the
richness of the nonhuman natural world; i.e. not only those elements which are
apparently of direct psychogenetic value to humans. The ecological wisdom of this shift
in emphasis is linked (inter alia) to the science of island biogeography, which
demonstrates the futility of attempts to preserve biological diversity within small isolates
or fragments of landscapes (wilderness areas, for example), which at some time might
have been representative of previously expansive natural systems.129 From an
129 The theory of island biogeography developed by MacArthur and Wilson (1961) states that the biological diversity
comprising island ecosystems exists at equilibrium, where the total number of species is determined by the
point at which the rate of species immigration equals the rate of extinction. Big islands contain more species
than small islands and remote islands support fewer species than less remote islands. In a mainland situation, a
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ecophilosophical perspective, Callicott (1991 :14-15; 1994: 65-67) has also advocated
that the preservationist emphasis on the ecstatic experiential value of isolated
wilderness areas, which humans periodically seek from their position in the developed
world, is less significant than the need for a shift in human appreciation of the integral
symbiotic connectedness between humans and the whole nonhuman natural world
[vide Leopold's views on organicism and human membership of the biotic community
(Section 3.4.2)]. Such an appreciation might prevent the destiny of decay described by
Rodman (1977: 112) whereby "the logic of preserving wilderness and wildlife on artificial
islands surrounded by the sea of civilization seems to involve its own mode of
destruction"; i.e. if the focus of preservationism is on wilderness and not on addressing
issues such as overpopulation and pollution, the latter problems will sooner or later
impact upon, if not destroy the wilderness (Eckersley, 1992: 41 ).130
3.3.3 Narcissistic new-paradigm claims: Intrinsic and radical value theory
As discussed in the introductory section to this chapter, much of the philosophical
debate within the discipline of environmental ethics has centred on the problem of
constructing an adequate theory of intrinsic value for nonhuman natural entities and for
nature as a whole (Callicott, 1985: 257). This is reflected in the many forms of intrinsic
value theory that have evolved subsequent to Aldo Leopold's exploratory development
of an environmental philosophy extending beyond the instrumental value paradigm. Fox
(1995: 162) classifies the various approaches to intrinsic value theory into four main
sample area within a particular system (eg. a newly demarcated wilderness area) is not in internal equilibrium - it is
in equilibrium with areas across its boundaries and will contain a diversity of species at levels that are maintained by
individuals migrating in from the larger landscape. Take away the landscape (i.e. transform the sample area of
wilderness into a small island distantly separated from other natural landscape) and the balance changes. Many
biota, particularly rare species, cannot maintain themselves independently, and vanish from the isolate; i.e.
biological diversity decreases and ecosystem decay sets in (Quammen, 1996: 443).
130 Beck (1995: 36-38) asks what characteristics of the nonhuman natural world preservationists wish to preserve? He
suggests that the process of human interaction with nature has consumed and transformed it into a meta-reality
that can no longer rid itself of the attributes of human (co-) creation [see also Comer (1977) and Haila (1997)].
In Beck's view the irreversible artificiality of nature is confirmed by its conservation through ecological
intervention and its construction according to ecological principles. The social consumption of nature (eg. by
preservationists) renders philosophically invalid the concepts and theories that conceive of nature as the
counter-image of human activity and power. In a similar query, Callicott (1994: 64-65) challenges the perceived
dualism of modem man being apart from nature and refers to the extensive anthropomorphisation of both the
old and new worlds long before the advent of modem man.
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types, which he describes as: Ethical Sentientism; Biological Ethics and Autopoietic
Ethics; Ecosystem Ethics; and Cosmic Purpose Ethics. There are also several politically
more radical forms of environmentalism that have emerged, which include Deep
Ecology, Transpersonal Ecology, Ecofeminism, Social Ecology and Bioregionalism, as
well as other extremist movements that will not be described here.131 The discussion
that follows deals with these value theories as a group that may be termed narcissistic
'new-paradigm' claims since, as previously stated, they currently have a weak injunctive
grounding in already established social practice that might otherwise warrant their
classification as paradigms in the Kuhnian sense.
The first example of a 'narcissistic new-paradigm' claim is described by Fox (1995) as
Ethical Sentientism, or awareness-based ethics, and is derived from a rejection of
criteria such as intelligence, autonomy and reason, which instrumental value theorists
include as justification for limiting the attribution of intrinsic value to humans. The
rationale for this rejection emerges from a logical conclusion to the argument that value
is attributable only on the basis of such criteria, which is that many humans - infants and
people who are comatose, for example - would not qualify as being intrinsically
valuable. The untenable implications of this conclusion conflict with the moral norms of
human society and, as Fox (1995: 163) observes, the standards for acceptance of all
humans within the realm of moral considerability have, therefore, been adjusted to
circumvent this dilemma. The philosophical basis upon which such adjustment in value
paradigms might be extended to the nonhuman natural environment is commonly linked
to the argument posited by Jeremy Bentham, that the call for racial equality amongst
humans could equally apply beyond this domain to include animals (Singer, 1995 in
Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995: 52). In this respect, advocates of ethical sentientism
argue that the adjustment of value criteria, through which human society is advantaged,
can be extended to attribute intrinsic value to nonhuman natural entities, using
sentience as a qualifying criterion. Peter Singer in his protest for animal liberation holds
131 Earth First! provides an example of a loosely organised extremist environmentalist movement whose mission is to
save wilderness through sabotaging the 'machines' that are perceived to destroy it. Its methods include
demonstrations, guerilla theatre, civil disobedience, and monkeywrenching. Significantly, there is an allegiance
within the movement to the Malthusian view pertaining to human population control. Merchant (1992: 173-
176) describes this and other radical positions in green politics.
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the view that all biota that have a capacity for sense perception have interests (for
example, higher order biota such as mammals, birds, fish and reptiles). He argues that,
particularly in the case of animals, which can experience pain and suffering, there can
be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration and to
count it equally with the like suffering of any other being (Singer, 1995: 52).132
Tom Regan's case for animal rights, which is also grounded in ethical sentientism, is
based on his critical interrogation of contractarianism/utilitarianism as a value system
(Regan, 1985 in Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995: 73). According to Regan,
contractarianism - which centres on the idea that morality consists of a set of rules that
a constituent of individuals voluntarily agree to abide by - fails in human society due to
the moral dilemma that arises when it cannot deal with injustices affecting 'non-
signatories' of such contract rules. Since the moral norms of society cannot deny
human justice in such situations, there is no rational case for denying justice in the case
of 'non-signatory' animals (Regan, 1985 in Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995: 74).
Utilitarianism - which is based on the principles of universal equality and the
achievement of the best aggregative balance of satisfaction of human interests - fails on
account of its moral focus firstly, on the satisfaction of an individuals' interests, not on
the individual whose interests they are and secondly, on the achievement of the best
aggregative consequences for everyone concerned, which are not necessarily the best
for each individual (Regan, 1985 in Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995: 76). Regan,
therefore, proposes a rights view which respects the equal inherent value of all
individuals and extends the scope of moral consideration beyond human intrinsic value
to include all entities which are subjects of a life and which have some level of
perceptual capability and psychophysical identity.
Biological Ethics and Aufopoietic Ethics advance the concept of the intrinsic value of
entities which are subjects of a life, by discarding the criterion which requires such
132 Animalliberationists use the term speciesism to describe the belief that humans are entitled to treat members of other
species in away that would be wrong to treat humans, and regard it as a form of prejudice no less objectionable
than racism or sexism. Such liberationists believe that a transcendence of speciesism will require greater
altruism on the part of mankind than any other liberation movement, since animals are incapable of demanding
it for themselves (Singer, 1995 in Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995: 59).
Michael Burns Chapter 3, Evolution of Environmental Ethics, Page 116
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Co-Evolutionary Relationships Between Environmental Ethics And Environmental Assessment
entities to be aware of their interests. It is argued that if interests are worthy of moral
consideration, then to add the pre-condition that an entity has to be aware of its
interests before these warrant moral consideration amounts to sentience chauvinism;
i.e. discrimination which relegates all of the non-sentient biological world to an irrelevant
moral status (Fox, 1995: 166, 168). Once the criterion of sentiency is discarded, this
immediately extends the realm of moral considerability to all animate subjects which
have nonsentient interests in maintaining their life and health (primitive biota, all plants
and animals); i.e. the condition of being alive is the central qualifying criterion for the
attribution of intrinsic value (Goodpaster, 1978: 319). The most significant end to which
living things continually strive is to produce and sustain their own internal organisational
activity and structure through regenerative processes - a property which Varela et al.
(1974) term autopoiesis. Capra (1983: 271-272) distinguishes autopoietic processes
from those associated with inanimate self-organizing systems by their qualities that
permit the overall pattern of an organism (or living system) to be preserved and
maintained under a variety of environmental conditions. Such processes account for the
relative stability of individuals, taxa and systems, despite the fact that they might change
over time - for example, through evolution and ecological succession. The criterion of
autopoiesis, therefore, advances the concept of respect for the intrinsic value of
individual subjects of a life to include as living systems all process-structures that
continuously strive to regenerate their own organisational activity and structure; i.e.
autopoietic ethics acknowledges the moral considerability of ecosystems, the ecosphere
and, conceivably, more abstract kinds of entities such as species and gene pools (Fox,
1995: 172; Goodpaster, 1978: 323).133
Ecosystem Ethics and Ecosphere (or Gaian) Ethics represent a subsystem of
autopoietic ethics and are an extension of Leopold's land ethic (Section 3.4.2), which is
captured in his focus on the biotic community [or ecosystem] (Leopold, 1991: 262).134
133 Taylor (1986: 119-129), who supports the concept of a life-based ethics, provides a somewhat contrary view to
Goodpaster by acknowledging the intrinsic value of living individuals (biological ethics), not systems (autopoietic
ethics). This raises the question as to how the interests of individual elements of systems (ecosystems, for
example) can be defended without defending the interests of the whole system - the functioning of which is not
reducible to the separate functioning of its individual components.
134 Heffernan (1982: 247) has reformulated this central definition of the land ethic by replacing the term 'biotic
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James Lovelock, for example, extends the concept of an ecosystem ethics to include
the autopoietic ecosphere as a whole, which he terms Gaia after the Greek goddess of
the earth (Lovelock, 1979).135Although this line of environmental ethics focuses on the
moral considerability of self-regenerating systems, this is not taken to the extent of
environmental fascism where the interests of individuals might be considered important
only insofar as they contribute to the integrity of systemic wholes (vide Marietta, 1988:
251). The moral considerability of individual biological organisms is strengthened, rather
than subordinated to the interests of ecosystems and the biosphere, by virtue of the fact
that they contribute in an essential way to some greater intrinsically valuable whole.
Because the interests of the individuals that constitute systemic wholes are guaranteed
to be served by the maintenance of the integrity of such wholes, this requires limitations
to be set on the behaviour of individuals that could threaten this integrity. Therefore,
ecosystem and ecosphere ethics respect the individualism of biological organisms and
the evolutionary paths which they might follow to the extent that this does not place at
risk the autopoietic functioning of the greater ecosystem or ecosphere of which they are
members (Fox, 1995: 179). Q'Riordan (1986: 3-4) characterises Gaianism as a position
from which the cosmos is recognised as being bigger and more wonderful than the
human mind can encompass. It is, therefore, regarded as prudent to provide a buffer
between what is thought to be technologically possible and what is believed to be
desirable. Gaianists argue that all development must be sustainable in ecological terms;
in particular, caution is advocated concerning the aggregate consequences of
individually minor alterations of the environment by human development.
Cosmic Purpose Ethics assume that in addition to humans, some or all nonhuman
entities are morally considerable because they embody or are expressive of some kind
of metaphysical cosmic interest relating to the ultimate ends of evolution and/or God's
community', which is used by Leopold, with the term 'ecosystem'.
135 Lovelock (1979) focuses on the autopoietic dynamics that have altered the earth's atmospheric conditions to the
extent that the chemistry of the air and water is controlled within predictable limits, despite perturbations in
solar flux. O'Riordan (1986: 4) explains Lovelock's understanding of this ecosystemic effect as an evolutionary
self-protecting mechanism which the ecosphere has developed as a functioning who/e.
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purpose (Fox, 1995: 179).136For example: Bookchin (1982), who is an advocate of
evolutionary nontheism, derives his views from the argument that evolutionary
processes advance individuation, freedom and selfhood; the evolutionary pantheistic
approaches of other cosmic purpose ecophilosophers place God in the position of
directing all aspects of the universe towards the realisation of ever greater richness of
experience or intensity of feeling (Skolimowski, 1981: 117); Christian fundamentalists
who attribute intrinsic value to the nonhuman natural world base their non-evolutionary
views on the biblical reference to God's creation of the world in its completed state and
justify the moral considerability of all creation through reference to God's expressed
satisfaction with His creative work [ "... God looked at everything he had made, and he
was very pleased" (Genesis 1: 31)]. From these examples, it is clear that a cosmic
purpose ethics is characterised by a hierarchy of intrinsic value that places humans in
the top evolutionary, or God appointed, position. Although this position is significant in
terms of how issues of competing rights might be resolved, it is not assumed that this
assigns humans with an automatic right to dominate entities of lesser intrinsic value.
A number of value theories have evolved towards the radical extreme of mainstream
environmentalism. Examples of these include the modernistic ethics of Deep Ecology
and Social Ecology and the post-modernistic ethics of Bioregionalism.137 Although the
different emphases of these ethics appeal to various constituencies, they offer a
common critique of industrial society and shallow environmentalism and are united in
their rejection of materialism and instrumentalism (Devall, 1991: 248). An emphasis on
the need for changes in the human conceptualisation and spiritual identity of 'Self (a
strong element particularly of Deep Ecology), the institutions and hierarchies of society
and the relationships between humans and the greater ecosphere draw these radically
inclined ethics towards the extreme position they hold on the ecophilosophical
136 It is the enriching metaphysical dimension of cosmic purpose ethics that differentiates this line of intrinsic value
theory from those previously described. However, it does introduce an unfalsifiable theoretical grounding
which is more difficult to defend or rationalise compared to most other naturalistic forms of intrinsic value
theory. Many ecophilosophers regard this as its disqualifying weakness (Fox, 1995: 184).
137 Ecqftminism is another example of environmentalism that gravitates towards the radical extreme of the
ecophilosophical spectrum - which is not discussed in this chapter. The truly radical extreme of
environmentalism, for example the Earth Firs/movement, which is described, for example, by Manes (1990), is
also not addressed in this dissertation.
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spectrum. According to Naess (1973a: 95-100) a radical ethics is distinguished from the
approach to problem-solving that is conceptualised in an isolated fashion, requiring mild
reform, in that a holistic view of the human position within the biosphere is assumed
(biospheric egalitarianism) and that deep change in the form of human life is required.
As described by Hattingh (1999: 70) such ethics share the assumption that mainstream
(shallow) environmentalism and environmental ethics provide a superficial
understanding of the environmental problematic and therefore call for inappropriate
responses, such as slight reformations of values, preferences, practices and
institutions. The radical call that is made is for a complete transformation, not only of
human consciousness (particularly with respect to human status within the biosphere),
but also human behaviour and societal structures.
Deep Ecology, as it has evolved since its original formulation described by Naess
(1973a), is a normative, ecophilosophical movement which has its grounding partly in
the experiences of humans in nature and partly in the knowledge base of ecology and
the life sciences - eg. conservation biology (Devall, 1991: 248). It is a probing,
challenging kind of ecology that Naess differentiates from the more conventional
apolitical kind, and it clearly distinguishes itself by questioning the compatibilities
between human society and ecosystems (Devall and Sessions, 1985 in VanDeVeer and
Pierce, 1994: 216). It has a strong biocentric emphasis which recognises humans as
equal participants in the biosphere (biocentric egalitarianism) and it represents the
antithesis of anthropocentric environmental positions that promote the superiority of
humans over other species (Sale, 1988: 670). The biospheric egalitarianism of deep
ecology and its cognizance of the principles of ecological interconnection introduce the
conclusion that no large-scale impacts on ecosystems will be without their effects on
human life (Drengson, 1980: 233).
In addition to its grounding in biocentric equality, deep ecology is based upon the
ultimate norm of self-realisation. Ecological self-realisation is derived from the process
of searching for a deep ecological consciousness and state of being which is achieved
through a meditative and questioning process and way of life that sustains the widest
possible identification with other life forms and entities (Devall and Sessions, 1985 in
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VanDeVeer and Pierce, 1994: 216; Warwick Fox cited in Eckersley, 1989: 114). The
achievement of such self-realisation permits humans to experience the ultimate level of
sensitivity towards the richness and diversity of life and allows the transcendence of
human relations to embrace the larger community of all living beings beyond any
ontological divide between the human and nonhuman realms (Naess, 1995a in Pierce
and VanDeVeer, 1995: 193). Naess draws a conceptualisation of the human Self from
the metaphysical inspiration that he derives from Gandhi's philosophy of spiritual growth
through liberated self-realisation (atman, the achievement of the supreme or universal
Self) and his belief in the unity of humanity with all living beings.138 In this context of
biocentric (or ecocentric) equality, maximal realisation of human potentiality cannot be
achieved if this compromises the potentials of realisation of other biota (current and
future generations) - eg. through the depletion of biological diversity, retardation of
evolution and a reduction in the complexity of ecosystems (Naess, 1973b: 232 ).139.140
The achievement of high levels of realisation of human potentialities implies that there is
a recognition of the intrinsic value of nonhuman biota and ecosystems and that there is
an acknowledgement of their equal right to achieve the highest level of self-realisation
(Naess, 1973b: 236).141
138 Self-realisation goes beyond the Western self, which Devall and Sessions (1985 in VanDeVeer and Pierce, 1994: 216)
define as the isolated ego striving primarily for hedonistic gratification. It is in reaction to this that deep
ecologists search for new lifestyles that are less hedonistic and exploitative of nature than lifestylesin the middle
and upper-middle classes in advanced industrial societies (Devall, 1991: 257).
139 The potentials of realisation of many biota have already been severely impacted by the physical transformation of
terrestrial ecosystems by humans. Such transformation has ended many millions of years of speciation within
the taxa of higher order vascular plants and vertebrates, and accelerated extinction is likely to continue in
response to shrinking areas of remaining natural habitat (Quammen, 1996: 549).
140 Aligned with N aess' conceptualisation of the human Self, Allendorf (1997) cited by Regosin and Frankel (2000: 322)
describes certain parallels between Zen Buddism and modem ecology, which share a non-dualistic
understanding of the fundamental identity of subject and surroundings. The latter authors argue that other
religions, in particular Jewish teachings, also promote the awareness of the interconnectedness of humans with
their environment as well as a reverence of that environment.
141 Although the intuition ofbiocentric equality is true in principle, deep ecologists acknowledge that mutual predation
and competition amongst species is a biological fact of life; i.e. it is natural that humans, like other species, will
modify some ecosystems. However, it is argued that we should be encouraged to livewith minimum rather than
maximum impact on other species and the Earth in generaL In this context, the exponential rate of growth of
the human population is an issue that seriously jeopardises the potential for humans to minimise their impact
on the ecosphere. This situation is aggravated by the false needs and desires encouraged by technocratic
industrial society, which gives rise to increased production and consumption of goods without meeting the vital
needs of humans, such as spiritual growth (Devall and Sessions, 1985 in VanDeVeer and Pierce, 1994: 217,
219). Deep ecologists are sensitive to an awareness both of the quality and quantity of products they consume,
based on the principle of least harm to living beings and biocentric identity (Devall, 1991: 250).
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The protection of nature that the biospherical egalitarianism of deep ecology demands
is conceived as the protection of the Self. This conception, therefore, promotes respect
for the diversity of all human individuals and their ways of life (cultures, occupations,
economic contributions) as well as the diversity of nonhuman individuals as parts of the
whole ecosphere, beyond any hierarchical structure which places humans (or certain
classes of humans) at the top (Devall and Sessions, 1985 in VanDeVeer and Pierce,
1994: 217; Naess, 1973a: 96).142This deep ecological consciousness differs from the
focus of the 'shallow' ecology movements which aim to curb, for example, pollution and
resource depletion in order to reduce the risk which such issues present to human
health and affluence within developed countries (Naess, 1973a: 95). Shallow
environmental ideologies are criticised for the willingness of their proponents to settle
for environmental policy reforms that do not drive changes in social paradigms that are
grounded in the 'myths' of economic growth and progress and the belief that technology
is the solution to environmental problems (Devall, 1991: 248).143
The transformation which Naess believes humans are capable of undergoing, in order
to achieve the state of atman and the unity with nature which this allows is not driven by
the force of duty to any external moral law. This, rather, can be achieved by drawing on
the positive inclinations embedded within humans. As Naess sees it, compliance to an
external moral law, i.e. duty, would entail alienation in the form of self-sacrifice. Unity
with nature, however, is achieved through an expansion of the self through a process of
identification with ever widening circles of nature. In this process, driven as it is by
empathy and a sense of shared interests, the narrow egotistical self is left behind and a
142 Deep ecology is based on firm principles of social justice and the promotion of appropriate institutional structures to
support these principles (Naess, 1973a: 96-98). It is argued that the process of self-realisation cannot be
advanced unless there is an egalitarian, classless society that permits the active (and acknowledged) contribution
of all members in a variety of specialised and non-specialised societal roles. In spite of this grounding tenet of
deep ecology, the movement is criticised for its non-confrontational social analysis of issues such as class, race,
injustice, capitalism, imperialism etc. and for its apparent Malthusian emphasis on the urgency for a reduction in
the human population (Sale, 1988: 672).
143 Whilst challenging the existence of an ecophilosophical dichotomy that has no convergence potential within policy
(Section 4.4.2), Norton (1999) supports the view that shallow environmental ideologies might well be more
closely aligned with those of advocates of unlimited economic growth than with the deep ecology advocacy of
environmental responsibility.
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richer, more mature ecological Self is realtsed.!" If reality is experienced by the
ecological Self, deep ecologists argue that human behaviour will naturally follow norms
of strict environmental ethics - but without the experience of duty and scarifice (Naess,
1995a in Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995: 197).
Social Ecology is based on the premise that the problems that place human society in
conflict with the nonhuman natural world have their origins within social development
itself (Bookchin, 1990 in Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995: 231); i.e. they are not
symptomatic of a conflict, in the first instance, between society and nature. The fracture
between society and nature is viewed as an expression of the divisions within the social
realm that have long existed in the form of domination by humans over other humans in
the process of sourcing goods and services from nature. In this respect, labour has
always been viewed as the scarce enabling resource necessary to harness, produce
and profit from these goods and services and this has given rise to the social
hierarchies of slaves and masters, masters and workers. Murray Bookchin (vide
Bookchin, 1988), who leads the social ecology movement, targets the elimination of
social hierarchies as a key priority and argues for the reconstruction of a
communitarianism or anarchist politics built upon the evolutionary continuity between
the social and natural realms.145 His views are derived from an understanding of
ecosystemic communitarianism, which provides a model or "image of unity in diversity,
spontaneity, and the complementary relationships, free of hierarchy and domination"
(Bookchin, 1982: 352). Human activity must be guided by overarching evolutionary and
ecological processes, not the instrumental needs of humans, in a way that seeks to
reconnect human social activity with the natural realm (Eckersley, 1989: 115).
Translated into an ecological ethics, this model informs humans about the 'goodness' of
actions insofar as these might be conducive to the fulfilment of certain natural ends or
tendencies.
144 The ideal of self-realisation is also advanced by the establishment of decentralised, non-hierarchical institutional
structures that deep ecologists advocate for the promotion oflocal autonomy.
145 In this respect, Bookchin's ideals embrace the economic insights of Karl Marx (Bookchin, 1988 in VanDeVeer and
Pierce, 1994: 236).
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Bookchin describes evolution as developmental, moving from the simple to the
complex, from the abstract and homogenous to the particular and differentiated,
ultimately toward greater individuation and selfhood within both nature and society
(Eckersley, 1989: 100). It is the role of humans, whose advanced evolutionary state is
described as "nature rendered self-conscious", to foster desirable evolutionary
pathways in order to promote the wider "emergence of mind in the natural history of life"
(Bookchin, 1982: 275-276).146For this to realise, humans must ensure the existence of
a large pool of ecological diversity since this is the necessary "medium for anchoring
varying degrees of choice, self-directed ness and participation by life forms in their own
evolution" (Bookchin, 1986: 29-38). Social ecology recognises the evolutionary position
of humans as being elevated from the pool of "first nature" and that our uniquely human
culture, institutionalised communities, language and other advanced attributes provide
us with a "second nature" status (Bookchin, 1987: 21). This implies that humans are not
ordinary members of the biotic community equal to other blota.!" Rather, it is the
"second nature" status of humans that assigns them the role of planetary stewardship
and requires them to promote new ecocommunities and ecotechnologies that foster
diversity and the growth of nature toward states of greater intellectuality (Bookchin,
1987: 32).148In addition to broadening the evolutionary pathways towards this ideal, the
diversity that social ecologists wish to promote also assures a future for humanity and,
simultaneously, provides relieffrom the ecological and social monoculture which is the
label of modern society.
It is the perceived power of humans to divine the path of evolution that exposes social
ecology to criticism in a number of areas. The normative basis of the argument used by
social ecologists, that because something is (human rationality is a product of evolution)
therefore something else ought to be (we ought to foster the development of rationality
146 Bookchin uses the term te/os to suggest a directionality in the evolution which ultimately yields "intellectuality" - an
evolutionary quality that provides humans with a privileged status (Bookchin 1982: 364).
147 Vide the contrasting views on this issue that are expressed, for example, by Leopold and deep ecologists whose
definition of biocentric equality does not elevate the position of humans above any other biota.
148 This emphasis on the role of society to promote change and novelty differs from that advocated by Leopold which is
to preserve (inter alia) the stability of the biotic community.
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in nature), is criticised for its lack of grounding in hypothetico-deductive logic. Whilst
there may be an objective scientific basis to recognise that there is a telos in nature and
that humans are a fulfilment of a tendency in natural evolution, Eckersley (1989: 109)
asks why this ought to serve as justification for infusing human values into nature to
foster and accelerate the future course of evolution? Critics also challenge the extent to
which the human role of stewardship over nature's diversity is extended via social
ecology theory. In this respect, Ehrenfeld (1978: 127), pointing to a string of
'stewardship' failures, is critical of the humanistic aims espoused by Bookchin, which
manifest as the desire to redesign the world in the human image. A sceptical view is
taken of the definition of stewardship which, for example, aims to speed up the
evolutionary process (through biotechnology, selective breeding) since the record
shows that attempts to manipulate ecosystems, even for less ambitious ends, generally
result in reduced complexity and diversity; i.e. results which expose human ignorance
rather than demonstrate "second nature" intellect. It is argued that such lessons should
encourage society to slow down, rather than accelerate, the pace and scale of
interventions in ecosystems to levels which are commensurate with human
understanding of ecology.
Bioregionalism is the final example provided here of another 'narcissistic new-paradigm'
claim pertaining to environmental value theory. It constitutes an emerging theory that
promotes the re-instatement of an organismic comprehension of the earth, aligned with
traditional ancient Greek wisdom that perceives humanity's status as servant or trustee
of the natural environment (Schumacher, cited by Sale, 1984: 168). This
comprehension contrasts the Cartesian position of humanity as master and possessor
of nature, which the scientific and technological revolution is perceived to have
encouraged humans to assume. In this respect, the growth of mercantile and corporate
capitalism and the spread of global exploitation are viewed by advocates of
bioregionalism as expressions of the recently assumed position of dominance by
humans over nature (Sale, 1984: 168).
These advocates argue that if humans are to restore the fractured relationship with
nature, it is necessary to understand their immediate and specific place of habitation
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and to become intimately bonded and responsive to the bio-physical opportunities and
constraints revealed by local habitat; i.e. the relationships of neighbourhood and
territory (Drengson, 1980: 237). It is the importance that is attached to this
understanding of habitat that provides bioregionalism with its distinguishing qualities. A
bioregion is defined as "a part of the earth's surface whose rough boundaries are
determined by natural rather than human dictates, distinguishable from other areas by
attributes of flora, fauna, water, climate, soils and land-forms, and the human
settlements and cultures those attributes have given rise to" (Sale, 1984: 168; 1985:
43). In the context of this definition, the significance of scale is recognised and is
accommodated in the nested concept of regions within regions. The ecoregion captures
the defining attributes of biogeographic similarity at the broadest scale, where
landscape units are recognised as extending over extensive areas (hundreds of
thousands of square kilometres). Within such regions, georegions may be defined
according to distinguishing surface features such as catchment boundaries,
watersheds, mountain ranges etc. Vitaregions describe the smallest regional context,
which is most significant in terms of the scale of human habitat. It is at this scale where
both geographic features and vernacular human culture are the primary characteristics
that define the region.
Bioregionalism requires an understanding of the capacities and limits of habitats, which
can only be established through the close and attuned association that self-conscious
living in a habitat invokes. In this respect, Alexander (1990: 162) suggests that
bioregionalism is the regional fulfilment of Aida Leopold's land ethic, which, as will be
described later (Section 3.4.2), enlarges the boundary of community to include soils,
waters, plants etc. It is argued that such understanding provides a new context to
human economic activity, which does not place at risk the imperative for maintaining
bioregional complexity and diversity. It is an understanding that stands in contrast to the
large-scale transformation of the environment that has accompanied the industrial
epoch of human evolutionary development. The concepts of 'steady state' economy and
regional economic 'self-sufficiency' fit comfortably with the definition of bioregionalism,
and also contrast the drives for 'growth economies' and 'globalisation' that are currently
taking place; i.e. developments that reduce environmental complexity and increase
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threats pertaining to many aspects of human security. In promoting this notion of
'steady state', there is a critical differentiation in bioregionalism between renewable and
non-renewable resources, and the environmental and social costs of their use and
intersubstitution (Sale, 1984: 170).
Although classified as radical in its formulation, the realisation of certain aspects of
bioregionalism is perhaps a less revolutionary concept than this classification would
suggest.149 Sale (1984: 171) describes some examples of socio-political separatist
movements that are occurring in various regions of the world, and which are indicative
of an evolutionary return by human society to the context of place and habitat. These
include, for example, the recent autonomies secured by Wales and Scotland in the UK,
the Basques concessions in Spain, the break up of the Soviet Union, the drive in Africa
for economic reconstruction and self-sufficiency through initiatives such as the
Millenium Africa Programme and, as discussed by Alexander (1990: 163), several
advances made in the establishment of bioregional communities in the US.
Perhaps the biggest barrier to the securement of a broadly shared allegiance to the
concept of bioregionalism is the tension between the perception of its scientific basis on
the one hand, and its appeal as an environmental ethics, based on cultural sensibility,
on the other (Alexander, 1990: 164). The validity of the key tenets of bioregionalism,
articulated for example by Sale (1985: 50), lack broad environmentalist support, not so
much in terms of the values that they espouse, but their defended status as 'natural
laws' defining what humans must do. In this respect Williams (1985), taking into account
the complex subjectivity of human consciousness, questions whether the laws of human
society can ever be reduced to obligations imposed by 'natural laws', for example, of
geography - as specified in bioregionalist value theory. Set against the reductionism
that is implicit in such theory, cultural sensibility is seen by some allegiants of
bioregionalism as the more defendable explanation of a developing trend in what
people appear to be choosing to do in terms of promoting sustainability - through a
149 In the context of this dissertation, the new generation tools for environmental assessment (eg. SEA), which take as
their points of departure the environmental capacity to support human development and societal visioning
concerning such development (Section 2.3.3.2), indicate that bioregionalism is an evolutionary possibility.
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sense of bioregional consciousness and relationship with habitat (Berg, 1981: 3;
Alexander, 1990: 169, 173).
Through the above reference to obstacles to securing a broad community of allegiance
to bioregionalism, the deficiencies of reductionism, which apply to many of the value
theories discussed in this section, begin to emerge as an explanation for the failure of
environmental ethics to deliver a new moral theory independent of the rules of
governance affecting traditional human relations. In the following section, the
reductionistic character of theoretical monism, and the problems arising from
monological ethical claims, will be discussed. This is intended to provide a basis for the
later evaluation of the alternative, which is ethical pluralism. In this respect, it will be
argued that the potential for a dialogical relationship between multiple autonomous
theories of value, which is a key principle upon which ethical pluralism is based,
presents a more viable option than monism for supporting the practical agenda of
environmentalism. This theme of ethical pluralism will be carried through to the
conclusion of this dissertation.
3.4 MONOLOGICAL ETHICAL CLAIMS VERSUS DIALOGICAL ETHICS
3.4.1 Theoretical monism: A flawed ideal
As described by Norton (1995b: 341-345) the discipline of environmental ethics has
been largely dominated by questions of axiology, and the related systematisation of
moral intuitions, in the search for a small set of first principles to guide policy and
related decision-making insofar as this relates to moral obligations concerning the
environment. The idea is that once warranted, the moral directives informed by such
principles might also be warranted, and in this way, the outcome initially anticipated for
the development of value theory in environmental ethics was that a single correct
answer could be generated for every situation of moral consideration (Stone, 1988b;
Norton and Hargrove, 1994: 238). Theoretical monism in environmental ethics was thus
perceived to be capable of providing an overarching moral theory pertaining to the
environment - in a sense, an algorithm (Wentz, 1993: 62).
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The appeal of theoretical monism is the promise offered, that once an adopted set of
principles is found to be self-consistent, the issue of external competing principles,
which might dictate different responses to particular situations, poses no problem since
the established theory will hold precedence in the minds of its allegiants. There is thus a
natural gravitation towards monism, since it resolves the dilemma of arbitrariness and
relativism, and is reflective of the rational worldview, through which logical deliberation
and positivism apparently tend to hold greater appeal than any subjective alternative.
Aligned with the monism of traditional human ethics, such as utilitarianism, there has
also been gravitation towards theoretical monism within the discipline of environmental
ethics, most notably in the defence of intrinsic value theory against instrumental value
theory, and vice versa. The previous two sections ofthis chapter have been intentionally
structured to highlight this 'created' dichotomy between entrenched paradigms of
environmental value pertaining to instrumental value theory (Section 3.3.2) and new-
paradigm claims pertaining to intrinsic and radical value theory (Section 3.3.3).
Theoretical monism, insofar as it relates to intrinsic value theory, has largely centred on
the definition of a set of principles that deal with the question: What beings are morally
considerable? Norton (1995b: 347) explains the search for a monistic theory of value as
an endeavour that also attempts to define a fundamental entity that exists
independently of human preferences and values, which explains and underpins all
normative judgements in all situations by providing an ontological foundation for value in
nature. In attempting to deal with the inherent problems arising from ontological
arguments, there have been many attempts to specify the boundaries of moral
considerability, illustrated by some of the theoretical responses described in Section
3.3.3 (sentience, autopoeisis, etc.).
In the debate concerning intrinsic value theory, a plurality of 'rules of right action'
concerning obligations toward individual members of natural communities, communities
as wholes, etc. have emerged. To illustrate this, reference can be made to Callicott's
argument for locating intrinsic value at the level of the biotic community (Callicott, 1980:
321-329), and the subsequent response that has had to be formulated to counter the
charge of environmental fascism that such value theory invokes; i.e. that the rights of
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individuals [both animals (Regan, 1983) and humans (Hardin, 1974; Shrader-Frechette,
1994)] are held secondary to the rights of the community. In the example used here, the
specification that individual human rights should remain inviolate over the rights of the
biotic community (Callicott, 1989), illustrates the requirement that has arisen for rules of
value prlorltlsatlon.l'" It, therefore, becomes apparent that the reductionism implicit in
rules such as these, tend to erode the advantages that motivated the search for a
monistic environmental ethics in the first instance, and highlights the view that if
theoretical monism is required to be accompanied by complex sets of prioritising
principles, the justification for monism dlsappears.l" Developments in intrinsic value
theory also highlight the perhaps uncomfortable notion, that the reductionism in
theoretical monism, which narrowly defined sets of first principles and rules of priority
would seem to imply, is little different to the reductionism of neoclassical economics - a
constituent of human-based ethics, which the discipline of environmental ethics seeks
to replace, or improve upon.
Related to the above interpretation of reductionism as a flawed aspect of theoretical
monism, is the view that monistic value theories presuppose one, universal experience
of reality that can be expressed in a clear, universally accessible language - a
presupposition that is shared by logical positivism and empiricism. However, the validity
of the 'positivist' view is challenged, for example, by Quine (1963; 1969) who argues
that whilst natural knowledge is based on sense experience, language is the essential
medium for conveying the understanding of such experience (Quine, 1969: 71, 72).
Language tends to be arbitrarily adjusted to project both analytical meaning (the direct
meaning of words) and synthetic truth (processed meaning), and through the human
psychological and cognitive process a "meagre" sensory input can deliver a complex
descriptive output (Quine, 1969: 83, 86). The empiricism to which language might be
150 Shrader-Frechette (1994) argues that such 'rules' also present a conceptual problem in that firstly, they introduce an
inconsistency with respect to the claims of priority of the biotic community (for example, the welfare of the
biotic community should take priority over human rights - yet the rules contradict this) and, secondly, such
rules require the impossible maximisation of two variables (the priority of the biotic community and the priority
of human rights).
151 Related to the reductionism implicit in theoretical monism, Light and Katz (1996) criticise developments within
environmental ethics which assume that only a small set of approaches in the field is worthwhile; i.e. that only
some ways of developing an environmental philosophy will yield a morally justifiable environmental policy.
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assumed to give expression cannot, therefore, be accepted as being universally
constant or true since the laws of logic are perceived differently according to the
language in which they are applied. Thus, empiricism cannot mirror reality in a
universally replicable manner (Quine, 1963: 20; 1969: 75).152
Quine's argument can be applied to question the existence of a monistic theory of
environmental value by explaining that for any description of the world that accounts for
all human experience, including reference to the intrinsic value of nature, another
description will exist that accounts for the same experience but without reference to the
intrinsic value of nature. Regan (1980: 365) makes a similar point in his critique of
Marietta's (1979: 205) argument that ecological knowledge will impart to humans an
obligation not to harm ecosystems, by stating that the opposite response (no moral
obligation in this respect) can also emerge in spite of such knowledge; i.e. facts at hand
may be viewed differently according to individual human consciousness. Thus, the
dilemma faced by intrinsic value theorists is the acknowledgement that intrinsic value is
either knowable beyond experience (i.e. it is an intuitive, or a priori, truth) or that the
attribution of intrinsic value is a figment of arbitrary linguistic choices. The
epistemological impossibility of reducing sentences to observational and logical terms
thus becomes apparent, since there will always be an indeterminacy inherent to the
translation of sensory experience into language (Quine, 1969:81, 82). To appeal to an
intuitive knowledge of the existence of intrinsic value in nature proves impossible to
defend, and an acknowledgement of the analytic and synthetic arbitrariness of language
disqualifies any epistemological justification for such an appeal. There are no
independent facts about the world, or canons of rationality, to which appeal can be
made in the course of determining whether a particular worldview (eg. one that
acknowledges intrinsic value in nature) is correct or more reasonable than any
competing worldview (Regan, 1980: 366).
152 In apparent support of Quine's argument, Hargrove's (1989: 2) reference to logical positivism distinguishes between
the activities that scientists engage inwhen making discoveries and those they engage inwhen justifying such
discoveries; i.e. accounts of one cannot be substituted for the other.
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Norton (1995b: 348-351) argues that in spite of an inordinate philosophical
preoccupation with intrinsic value theorizing, the monistic environmental morality
advocated by applied environmental ethicists has still to clearly specify the boundaries
of moral considerability in nature. The manipulation of monistic theory, as in the case of
Callicott's response to reconciling principles of environmental holism with obligations to
individual rights, and the vagueness as to what beings are morally considerable, has left
environmentalists without a reference base that clearly defines what they are obligated
to protect (Katz, 1985: 241-256; Aiken, 1984: 269).153 The metaphysical search for a
fundamental entity that exists independently of human preferences and values, and
which provides an ontological foundation for value in nature, has thus failed to create a
strong single foundation for environmentalism. As a consequence, there has been
disillusionment in the poor return on the high expectations that environmentalists have
had in terms of the potential unifying function of a monistic, intrinsic value theory in
environmental philosophy.l'"
If theoretical monism, as described above, is a flawed concept, what then is the
alternative? In the following sections, the potential of a practical dialogical ethics,
unconstrained by reductionistic principles, and accommodating of moral pluralism, will
be proposed. To introduce this alternative, Aldo Leopold's land ethic will now be
discussed in terms of its practical emphasis and openness to accommodation of
different value positions. From the discussion, the land ethic will emerge as a template
for a pragmatic and viable environmental ethics.
153 Callicott (1996: 219) charges Norton with misinterpreting his position on intrinsic value. Contrary to Norton's claim
that he attributes value in nature as being independent of human valuations, he (Callicott) argues that there can
be no value without a valuer, something has value only if it is valued and there can be no value independent of
(human) consciousness. Ibis is an argument that is also well defended inter alia by Weston (1996: 140) and
Stone (1988b: 140); i.e. that only humans do the valuing of nature.
154 The inflexibility or limits of monistic philosophy are stated by Minteer and Manning (1999: 191) as a source of
disillusionment experienced by environmental ethicists. Aligned with the views of Norton (1995b), these
authors suggest that as a consequence, the mode of philosophical enquiry is shifting towards the practical
resolution of real world dilemmas through the accommodation of moral pluralism as a tenable position in
environmental philosophy.
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3.4.2 Leopold's land ethic: Aframeworkfor a dialogical environmental ethics
Aldo Leopold was employed by the Forest Service in the American Southwest, where
he was tasked with the implementation of Gifford Pinchot's conservation policy. A
growing realisation of the failure of the conservation philosophy to achieve the aim of
resource management for sustainable utilisation caused Leopold to critically re-form his
personal worldview on the natural environment and humanity's position within it. An
insight into his transformation from an analytic scientific resource use manager to a
philosopher of environmental management is provided in A Sand county almanac,
which contains a compendium of essays that Leopold drafted in the final decade of his
career (Leopold, 1991). The concluding essay of the compendium is The land ethic, a
seminal writing that presents Leopold's practical philosophy on the need for humanity to
develop an ecological conscience in order to foster a respectful and surviving
relationship with the natural environment. The essay is written with a pragmatic but
uncompromised sensitivity towards establishing the credibility of his management
principles amongst a predominantly anthropocentric audience. Leopold's land ethic has
had a profound influence on the development of contemporary environmental ethics
and the following review of its conceptual foundations is therefore, appropriate.
The extension of ethical criteria to various fields of conduct is described by Leopold as a
gradual process that introduces into society previously inconceivable moral ideals and
altered patterns of behaviour (Leopold, 1991: 237). Callicott (1989: 76-77) supports
Leopold's views in this regard, and describes examples of trends in emergent moral
ideals concerning issues such as civil rights, human rights and women's liberation,
which point to an extension of a modern moral consciousness. Aligned with the earlier
discussion of the evolution of human society (Section 1.2), Leopold argues that there is
a process of ecological evolution in place which determines the extension of
relationships and a social conscience between individuals in human society (the
foundation of human rights, for example) to one which encompasses humanity's
relationship to land, plants and animals (Tallmadge, 1981: 357). This relationship is
captured in Leopold's concept of the biotic community, which includes humans as
members, not as the excluded conqueror. Through similar argument, Wilson (1984: 85)
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suggests that humans have an "urge to affiliate with other forms of life [and that this] is
to some degree innate [residing as a] programme [within the brain]".155
Although Leopold suggests that an ethical consciousness that transcends egocentrism
exists in many aspects of society, land-use ethics is highlighted as being governed
primarily by economics and narrow human self-interest (Leopold, 1991: 245). He argues
that the affirmation of an ethical consciousness of humanity's relationship with the biotic
community must still be achieved through the process of evolution, which will bring
about an internal shift in human intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections and
convictions pertaining to this relationship (Leopold, 1991: 246). The evolution of the
ethical consciousness that Leopold anticipates is explained by Callicott in terms of the
extension of Humean-Darwinian "familial social sentiments" to the level of the broader
biotic community, which reflects the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to
evolve modes of co-operation (Callicott, 1989: 79).156It is Leopold's view that these
'naturally selected' sentiments or ethics endow human beings with a moral response to
perceived bonds of kinship and community membership. Through practise and lessons
learned, such an ethics is also expected to become a more prominent ecological
necessity in the evolutionary continuum which is shaping human society within the
greater environmental context; i.e. ethics not only raise moral concern for new subjects,
but ethical insight is also derived from the science of ecology (Marietta, 1982: 153).
Limitations on freedom of individual action are contingent upon the emergence of any
ethics and are, therefore, pre-requisite for the necessary mode of human cooperation
within the biotic community if its fitness and survival are to be secured. Viewed from
155 The bracketed text is added to clarifyWilson's argument in the context that it is used here.
156 Callicott (1989: 79; 1990: 121-122) explains Darwin's communitarian moral philosophy as one based on the
evolutionary traits of affection and sympathy which presented mammals with intra-familial competitive
advantages in terms of rearing offspring to maturity. In the case of the human species, which acquired the
power of speech and a capacity for abstraction, a spilloverof these traitsinto extra-familialsocietalrelationships
resulted in the eneodement of various behaviours judged to be concordant or discordant with these
competitively advantageous communal-emotional bonds - thus, giving rise to the origin of ethics. Callicott
interprets the land ethic as Leopold's extension of such ethics beyond the human species to apply to the
ecological community as a whole. Whilst Callicott's interpretation in this respect is useful to the discussion
presented here, it must be noted that he interprets the land ethic as advocating a nonanthropocentric monistic
ethics - different to the interpretation presented here, which is based on the land ethic as a form of ethical
pluralism; i.e. it accommodates both aspects of nonanthropocentrism and enlightened anthropocentrism (see
Section 3.4.3).
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Leopold's perspective, a limitation on freedom of action is not paradoxical to the
Darwinian evolutionary concept of 'survival of the fittest'. The survival of the fittest
individual species is not the central issue; rather, it is the fitness of the community that is
achieved through evolutlon.!" Collective fitness cannot be realised without limitations
on individual action, which might otherwise militate against the inter-dependent survival
of the elements of the community whole.
One of Leopold's criticisms of the practise of Pinchotist conservation, and land-use
practise in general, is the philosophy towards valuing the environment only in terms of
an economic currency.l'" Based on his understanding of systemic functional
relationships and the 'integrity' of the biotic community, which is necessary to ensure its
'stability', he was critical of the conservationist focus on instrumental valuation of only
those constituent species useful to human society (Leopold, 1991: 244_247).159He
believed that this philosophy offered little security to the continued existence of the
majority of species, communities and ecosystem processes for which no attribution of
apparent economic value could be derived. In his defence of the rights of species,
Leopold is critical of such conservationist arguments, which are founded only upon an
economic rationale for the protection of biota. To illustrate his concerns, he refers to the
manufactured economic argument presented by ornithologists in defence of threatened
songbirds - a defence based upon the birds' value only as an agent for the bio-control of
insect pests (Leopold 1991: 247). Ehrenfeld (1978: 193) points to a similar trend in
manufactured economic arguments in his discussion of the conservation dilemma,
157 Norton describes the influence that the writings of the American pragmatist Arthur Twining Hadley had on many of
Leopold's views on environmental ethics. In the context of Leopold's interpretation of the process of societal
evolution towards achieving the extension of a human moral conscience towards the broader biotic community,
Norton considers the influence of the following statement by Hadley as pertinent: "It is the institution even
more than the man that has been marked out for survival by the process of natural selection" (Hadley, 1913
cited in Norton, 1996a: 87).
158 Judging Leopold's criticism of Pinchotist conservation, Passmore (1974) cites him as an uncompromising
preservationist. However, Norton (1986a: 207) argues that Leopold did not equate 'non-economic' with
'nonanthropocentric' and, therefore, does not judge him as uncompromising. As discussed elsewhere in this
chapter, Leopold clearly did have the flexibility to adjust his nonanthropocentric intuitive beliefs to
anthropocentric arguments when arguing policy issues in the real world arena of environmental management.
159 Ehrenfeld (1978: 188) suggests that Leopold's argument for preserving species that are essential to the healthy
functioning oflarge ecosystems exposes aweakness in the defence of other species that are not essential in this
respect - i.e. species, in the absence of which, ecosystems can, nevertheless, function effectively.
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suggesting that there is a tendency to attach exaggerated and distorted humanistic
'values' to elements of nature that are not obviously 'useful' as resources.
To suggest that Leopold totally rejected economic arguments for valuing nature in terms
of its instrumental value for humans would wrongly place him outside the arena of
practical environmental management. His deep immersion and experience in
conservation imparted a pragmatism that permitted him to accept a degree of economic
rationale in environmental management. However, he argued that economic expediency
should not be the major criterion to inform land-use decisions and that ethical and
aesthetic considerations are equally important. Leopold implied that human cultures will
have to rise above economic determinism to become sensitive to ethical and aesthetic
values if they are to survive in the long run, and this is clearly reflected in his statement:
"[that each question should be examined] in terms of what is ethically and aesthetically
right, as well as what is economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends to
preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it
tends otherwise" (Leopold, 1991: 262). This view is also present in Leopold's essay,
Thinking like a mountain, which describes the cascade of environmental consequences
which result from management policies developed from the time perspective of humans,
which have no sensitivity to the larger, autonomously functioning environmental context
(Leopold, 1991: 137-141 ).160 Thus, although Leopold acknowledges that the dominant
social paradigm for attributing value to nature remains grounded in economic
arguments, he indicates that human society should draw closer to the admission of
biotic rights for species.
Although Leopold argues for the biotic rights of species, his enquiry into environmental
values transcends the issue of individual value and is concerned more with the holistic
value of the collective biotic community. This is illustrated, for example, in his
description of the 'land pyramid', which he uses to conceptualise the transfer of energy
160 Norton (1995b: 353) interprets Leopold's admonition to think like a mountain as a call to respect longer-scale values
embodied in the multi-scalar structures and processes of slow-changing natural systems and to balance these
against the short-term values of economics. Making a similar point Carpenter (1981: 176) emphasises the
mismatch between the short timetables of finance and politics and the much longer time-scales of natural
processes.
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between and across trophic hierarchies within the biotic community (Leopold, 1991:
251-258). The emphasis in Leopold's land ethic is on the holistic functioning of the
community as an 'energy unit', within which the circuit of energy between its constituent
parts is maintained more or less effectively depending upon the degree of human
impact to which the land is exposed and thereby changed. The use of the term 'energy
unit' in his characterisation of the biotic community is illustrative of the emphasis he
places on the functioning and value of the whole rather than on the individual
components.
It is the advancement of holism as one of the pillars of Leopold's land ethic that places
this 'dialectical' philosophy in a position that contrasts it against the monistic and
individualistic moral ideals that have evolved in other areas of mainstream modern
ethical philosophy. For example, Kantian and Benthamic philosophies, which attribute
moral considerability to individuals according to the criteria of rationality and sentiency
respectively, cannot be extended to justify the moral considerability of the biotic
community since, as a whole, it does not have the requisite psychological experience
upon which to extend such criteria (Callicott, 1989: 84-85). The application of moral
considerability to Leopold's ethical holism is, as discussed previously, grounded in the
inherited altruistic sentiments which human society has, or is capable of expressing,
towards other members of the biotic community. Although evolutionary science
suggests that such moral sentiments exist as an encoded societal inheritance, Leopold
suggests that they are more directly informed by the science of ecology, through which
insight is gained into the relationships of organisms to one another and to the physical
environment.l'"
The ecology that is infused into Leopold's holistic conceptualisation of the biotic
community has a rational scientific grounding in the land ethic (vide his explanation of
the pyramidal functioning of trophic processes ).162 Norton (1996a: 89) believes that this
161 Leopold's management experience brought with it an acknowledgement that knowing where the utility of individual
elements of nature begins or ends is a complex issue. He had participated in failed scientific predator
eradication programmes, aimed at maximizing species utility (deer), and had experienced the unforseen
outcomes of such programmes.
162 Contrary to Leopold's views [and the aligned views of Book chin (1982)] that only ecology provides the principal axis
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grounding in the scientific facts, for example, of physics, chemistry and geology are
offered by Leopold as first order beliefs which explain the ecological functioning of the
biotic community. Influenced by Ouspensky, the Russian philosopher who saw
organicism as an alternative to the atomistic scientific way of looking at the world,
Leopold also explored this somewhat metaphysical conceptualisation of the biotic
community in his essay Some fundamentals of conservation in the southwest (Leopold,
1979). His writing suggests that he intuitively aligned his worldview with an organicist
understanding of the earth as being an organismic whole with a slow-metabolizing life
(Norton, 1991 a: 40). However, he considered the organicist conception of the world,
and the scientific mechanistic alternative, to be second-order beliefs based on the same
first-order scientific facts, and not able to be established conclusively. Both conceptions
acknowledge the ecological interdependency and interrelatedness of the elements of
the biotic community and it is essentially the choice of descriptive language that
differentiates them (Norton, 1986a: 206; 1996: 89). The concept of sustainability, which
relates to the desire that humans have to pass on the world in an intact state to future
generations, is explained by Leopold as an intuitive third order principle which is used to
judge second order conceptions of the world. It is a guiding principle grounded in a
respect for the ancestral wisdom that truth and right action is that which prevails in the
long term.163 Short-sighted economic determinism in land management fails because it
disregards the third order principle of sustainability. Land management which is founded
upon the science of ecology, and which takes a long-range view, has the prospect of
being sustainable. In Leopold's view, it is of little relevance whether it is organicism or
long-sighted anthropocentrism that drives sustainable land use behaviour.
along which society should be organised in future, Beck (1995: 40) argues that ecology is "on the verge of
placing itself at the greatest possible distance from that 'naturalness' to which it sometimes appears disposed to
give expression". Convergence in spontaneity in the social life of society with the spontaneity in nature implies
that this would be derived from amodel offree, autonomous interaction according to an ecological "law of nature".
As Beck points out, such convergence is not happening "naturally" and in reality, the common callis for strong
authoritarian intervention to [unnaturally] manufacture the holism that Leopold advocates.
163 Sagoff (1988: 148) citing Pinchot (1910: 42) explains the contrast between Leopold's views on sustainability and the
conservationist argument that requires attention to be directed at the welfare of current generations before that
of future generations.
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Leopold's pragmatism ultimately influenced his external philosophical strategy, which
was to extract a culturally viable common thread from both organicism and
anthropocentrism. This thread was the acknowledgment of the functional
interdependency of man and the other elements of the biotic community (Leopold,
1991: 42). The construction of Leopold's land ethic around the concept of an
interdependency between the elements of the biotic community does not imply that he
ultimately embraced nonanthropocentrism. Although he rejected narrow-
anthropocentrism, he did not deny the human privilege of managing the earth's
resources nor did he advocate the acceptance of a single ultimate value to guide such
management (Hargrove, 1989: 96).164 His point was that to ensure the survival of
human life on earth within a suitable environing context, prevailing policies and
management practice had to shift away from short-sighted economic determinism
towards the adoption of a long-sighted view of humanity's position within the biotic
community. The usefulness of the organicist metaphor which he employed to inform his
vision for improved policy and land management was its focus on the functioning of
systems and processes rather than the unsustainable economic pursuit of land
management for maximum human utility.
Leopold, therefore, advocated an integrative systems approach to environmental
management. In the context of value theory, this integrative approach is interpreted as
being accommodating of dialogue between nonanthropocentric and anthropocentric
appeals to environmental value, and, where necessary, movement between these two
ethical positions. An appeal from one position is interpreted as no more or less
164 The view expressed here is aligned with the critique levelled by Norton (1991b: 181-182; 1995b: 345-354) against
Callicott's nonanthropocentric, monistic conception of value which he (Callicott) believes is central to
Leopold's land ethic, i.e. that Leopold's rejection of prevailing land-use management is a rejection of
anthropocentric instrumental value theory and that the holism/organicism which the land ethic invokes
attributes human-independent value to the biotic community as a morally considerable being. Based on this
interpretation, Callicott suggests that Leopold declared moral allegiance to the hypothesis that nature has
inherent value. However, Norton suggests that the land ethicpromotes manageria/holism and that it is morally
anthropocentric to the extent that the concept of the biotic community is offered not as a source of human
independent value but as the contextfor human actionswhich are sustainable only if the integrity and autonomous
functioning of the community is not disrupted as a consequence. Because Leopold recognised the complexity
of the interrelationships in nature and its multitude of values, Norton believes that the option Leopold chose to
advocate the protection of this complexity was the protection of the integrity of the community processes
which sustain the constituent components - including the economic and cultural values of human communities;
i.e. the land ethic advocates what should be protected, not what should be valued.
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significant than an appeal made from the other. The important point of the land ethic is
that, irrespective of the relative ethical merits of human actions and relationship with the
environment, sustainability will be guaranteed only through long-sighted understanding
of human land-use and impact on the environment. In Leopold's view, this requires an
acknowledgement of the pluralism of values according to which this broadly accepted
imperative is justified. Norton (1995b: 355-35) believes that the challenge for
democratic society to implement this management philosophy is the development of
compatible policies that promote both human interests into the indefinite future and the
protection of nature and natural processes through the application of best scientific
knowledge. This is aligned with Leopold's anthropocentric views in which the right of
humans to alter nature is not questioned, provided these alterations are consistent with
ecological knowledge and protect human life in the long run, as well as the natural
systems upon which life depends.l'" At root, however, is the challenge, articulated by
Leopold, of creating a social consciousness that will create better processes for
addressing environmental decisions that affect the interests of present and future
generations.
Environmentalism provides the fertile ground from which a social consciousness of the
kind advocated by Leopold can emerge. From the discussion in the previous section, it
is evident that theoretical monism, and the use of this framework to develop a theory of
intrinsic environmental value, has not effectively supported the practical agenda of
environmentalism to the extent that Leopold's challenge requires. The potential of
enlightened anthropocentrism, as an alternative, will now be described.
3.4.3 Enlightened anthropocentrism
Weak (or enlightened) anthropocentrism is proposed by Norton (1984a) as an
alternative and more appropriate and defensible theory of environmental value, to the
divergent extremes of value theory discussed earlier in this chapter. Norton's defence of
enlightened anthropocentrism is based on his interpretation of some of the key
165 That Leopold did not totally reject anthropocentrism is evident inhis acknowledgement that: "Granting that the earth
is for man - there is still a question: What man?" (Leopold, 1979: 141).
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elements of Leopold's land ethic, which include: the retention of humans (in particular,
the value of human consciousness) as an important source of value in nature; rejection
of individualism in favour of a holistic environmental perspective, with humans placed
within the context of their sustaining environment (equivalent to Leopold's organicism);
and a long range vision for human existence within their sustaining environment,
specifically with respect to intergenerational decisions concerning resource use and
management.
According to Norton's interpretation of the land ethic, an accommodation of a
divergency of positions other than nonanthropocentrism is a central feature of Leopold's
views, which advocate an inclusive, integrative ethics built on common denominators of
many philosophies (Norton, 1991a: 42-43, 60);166 i.e. Leopold was not a monistic
theorist for whom rejection of anthropocentrism would be a pre-requisite for an
acceptable environmental ethics.167In his discussion of the land ethic Norton (1996a:
85) describes Leopold's environmental philosophy as having developed from his
management experience and an acknowledgement of the limited scientific
understanding of complex ecosystems in terms of their sustainable utility for humans -
and not from a philosophical conversion to nonanthropocentrism as the superior
metaphysical or moral position.168Leopold clearly held certain anthropocentric views,
166 This advocacy of moral pluralism is supported by Stone (1988b) who describes moral pluralists as being able to
develop a conception of the moral realm as consisting of several schemata, whereby, according to a lexical
ordering mie, one theory might be adopted to guide relations between close human associates, others might
define obligations to fellow citizens and future generations, and yet others might guide relationships between
humans and non-human natural entities (Stone, 1988b: 152). Callicott (1990: 109-111), drawing on concerns
expressed by Wentz (1988: 313), questions how moral pluralists will act when faced with inconsistent or
mutually contradictory ethical principles; i.e. when various independent principles do not converge on a single
course of action. He suggests that if it is left only to moral intuition to prioritise conflicting principles, this leads
to inconsistency in the choices that are exercised. In this respect, Callicott finds Stone's argument weakened by
the selective choice in moral guidance which he (Stone) believes is available through recourse to the modem
and contemporary philosophies of Bentham, Kant, Leopold and others, but which alternative philosophies (not
currently in vogue) are disqualified from providing. In cases which are open to moral abuse, Callicott also
suggests that a principle which might seem most convenient or self-serving in the circumstances will tend to be
the one of choice (Callicott, 1990: 112).
167 Hargrove (1992), who presents a case for weak anthropocentric intrinsic value in environmental ethics, agrees with
Norton's interpretation of Leopold's land ethic - that environmental ethics does not need to be and cannot be
fully founded upon nonanthropocentrism.
168 In his treatise on society's need to be defended against science Feyerabend (1981), like Leopold, challenges the myth
that science (alone) provides the means of understanding the world. The exaggerated competence and
successes of science make it imperative that it should be just one of the many ideologies that propel society
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exemplified through his recognition that humans must and should manage the world. He
acknowledged that, through management, humans impact on the natural systems which
sustain them, but advised that such management would ultimately be judged successful
only if it promoted the protection of nature and, significantly, ensured the survival of the
human race in the long term. Above all, Leopold was a pragmatist in the sense that he
held the view that, given current attitudes in society, anthropocentric arguments, based
on the good of the human species, would have most appeal in environmental policy
debates.
Anthropocentrism is described by Norton (1984a: 133) as a position that treats humans
as the loci of intrinsic value and which views all elements of nature as having value that
is instrumental to the satisfaction of human interests. However, there is an ambiguity to
anthropocentrism, linked to how human interests are variously defined, which would
suggest that an environmental ethics does not need to be founded on the supposition
that this requires a rejection of anthropocentrism (Norton, 1984a: 134, 146-147). Norton
introduces two concepts of human interest, the construction of which is based on what
he defines as either felt or considered preferences. Felt preferences are desires or
needs expressed by human individuals, which can be temporarily satisfied by some
specifiable experience; considered preferences are expressed after careful deliberation
and judgement that they are consistent with a rationally adopted world view, fully
supported by a set of aesthetic and moral ideals and non-reductionistic scientific theory.
For Norton, reference to the interests and/or ideals that are embraced in various
situations furthermore determines whether a value theory may be judged strongly or
weaklyanthropocentric.169
Enlightened anthropocentrism places value not only on felf preferences but also on the
process of value formation embodied in the criticism and replacement of certain felt
preferences with more rational ones; i.e. considered preferences supported by ideals.17o
(Feyerabend, 1981: 162); i.e, an advocacy of worldview holism with which Norton credits Leopold.
169 Strong anthropocentrism assumes that human felt preferences predominate in determining value. The preference-
based, value-free and reductionistic methodology of neo-classical economics typifies strong anthropocentrism.
170 Norton (personal communication, September 1998) currently prefers the term ''broad'' or "enlightened" rather than
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Human interests constructed from considered preferences and ideals make value
formation possible that can relate to experiences of nature which are achieved through
rational and scientific reasoning as well as through experiences associated with spiritual
enrichment or other subjective and/or moral motives- i.e. experience derived from a
pluralism of values.!" Values that are thus formed are not necessarily shaped only by
the attribution of intrinsic value to nature.172 Norton's concept of the negative value of
environmentally destructive felt human preferences is consistent with Leopold's
rejection of reductionistic, shortsighted, economic reasoning. Similarly, the concept of
considered human preferences and the ideals that they foster are consistent with
Leopold's holistic approach that he advocated in opposition to economic determinism;
i.e. holistic in the sense here, that decisions should be broadly and rationally informed
both by systemic ecological knowledge and empathy for the natural environment. The
extension of human value beyond merely the satisfaction of felt preferences and the
defence of ideals against reductionism to such preferences differentiates enlightened
anthropocentrism from strong anthropocentrlsm.l"
Norton reinforces the adequacy of enlightened anthropocentrism as a distinctive ethics
by positively differentiating its non-individualistic value system from positions based on
individualistic values, which are the basic units of concern espoused by contemporary
"weak" anthropocentrism to describe his understanding of human valuation of the environment.
171 For example, Thoreau (1958) believes that nature expresses a spiritual reality from which humans can learn spiritual
value. The ideal to improve human spirituality is justified without attributing intrinsic value to nature.
172 Hargrove (1992) finds Norton's interpretation of intrinsic value confusing; i.e. that such value is instrumental in the
sense that natural objects have value only in transforming humans in their rational and responsible perspective
of the natural environment. He believes that anthropocentric intrinsic value requires little defence - valuing a
natural object for its beauty rather than its use does not have to involve confusing detours into metaphysics or
mysticism.
173 Westra (1996: 109-112) is critical of Norton's defence of enlightened anthropocentrism based on the considered
prefirences that supposedly guide rational human action. Given the complexity of ecosystems and the poor
understanding of cumulative and synergistic environmental effects of human actions, she questions the extent
to which a rational person derives considered preferences through reference to a scientific resource base of
such deficiency. It is argued that immediate needs - for example, job securement in industry that might ultimately
not be sustainable - tend to dominate over the considered preferences that supposedly inform enlightened
anthropocentric decisions. Westra is an advocate of ecocentrism and bases this position on the view that human
interests are defensible, not because humans are intrinsically valuable beings (unlike anything else) but because
both humans and non-humans share an interest in the need for a secure habitat - which is derived from
valuable contributions of all participants in ecosystemic processes; i.e. all living things are possessed of value
singly and collectively (Westra, 1996: 112).
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ethical systems such as utilitarianism and deontology (Norton, 1984a: 138-141).
Utilitarians, for example, derive ethical rules from the general principle that all actions
should promote the greatest possible happiness for the greatest possible number of
individuals; contemporary deontologists derive ethical prohibitions from individual rights
and obligations to protect those rights. As discussed in Section 3.4.2, Leopold largely
rejected individualism in favour of holism, through reference to an organicist metaphor,
which advocates a shift away from moral concern for individuals and species of plants
and animals to a concern for the biotic communitycollectively.174In this sense, he also
urged humans to alter the perception of their apartness from nature (their environmental
individualism) in favour of an acceptance of their interrelatedness with the rest of the
bio-geophysical world.175 According to Norton, Leopold believed that an
acknowledgement of this interrelatedness fosters a moral reaction to the community of
life and, as a consequence, improves the survival chances of human culture.
Norton's theory of enlightened anthropocentrism assumes that it is a worthy cause for
human culture and consciousness to be perpetuated in the long term; i.e. a universe
containing human consciousness is considered preferable to one without it (Norton,
1984a: 143). He approaches this issue by emphasising the non-individualistic
Leopoldian directive to current human generations to maintain the integrity and health of
ecosystems, and thereby guarantee a stable flow of resources necessary for ongoing
human life into the indefinite future (Norton, 1984a: 144 ).176In this way, options can be
held open, so that the reasonable needs of future humans can be fulfilled with respect
174 Shrader-Frechette (1994: 61-67) and certain other environmental ethicists recognise problems with the subordination
of the welfare of individuals to the "integrity, beauty and stability" of Leopold's biotic community, which
implies that human rights, for example, become secondary to the rights of the community.
175 Echoing Leopold's view that man should not perceive himself to be apart from nature, Callicott (1994: 63) refers to
Darwin's (1874) conclusion that there is a seamless continuity between gradually evolved man and his fellow
voyagers in the odyssey of evolution
176 Callicott (1996: 220-221) is critical of Norton's anthropocentric interpretation of Leopold's long range view, arguing
that it (the interpretation) indicates a flawed alignment with the third leg of Pinchot's three-legged utilitarian
motto: "the greatest good, of the greatest number, for the longest timl' (see Section 3.2.1). Further criticism of
the long range allocational decisions which Norton believes are resolved through enlightened anthropocentrism
is offered by Westra (1996: 112), who argues that the moral basis upon which decisions affecting the distant
future must be considered from this position, as well as the moral appeal to considered human preferences - which
may not be universally defensible (Westra, 1996: 111) - are neither easier to defend nor are less controversial
than an appeal to the intrinsic value of non-human natural entities.
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to whatever goods and services they may require, but which cannot be anticipated at
present. Attention here, is directed at the issue of ecosystemic holism, and not on the
fulfilment of specifiable individual needs. Norton points out that attempts to govern
behaviours affecting the distant future cannot appeal to individual interests and needs
of future persons since, paradoxically, the very existence of such individuals hangs in
the balance until all relevant decisions are made; i.e. the central value placed on human
consciousness cannot be perceived as the aggregation of the value of individual future
consciousnesses, since these cannot be 'counted' before current decisions on resource
allocation are made (Norton, 1984a: 144).
The maintenance of ecosystemic holism, i.e. the community of life as a fully integrated
systemic whole, which is the key focus of enlightened anthropocentrism, concerns both
non-renewable and renewable environmental resources. In terms of Norton's value
theory, it is implied that current generations should not harvest more than the maximum
sustainable yield of renewable resources; there is also an obligation to maintain a stable
level of non-renewable resources for utilisation by succeeding generations, necessary
to perpetuate human consciousness. However, human technology and the issue of
product substitutability are pertinent in this latter regard, in the sense that the depletion
of a particular non-renewable resource may be viewed as tradable against the
development of a technology that makes future human dependency on the depleted
resource redundant (Norton, 1984a: 145).
In various publications (eg. Norton, 1992; 1995a), the concepts of spatiotemporal
horizons of human concern and the spatiotemporal dynamics of nature emerge as
important interrelated aspects of Norton's philosophy of enlightened anthropocentrism.
Based on the interpretation of hierarchy theory developed by Holling (1992), Norton
describes the controls and constraints on sustainable human activity that flow down
from natural spatiotemporal hierarchy systems. Larger and slower-changing processes
at higher hierarchical levels (eg. processes controlled by global physical systems)
constrain the behaviour of individuals, including humans and their preferences, at lower
levels. According to this model, humans can act freely on the scale of individual choice
(i.e. they can strive to satisfy their diverse felt preferences) through their actions that
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may be located towards the bottom of the spatiotemporal hierarchy - up to the point
where these become constrained by environmental conditions imposed by higher
spatiotemporal hierarchy controls (Norton, 1995a: 52). By operating outside these
natural controls, the impact of human actions can also work their way up the hierarchy
to disrupt critical 'mesoscale' processes - the result of which manifests, for example, as
the familiar 3rd generation environmental problems described in Section 3.2.2.3. Here,
the requirement of current generations to maintain the integrity and health of
ecosystems, in order to promote the value associated with the perpetuation of human
consciousness, becomes jeopardised as uncertainty develops whether human societies
will be able to adapt and thrive when the ecological context in which they have evolved
is severely affected (Norton, 1995a: 53).
Using hierarchy theory, Norton constructs a spatiotemporally organised and ecologically
informed model of the space in which individuals and communities formulate and
pursue their values (including environmental values) and are able to anticipate the
associated consequences of this pursuit. For example, decisions derived from the scale
of locally developed values, which give expression to the preferences of individuals,
might cause quickly reversible impacts that do not raise questions of intergenerational
moral importance (Norton, 1995a: 58). Here, 'standard' controls under which individual
transactions take place are appropriate for directing decision-making and policy (eg.
normal individualistic criteria of economic efficiency, tempered by interpersonal equity
considerations). However, there is clearly a potential for conflict to arise between values
experienced at different hierarchical levels. For example, values expressed as individual
preferences may conflict with community-scale values (eg. values linked to the survival
of culture and traditions), and the policies required here must focus on higher level
interventions, directed at the maintenance of keystone processes that structure the
'landscape' and determine the sustainability of communities (vide Holling, 1992: 478).
Where irreversibility and catastrophe are anticipated as a consequence of value
conflicts, for example, species extinctions and biological impoverishment, the
enlightened anthropocentric policy intervention that is required to guarantee the value of
ongoing human consciousness is clearly of a different order to the interventions
whereby 'lower scale' environmental processes are protected and individual human
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preferences and interests served. Through reference to this hierarchical model,
principles thus emerge that can inform policy and environmental decision-making, which
proscribe behaviours that are recognised to be environmentally destructive - in
particular behaviours that are expected to have effects upon the long range future of
human exlstence.!"
In summary, Norton believes that an adequate environmental ethic does not need to be
nonanthropocentrlc.?" However, he argues that it should also not be limited to
considerations of individual human interests in the form, for example, of narrow,
economistic instrumental value theory. Enlightened anthropocentrism describes an
emergent trend in environmental ethics, which finds value in human loci, but which is
non-individualistic in the sense that such value is not restricted to the satisfaction aftelt
preferences of human individuals. Such an ethics deals with environmental decisions
concerning distributional fairness within generations, and it also deals with decisions
concerning longer term, cross-generational human interests and associated
environmental issues.179 It is undergirded by a rationally constructed world view that
derives values from experiences of nature, which are achieved through scientific
reasoning, an intuitive avoidance of actions that are environmentally harmful, and an
appreciation of humanity's interconnectedness with the broader community of life on
earth. Importantly, enlightened anthropocentrism supports a pragmatic ethics that
avoids difficult-to-defend references to the intrinsic value of non-human natural objects.
As a supporting value theory that can underpin the broad mission of the discipline of
environmental ethics, enlightened anthropocentrism will be discussed further in the
177 Norton (1984a: 138, 142) argues that the derivation of guiding principles to support an environmental ethics is best
achieved through a practical philosophy, as will be discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.2).
178 Attfield (1999: 6) shares Norton's views that sustainability does not require a nonanthropocentric ethic since it is
justifiable on an anthropocentric basis - for similar reasons to those stated by Norton.
179 Norton's views on enlightened anthropocentrism have attracted criticism inter alia from Westra (1996: 109-112), who
questions whether long-sighted anthropocentrists exist in reality - particularly in the area of politics, policy-
making and corporate business -where it is argued that the pressure of political correctness with regard to other
issues lowers the priority of green concerns. Defending a contrary position to enlightened anthropocentrism,
Westra argues that as human economic, recreational, aesthetic and spiritual values are subordinated to the
anthropocentric imperative of survival, anthropocentrism becomes so weakened as to be non-existent; i.e. as
the survival imperative becomes the common denominator humans share with the rest of life, ecocentrism, or
biocentric holism emerges as the most defendable ethical position.
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concluding chapter of this dissertation, where its alignment with the new generation
tools for environmental assessment will be established.
3.5 CONCLUSION
The discussion presented in this chapter has been structured around the response
within the discipline of environmental ethics to the failure of traditional human ethics, for
example, utilitarianism, to resolve the environmental crisis as this has been variously
perceived by the environmentalist movement. Through application of Kuhnian theory,
the failure of human ethics to deal with the environmental problematic is interpreted as
having placed into question its ability to resolve the crisis through 'normal' adjustment
and incremental change. In this respect, it is concluded that the opportunity now exists
for a new, more capable paradigm to emerge, and the developments in environmental
ethics are described as the initial response to this opportunity.
The original intent of environmental ethics, as this has been outlined in this chapter, has
been the development of a new moral theory that will ethically enfranchise non-human
natural entities and nature as a whole, and situate the environment as the object of
human moral concern rather than one of mere utility. Measured against the tradition of
human ethics, in which the environment is broadly valued in terms of its instrumental
utility, the delivery of such a new ethics is regarded as a radical endeavour, demanding
of revolution insofar as this relates to the human-environment relationship. Contrary to
the initial expectation that the discipline of environmental ethics could bring about such
revolution, it is concluded that this has not occurred - a situation that is perhaps not
unexpected.
Environmental ethics is still at an originary stage, which is characterised by the high
degree of experimentation and uncertainty that exists within the discipline. It is argued
that this is predictable in terms of Kuhnian theory, as the effects of unresolved crisis
trigger a proliferation of different ideas, which open up a breadth of new possibilities for
resolving the environmental crisis. It is a situation that should be anticipated and
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welcomed as the cultural process of exploring through new sets of possibilities runs its
course prior to the revolutionary emergence of a viable new paradigm in environmental
value theory.
The divergence in value theory that has emerged in environmental ethics has been
described through reference to the main dichotomy between groups of entrenched
paradigms of instrumental environmental value, on the one hand, and 'new-paradigm'
claims, on the other. Whilst the entrenched paradigms are relatively familiar in terms of
their close relationship with human ethics, the 'new-paradigm' claims pertaining to the
intrinsic value of the environment, and the pool of radical value theory, are described as
'narcissistic'. This descriptor is used here in the sense that these claims tend to distort
the Kuhnian notion of 'paradigm', since they cannot be defended, in the paradigmatic
tradition, on the basis of sets of tested and viable first principles; i.e. they are largely
'slogan-driven' at present - which is not to say that they never will achieve true paradigm
status.
It is concluded that there is a high degree of reductionism implicit in the many initiatives
concerning the notion of intrinsic environmental value. This is attributable to the
narrowness of attempts to derive a small set of first principles that are capable of
warranting the moral directives that they intend to inform. Although a gravitation towards
the reductionism of theoretical monism is understandable, in that it avoids the dilemma
of relativism, theoretical arbitrariness etc., it is concluded that this reflects a number of
parallels with the reductionism of neoclassical economics, which the discipline of
environmental ethics seeks to replace, or improve upon. As a consequence, there has
been disillusionment in the poor return on the high expectations that environmentalists
have had in terms of the potential unifying function of intrinsic value theory.
An alternative to theoretical monism, and some of the radical ethics described in the
chapter, is enlightened anthropocentrism. This has been described as a position in
environmental philosophy that treats humans as the most important loci of value, but at
the same time views the existence of a healthy environment as important to the
satisfaction of considered human interests and preferences. A template for its
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formulation exists in the basic structure of Aida Leopold's land ethic, which has the
potential to effect practical change in terms of resolving the environmental crisis, inter
alia through its accommodation of moral pluralism; i.e. its aversion of monistic
reductionism. Enlightened anthropocentrism is pragmatic in the sense that it avoids the
difficult-to-defend attribution of intrinsic value to the environment, and as an alternative,
advocates change from within the existing anthropocentric paradigm of human society.
It assumes that it is a worthy cause for human culture and consciousness to be
perpetuated in the long term, and that it is this justification that can persuade current
human generations to maintain the integrity and health of ecosystems on which human
life and consciousness depends. This understanding of the human-environment
relationship changes the perception of human apartness from nature in favour of an
interrelatedness between humans and the greater biotic community, as defined by
Leopold.
Having traversed the spectrum in environmental value theory, an understanding has
been gained of the evolutionary trajectory of the discipline of environmental ethics.
Supplementing the information contained in Chapter 2, this has advanced the
dissertation's central research intent, which is to investigate the co-evolutionary
dialectical relationship between environmental ethics and environmental assessment. It
is clear that such investigation will need to deal with the contrasting strong and weak
paradigmatic attributes of the two disciplines, which is evident from the dissertation's
narrative thus far. Since this raises the possibility of an incommensurable relationship
between environmental assessment and environmental ethics, it would seem that an
indirect relationship between the two disciplines must be investigated. The analytical
approach adopted in this regard, and the revealed dialectical relationship between the
two disciplines, are the central themes of investigation and interpretation in the next
chapter.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
The individual development paths of environmental ethics and environmental
assessment are described in the two preceding chapters largely through reference to
the separate evolutionary trajectories that have created their present form. The aim of
this chapter is to interpret this information in order to investigate the existence of a
dialectical co-evolutionary relationship between the two disciplines. As stated in the
introductory chapter of the dissertation, the relevance of undertaking this investigation
lies in the view that a constructive dialectical relationship between the practice of
environmental assessment and the discipline of environmental ethics offers the
potential to contribute to the integration of the currently dissociated objective and
subjective aspects of human perception of the environment and thereby arrest the
pathology in the human-environment relationship (see Sections 1.2 and 1.3).
In responding to the above aim, the chapter will begin with a brief review of the
paradigmatic qualities of environmental assessment, which have been described
previously in terms of Kuhnian theory (Chapter 2), and the contrasting non-paradigmatic
qualities of environmental ethics (Section 3.1). This is necessary since, according to
Kuhn (1970a: 150), there would seem to be little potential for discovering a direct
dialectical relationship in a situation where, for example, the standards and
metaphysical principles of competing paradigms - i.e. standards and principles that
differentiate environmental assessment as a paradigm from those supporting the
diverse value theories within the discipline of environmental ethics - are expected to be
mutually incomprehensible (vide Oldroyd, 1986: 323; Chalmers, 1982: 96).
Having exposed the potential incommensurability between environmental assessment
and environmental ethics, the chapter follows with a description of the approach used to
model the co-evolutionary relationship between the two disciplines. In orderto avoid the
investigative barriers to revealing a direct dialectical relationship between environmental
assessment and environmental ethics, the model will be shown to incorporate the
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evolutionary progression of environmentalism as a dialectical intermediary, which has
the potential to reveal an indirect relationship between the two disciplines. This
relationship will be described as having its grounding in the common origin of the
practice of environmental assessment and the philosophy of environmental ethics, both
of which are responses to the environmental problematic as this has been, and
continues to be, variously articulated by the environmentalist (see Section 1.1).
Advancing from this grounding of the model, the chapter will then describe the mediated
dialectical relationship between environmental assessment and environmental ethics as
revealed by the model.
The analysis concludes with a focus on the strong dialectical relationship between the
new generation approaches to environmental assessment, specifically SEA (Section
2.3.3.2), and developments in environmental ethics that are located within the sphere of
practical philosophy, for example, of enlightened anthropocentrism (Section 3.4.3).
4.2 INCOMMENSURABILITY: A POTENTIAL BARRIER TO DIALECTICAL
RELATIONSHIP
In Chapter 2 the origin of EIA is explained as being discontinuous with the tradition-
bound situation that preceded it, and it is suggested that its revolutionary qualities can
be defined in terms of a new paradigm in environmental decision-making that it has
introduced. In this respect it is argued that EIA has proved more capable of resolving
pressing environmental issues than the tools for decision-making that were employed to
support the previous paradigm of narrowly defined economic determinism which NEPA
has displaced. The coherent tradition of EIA, which has remained consistent in terms of
both its established first principles and the form and effectiveness which these have
introduced to the standards of practice and methods of EIA, place it firmly within Kuhn's
definition of a paradigm (Kuhn, 1970a). Whilst EIA has undergone cumulative change in
the interval since its emergence, it has delivered no theoretical or conceptual novelty to
the extent that its paradigmatic character has changed significantly. Rather, it has
continued to function from the platform first introduced by NEPA and it is the strong
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conceptual and methodological grounding which this provides that has enabled EIA and
its derivatives to be applied as tools for decision-making for more than three decades.
Confidence in EIA has been secured through the success that it has achieved in
resolving certain classes of problems. This is largely as a result of the potential for
these problems to be stated in terms which make their resolution possible; i.e. it is
presupposed that EIA provides the theoretical basis and methods for their solution as
well as the criteria that indicate when a desired solution has been achieved (vide Kuhn,
1977: 167). In Chapter 2 it is argued that where the promise of resolution is not
apparent for those problems that have no immediate prospect of a solution derivable
through EIA, these are either rejected or interpreted as anomalies, to be resolved
through progressive methodological development, primarily because they are not
reducible to a form that can be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools
that EIA supplies. These paradigmatic aspects of EIA (i.e. the guarantees it provides for
problem resolution and the criteria used to reject problems which cannot be resolved)
have secured the global allegiance of a community of practitioners and other
stakeholders who are persuaded by the promise that EIA offers in terms of its decision-
support capability. In this respect, the allegiance that EIA has secured has yet to be
undermined by any competing paradigm that is capable of offering better support for
decision-making.
Unlike the tradition of EIA, which is shaped monistically and assumes its effectiveness
through its paradigmatic character, the situation within the field of environmental ethics
is marked by constant debate and lack of consensus over the fundamentals of an
environmental ethic. In this respect, a universal set of first principles has yet to emerge
to support a monistic theory concerning, for example, the assignation of 'rights' to the
non-human natural environment. This is largely a consequence of the polarised
positions assumed in the debates concerning environmental ethics, mainly between
anthropocentric expressions of environmental value on the one hand and the
ontological pursuit of intrinsic valuation of environmental entities and systemic wholes
on the other. Amongst the proliferation of ethical positions that are arranged about and
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between these extremes, a primary endeavour of environmental ethics remains the
search for a basis of value independent of human preferences and self-centred
evaluations. This search has yet to yield a strong single foundation for environmental
ethics in the paradigmatic tradition of EIA.18o
From the above overview it would not seem to make sense to search for a direct co-
evolutionary relationship between environmental assessment and environmental ethics
since, according to Kuhn (1970a: 109), an incompleteness of logical contact between
the two disciplines is likely to exist. Based on Kuhn's views on the incommensurability of
competing paradigms/candidate paradigms, it is concluded that rational exploration
between the evolutionary trajectories of environmental assessment and environmental
ethics is unlikely to be fruitful. It is anticipated that better results can be achieved
through the investigation of an indirect dialectical relationship, and the methodology
employed to undertake this investigation will now be described.
4.3 MODELLING THE CO-EVOLUTIONARY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
EIAAND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
4.3.1 Model structure
In this section, the outline of a dialectical model will be defined which is used to explain
the co-evolutionary relationship between EIA and environmental ethics. In order to do
this, it is necessary to first introduce an intermediary into the investigative structure,
which through its own direct dialectical relationship with EIA and environmental ethics,
can reveal an indirect (i.e. a mediated) relationship between these two disciplines. The
evolutionary trajectory of environmentalism is selected here to serve as this
intermediary since, as a broad social-political movement, it is expected to have invited
direct responses from within both the philosophical domain of environmental ethics and
the action-forcing policy element of EIA. These responses will have been intended
180 As discussed in Section 3.1 it can be argued that such a single foundation for environmental ethics is not required [eg.
Hargrove (1989: 8)].
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largely to resolve the environmental problematic as this has been/is perceived by the
environmentalist movement. The model that has been developed to depict this
response-relationship is shown in Figures 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) and its defining features are
described below. Figure 4.1(a) summarises the key features of the evolutionary
trajectories of environmentalism, EIA and environmental ethics, which have already
been described in Chapters 2 and 3, and it is from this interpretive basis that the
interpretation of the co-evolutionary relationships depicted in Figure 4.1 (b) is derived.
The analytical framework that is provided by the evolutionary trajectory of
environmentalism creates the primary structure and central axis of the model depicted
in Figure 4.1. Also contributing to this primary structure is the evolutionary trajectory of
EIA and the pattern of divergent development of environmental ethics (not definable
according to a trajectory per se ).181 The model's secondary structural character is
created by the temporal division, according to which the evolutionary trajectories of
environmentalism and EIA are fragmented and the developments within environmental
ethics have progressed more diffusely between its early and later stages. The temporal
division that is introduced is used to indicate the phased nature of evolutionary
development that has occurred within both the environmentalist movement and the
practice of EIA, and in this respect, there is alignment with the structure previously used
to explain the temporal-thematic evolutionary patterns described in Chapters 2 and 3.
Whilst the concepts of a trajectory and temporal phases of development are appropriate
for incorporation into the model to conceptualise the evolution of environmentalism and
EIA, they are less appropriate for application to developments in the field of
environmental ethics. As stated previously, the discipline is still in its formative phase
and its diverse outputs reflect the disorganised processes of exploration,
experimentation and testing of ethical theory aimed at resolving an environmental crisis,
which it might be argued, traditional forms of intervention (eg. conventional ethics,
environmental policy) have failed to address thus far [vide Weston (1995: 463; 1996:
181 In a sense, environmentalism is depicted in the model as an independent variable that has mediated the co-evolution
of its two dependent variables (environmental assessment and environmental ethics).
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147)]. Developments in environmental ethics can, therefore, be interpreted as a
manifestation of a paradigm shift in process, but not yet achieved (Hattingh, 1999: 80),
evidenced by the fact that such developments are located outside the track of a
definable evolutionary trajectory that would mark the normal advancement of a
discipline that has already achieved paradigm status (Kuhn, 1970a: 186; Oldroyd, 1986:
322; Toulmin, 1972: 101). In Figures 4.1(a) and (b), the key developments in the
evolution of environmental ethics are arranged in the form of a diverging structure which
has only loose definition according to a temporal pattern of development; i.e. a narrowly
defined pool of value theory during the 1970s, characterised, for example, by the
attention directed at animal rights theory, broadening over time into a diverse pool of
value theory.
The model presented in Figure 4.1(a) and (b) also indicates the external forces that are
recognised as having triggered the various directional shifts and phases of
advancement of environmentalism over the past 30 years, and which are also expected
to have invited certain responses (strong, weak, inadequate, staggered) in the evolution
of EIA and the generation of environmental value theory. These are characterised in
terms of the generational definitions attached to the broad forms that the environmental
problematic is perceived to have assumed (i.e. 1st. 2nd and 3rd generation environmental
problems) and which are shown to have directed the evolutionary responses indicated
in Figures 4.1(a) and (b).182
1821 st generation environmental problems are defined in terms of human (over-) use of the environment, the depletion
of non-renewable resources (production effects) and specific threats to particular species and natural areas; 2nd
generation problems have their definition in consumption-related impacts (eg. pollution) affecting human
health and quality of life; 3'd generation problems relate to threats (potentially catastrophic) which modern
industrial societies pose to future generations (eg. global warming). These generational definitions of the
environmental problematic are discussed in Section 3.2.
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The individual evolutionary developments of EIA and environmental ethics, which might
be assumed to have been directed at the resolution of the environmental problematic
(as this has been/is perceived by the environmentalist movement) are summarised in
the model and an assessment presented of the adequacy of response to the various
themes in environmentalism. A cross-cutting temporal analysis of the individual
responses in EIA and environmental ethics to the evolution of environmentalism, and an
assessment of trends in this respect, completes the model structure.
4.3.2 Cross-cutting analytical logic
The analytical logic used to investigate the dialectic between environmentalism and EIA
is based on the assumption that this (the dialectic) will be shaped by the influencing
vectors of environmentalism that can be stated in terms that permit a response via EIA
through recourse to its conceptual, theoretical and instrumental attributes. Importantly,
this includes the language of discourse between environmentalism and EIA and, more
specifically, the status attributed to it-, 1-and we-language in contributing to and creating
the dialectic (see Chapter 1). Kuhn (1970a: 23-24) would explain this as a logic that
constitutes the rules or standards held in common by environmentalism and the EIA
paradigm, which are revealed in their individual evolutionary paths; i.e. common
grounding values and principles that define a logical contact or coherency. Conversely,
aspects of incommensurability between environmentalism and EIA, due to the absence
of shared rules, can also explain the extent to which discourse may not have been
possible along their respective evolutionary paths. The logic of shared values and
principles (i.e. rules, in the Kuhnian sense) is, therefore, applied as an investigative
medium to undertake the cross-cutting analysis to define the dialectical relationships
that provide part of the linking structure to the temporal-dialectical model presented in
Figure 4.1. Essentially, this logic represents the interpretive medium for defining the
patterns of dialogue and development synchronicity between environmentalism and EIA
over the past three decades. A less formal interpretive medium is used to define the
patterns of dialogue between environmentalism and environmental ethics.
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Whilst it has been previously stated that environmental ethics is not definable in terms
of a paradigmatic tradition, this does not suggest that there is no point of convergence
around which some key value theories arising from within the discipline are located. In
this respect, the fundamental principles of Aldo Leopold's land ethic (Leopold, 1991) are
clearly of major significance given that extensive reference is made to these principles
in the cornerstone arguments and multiple interpretations of what might constitute an
environmental ethic. For example, the contrasting views offered by Norton and Callicott
(discussed in Chapter 3), which are grounded respectively in pluralistic and monistic
(non-anthropocentric) moral arguments, both draw largely on Leopoldian principles for
their central philosophical themes [eg. Norton (1984a, 1991a, 1996a); Callicott (1979,
1989)]. For the purpose ofthe following analysis, these principles are regarded as being
sufficiently constant and fundamental to some of the key evolutionary forms of
environmental ethics. Thus, if a dialectical relationship between EIA and environmental
ethics is to be revealed in their evolutionary histories, it is likely that these principles
could in some way have enabled/created this relationship over time.183 In order to
establish this possibility, Leopold's land ethic principles are used as an investigative
medium to reveal patterns of dialogue between EIA and the discipline of environmental
ethics. In this respect, the interpretation is based on the discussion presented in Section
3.4.2, which emphasises the pragmatism of Leopold's philosophical strategy and its
culturally viable grounding in both organicism and anthropocentrism - where a rejection
of narrow anthropocentrism is implied, but not to the extent that a doctrine of
nonanthropocentrism is embraced [vide Hargrove (1989: 96)]. Here, reference is made
to Norton's (1995b: 353) interpretation of Leopold's philosophy, which is seen to
promote compatible policies that serve both human interests into the indefinite future
and the protection of nature and natural processes through the application of best
scientific knowledge. Considering the practical application of such philosophy, the key
challenge is to create a social consciousness that will result in better processes for
supporting environmental decisions that affect the public interest of present and future
generations. In attempting to reveal a dialectical relationship between EIA and
183 The interpretation of a dialectical relationship will be based mainly on the emerging theory of enlightened
antbropocentrism, which is constructed upon the fundamental principles of the land ethic (Section 3.4.3). ,
Michael Burns Chapter 4, The Dialectical Relationship Between Environmental Assessment
And Environmental Ethics, Page 160
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Co-Evolutionary Relationships Between Environmental Ethics And Environmental Assessment
environmental ethics, the extent to which this challenge is supported by emerging
ethical theory will be established.
An interpretation and discussion of the results of the above analysis is presented in the
sections that follow. This begins with a discussion of the common origin of
environmentalism and the disciplines of environmental ethics and EIA, which will be
explained through reference to the catalytic influence of 1st and 2nd generation
environmental problems. Analysis of the evolutionary progression during the first
decade (1970-1980) will then be undertaken through reference to both the thematic
response in environmentalism (i.e. response to the perceived environmental
problematic) and to the respective responses (shared values and principles, also
differences) in the development of EIA and environmental ethics. Discussion of the
continued evolutionary progression during the second and third decades (1980s, 1990-
present), which is shown to have been directed by a continued appreciation of 2nd
generation environmental problems and the emerging severity of 3rd generation
problems, concludes the analysis. This focuses on both the strengthening dialectical
relationship between EIA and an emerging pragmatist understanding of environmental
value theory (a shift towards theoretical pluralism), and the adequacy of response that
this offers to contemporary environmentalism. In this respect, the chapter concludes
with a discussion of the strong dialectical relationship that will be shown to exist
between enlightened anthropocentrism (a new generation position in environmental
ethics) and the new generation approaches to environmental assessment and
management - a situation that will be investigated further in the final chapter of this
dissertation.
4.4 DIALECTICAL RELATIONSHIPS GROUNDED IN A COMMON ORIGIN
The history of contemporary environmentalism has its origin in the environmental
custodianship ideals of the preservationist and conservationist movements, which took
form and have developed since the end of the 19th century. Its origin is thus grounded in
the 1st generation environmental concerns that were articulated by these movements in
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response to the unsustainable trend in the exploitation ofthe earth's resources that was
recognised at the time (Figure 4.1 (a), window 2). The post-Pinchotist conservationist
lobby for environmental custodianship, which was triggered by the economic risk posed
by the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, differed from the preservationist
lobby which (inter alia) argued for the protection of certain species and selected areas
of outstanding natural appeal (Section 3.2.1). However, the concerns of both
movements were grounded in a shared appreciation of the environmental
consequences of the production effects of economic activity on the natural resource
base which was being utilised at an unsustainable rate (Norton, 1991a: 213). In a
Kuhnian sense, the views and actions of conservationists and preservationists were
shaped by shared rules (principles of moderation concerning the use of environmental
resources) that were considered applicable to the resolution of a special class of
problem. This problem was commonly defined as the disregard for environmental limits
and the environmental effects of production, which both movements saw fit to resolve,
albeit from slightly different perspectives [vide Kuhn (1970a: 23-24)].184
It was the emergence of 2nd generation environmental problems, linked mainly to the
consumption-related impacts of the post-war techno-industrial revolution, which served
as the effective catalyst, triggered by the environmentalist movement, for the genesis of
both the philosophical discipline of environmental ethics and the practice of EIA (Figure
4.1 (a), windows 1 and 3). In creating this impetus, the portrait of environmental decay
described, for example, by Carson (1962) - which emphasised the pervasive
environmental impacts of pollution, pesticide usage and the siting of nuclear facilities,
etc. - provided environmentalism with the raison d'etre to seek both a new
environmental ethic and the institutionalisation of a process such as EIA. Two emerging
environmental disciplines with a common appreciation of the consumption and
184 As discussed in Section 3.3.2, both conservanorust and preservanorust principles have a common
appreciation/ grounding in the instrwnental values that the environment provides to humanity. Preservationists
do not seek the avoidance of sustainable productive use of environmental resources (the conservationist
position on environmental utility), but argue that certain aspects of the non-human world should be left in a
'natural'state in order to provide other humanly useful services such as sustainable life support functions (eg.
the environment's source and sink values), its psychogenetic value, etc.
Michael Burns Chapter 4, The Dialectical Relationship Between Environmental Assessment
And Environmental Ethics, Page J 62
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Co-Evolutionary Relationships Between Environmental Ethics And Environmental Assessment
production effects of 1st and 2nd generation environmental problems, were thus
established.
The commonality in alignment between the origin of EIA and environmental ethics is
described inter alia by Sessions (1974: 80) and Sagoff(1988: 147)who suggest that the
formulation of environmental policy at that time (NEPA, with EIA as its action-forcing
provision) echoed the concerns of Aldo Leopold for the ethical and aesthetic linkage
between humanity and nature. Grounded to some extent in the principles of Leopold's
land ethic [eg. that the survival of human cultures in the long run requires a sensitivity to
ethical and aesthetic values (Section 3.4.2)], NEPA thus provided a formal set of
(Kuhnian) 'rules and standards' (values, principles) necessary for achieving the
resolution of the environmental problematic as this was broadly perceived by the
environmentalist movement. These values and principles were seen to have the
potential to direct both the initial practice of EIA and the philosophical endeavours within
the new field of environmental ethics in a more formally constructed framework than any
previous structure (undefined 'rules and standards') linking the actions of
preservationists and conservationists.
Based on the above analysis it is concluded that the initial dialectical relationship
between environmentalism (providing a central linking structure) and environmental
ethics and EIA was characterised by certain shared theoretical concepts, including the
Leopoldian principle of resolving the long term environmental effects of production and
consumption. At the point of origin of environmental ethics and EIA - with their purpose
aligned with the cause of environmentalism - there was no evidence to suggest an
'incompleteness of logical contact' between the two disciplines, which Kuhn (1970a:
109) would define as a paradigmatic incompatibility.
Whilst the ethical and institutional response to dealing with emerging environmental
crisis was prompted by somewhat different motives - the preservationist bias of
environmental ethics differed from the greater conservationist bias of EIA - the shared
environmental custodianship ideals promised an alignment in the respective missions of
Michael Burns Chapter 4, The Dialectical Relationship Between Environmental Assessment
And Environmental Ethics, Page 163
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Co-Evolutionary Relationships Between Environmental Ethics And Environmental Assessment
the two disciplines. Any difference in motive for environmental custodianship did not
manifest as a cause for significant evolutionary polarisation. In this respect, the
distinction between the motives of the more anthropocentrically inclined purpose of EIA
and the less anthropocentrically inclined purpose of environmental ethics promised to
diminish in importance as the emphasis of both disciplines was directed towards the
longest term values (instrumental, intrinsic) assumed to be important for the protection
of the environment (vide Norton, 1986a: 212-213).
The extent to which the development trajectories of environmental ethics and EIA would
sustain this promise of alignment would be revealed in the course of the following
decades. In the discussion that follows, an analysis is provided of the dialectical
continuity/discontinuity between environmentalism, EIA and environmental ethics.
Through reference to the structure of the dialectical model structure presented in Figure
4.1(a) and (b), the analysis focuses on the various temporal responses to the
environmental problematic, which define the individual evolutionary trajectories of
environmentalism and EIA and the divergent evolution of environmental ethics. In the
concluding analysis of the mediated dialectical relationship between EIA and
environmental ethics, the focus is on the similarities and differences that are evident in
these responses.
4.5 POST -ORIGlNARY DIALECTICAL RELATIONSHIPS
. 4.5.1 Dialectical relationship between environmentalism and EIA
4.5.1.1 Dialectical relationship between environmentalism and EIA: 19705
The externally perceived mission of the environmentalist movement during the 1970s
manifested quite differently to what might perhaps have been anticipated as an
appropriate evolutionary response to the environmental problematic (1st and 2nd
generation environmental problems).
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As described in Section 3.2.2, environmentalism during the 1970s was recognised as a
movement in which societal demands for equitable access to environmental goods and
services emerged as the dominant theme. The initial evolutionary development of
environmentalism was thus directed by the imperative of human well-being insofar as a
response to the effects of 1st and 2nd generation environmental problems was called for.
Whilst the politicisation of the emerging environmentalist movement might have sought
progress from an entirely different grounding - eg. a moral grounding in the search for a
new ethic of the environment (eg. Naess, 1995b: 445) - this was made redundant by its
association with the democratic demand for citisen participation in decision-making
concerning environmental contribution to human well-being. As described in Section
3.2.2, a crisis of participation had developed (Eckersley, 1992: 8-11; Foreman, 1995:
50-53; Rodman, 1980: 65).
In what should have become the quest for moderation in human exploitation of the
environment (development of an environmental custodianship ideal) environmentalism
continued to be defined in terms of strong human interests as the dominant measure of
valuation of the environment. This development exhibited little discontinuity with
traditional instrumental value theory and clearly, no major shift attributable to a fresh
insight into the consequences of the environmental problematic could be discerned.
Similar to the causal influences that first directed the trend in environmentalism during
the 1970s, the origin of EIA was linked to the increasingly politicised demand from a
broadening constituency for an integrated approach to decision-making in order to
address pressing environmental issues (Carpenter, 1981: 176). This stemmed from a
recognition of the severity of the developing environmental problematic and, more
specifically, from a realisation of the extent to which this could pose wide-ranging
threats to human well-being. The constituency demanding this approach included both
environmentalist factions, with a developing understanding of environmental cause-
effect relationships associated with resource depletion, and an increasingly affluent
sector of society sensitised to the cause-effect relationships linked to production and
consumption effects mainly insofar as these impacted on economic growth.
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The political enactment of NEPA (with EIA as its action-forcing provision) reflected a
broadly sought response to 1st and 2nd generation environmental problems as these
were recognised by various constituencles.l'" In this respect, NEPA provided an
unprecedented opportunity for the public to influence decision-making concerning the
environment, which was made possible by the statutory requirement for public
disclosure (through EIA) of project information held by US federal agencies (Barbour,
1980:114, 189). Such influence was strengthened by NEPA's entrenchment of the
grassroots democratic right to challenge agency plans via the federal courts - illustrated
by the fact that by 1978, about 1000 NEPA cases had been filed by various plaintiffs in
the US (Clark, 1997:18). The rigor with which the legal process dealt with the NEPA
suits filed against federal agencies, and the high proportion of rulings issued in favour of
the plaintiffs in these cases, reflect the sensitivity of NEPA to the environmentalist crisis
of participation that prevailed at the time.
The emerging dialogue between the environmentalist movement and developments in
EIA during the first decade was clearly defined by the extent to which human interests
shaped the discourse (Figure 4.1 (b), window 1). It might be concluded, therefore, that
the potentia/for a strong dialectical relationship existed between the practice of EIA and
the participatory theme of the environmentalist movement at the time. In this respect,
the logical basis for the relationship is revealed by the particular class of problem -
environmental threats to human well-being - which was deemed to be important in
terms of its resolution through EIA. It is also revealed by the apparent capacity of EIA to
respond to (resolve) this class of problem through application of the conceptual and
instrumental tools that had been developed to support the process. Dealing with the
emerging threats to human well-being was thus perceived to fall within the sphere of
resolution of the new EIA paradigm.
185 The NEPA policy response supports the view expressed by Norton (1991a: 187-243) that competing principles (for
example, preservationist, conservationist and economically utilitarianist values) often suggest similar moral
strategies; i.e. that consensus in a policy instrument such as NEP A can be achieved and that shared policy goals
emerge within such a statutory framework in spite of the divisions regarding the basic environmental values of
various constituencies.
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Packaged within the framework of EIA, the traditional scientific method applied in
impact assessment during the 1970s was aligned with the anthropocentric rationality
that prevailed in the environmentalist movement. Alternative approaches to resolving
environmental issues through EIA that could not easily be framed within a narrow
scientific or technical context were not immediately sought out in the first decade.l'"
Criticism of the process of EIA as it was first practiced, is that it was product driven, with
scientific data collection preceding positivistic analysis and the production of technical
reports (Bacow, 1980: 109; Graham Smith, 1993: 9). Supporting this view, Shrader-
Frechette (1982) argues that EIA typically sought to assess only proximate (usually
technical) project alternatives, for example, rather than fundamentally different options.
To illustrate the technical emphasis of EIA the latter author defines this tendency as the
fallacy of unfinished business; i.e. unfinished in the sense that, while alternative
technical design and economic feasibility options received attention in EIA, alternative
social, ethical and political solutions were seldom considered .187Q'Riordan (1981)
suggests that this severely limited the effectiveness of EIA, citing the absence of
socially related data and the problematical [economically value-laden] weighting of
findings as contributing factors. EIA was thus weakened by what S6derbaum (1990:
485) describes as a single paradigmatic scientific perspective and the absence of a
broad information base to aid decision-making. This supports Commoner's (1971: 187)
conclusion that reductionism in the system of natural science as practiced in the 1970s -
i.e. scientific analysis of the properties of isolated parts and an inattention to the natural
complexity and interconnectedness implicit in system wholes (incorporating humans) -
explains the ecological failure caused by technology [and to some extent, the tools
applied to assess its environmental impact].188
186 Graham Smith (1993: 8), citing Sadler's (1986: 102) views suggests that the practice of EIA was grounded in a
technocratic perspective on problem-solving (which served as a supplementary mechanism to its scientific
content) thereby perpetuating to some extent (rather than displacing) the paradigm of political economic
determinism in decision-making.
187 Callicott (1994: 70) explains this trend as a response to political and social preference pressures and not to the lack of
alternative technologies which could prove more capable of sustaining the health of ecosystems under threat.
188 Howard (1979: 176) protests against the moral dimension which holistic arguments such as those posited by
Commoner automatically acquire and considers it unwarranted that analytic reductionism should be considered
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In addition to the expectation that EIA would resolve the environmental problematic, the
approach to such resolution that was anticipated by the environmentalist movement
centred on the promotion of participation in decisions concerning equitable access to
environmental goods and services. This appeared to be easily compatible with the
conceptual basis for EIA, which was derived from the need to deal with issues such as
the social fairness of resource allocations and to ensure balanced decision-making in
the broad public interest (Canter, 1977: 1). However, in contrast to the compatibility of
the conceptual rationale for EIA with the defined crisis of participation, a response
would prove difficult to formulate through application of the relatively simple instrumental
tools which had been developed to put the practice of EIA into effect (Figure 4.1 (b),
window1). Symptomatic of the initial urgency to clarify and make workable the new
paradigm of support for environmental decision-making, the tools available for EIA were
designed to reduce environmental complexity for the purpose of impact assessment.
Significantly, they excluded techniques that would prove capable of resolving complex
issues linked, for example, to the social environment and the integration of such issues
with bio-physical environmental considerations addressed through EIA in its primitive
form.
Whilst EIA might have attempted to deliver a response to the societal demand for
equitable access to environmental goods and services during its first decade of practice,
its reductionistic methods and focus on bio-physical environmental issues proved
incapable of fully responding to the perceived environmental crisis [of participation]. In
the absence of real participatory opportunity provided via EIA, litigation proved to be the
only effective option available to environmentalists in terms of influencing development
decisions (Carpenter, 1981: 177-178). As described, for example, by Canter (1997) and
Holmes Rolston (1988: 253) recourse to NEPA's last resort option (legal intervention)
proved to be a more effective (adversarial) mode of participation than any opportunity
that EIA could provide through good process and method (Figure 4.1 (b), window 1).
morally reprehensible. In this respect, he argues that holism cannot hold this privileged position unless an
adequate alternative can be offered to this analytic approach to ecosystem understanding.
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The reductionism of EIA and the axiomatic belief in the objectivity of science inherent in
its methods proved to be an inadequate response to the subjectivity of multiple social
preferences and values arising from the environmentalist crisis of participation. As
discussed in Chapter 1, the rational disclosure of the world that EIA proved capable of
providing - articulated via monological it-language -was dissociated from the multiple 1-
languages of environmentalists. The objective scientific method of EIA thus proved
incapable of engaging the inter-subjectivity of environmentalism and its multiple
expressions of environmental value (Figure 4.1 (b), window 1). As a result, the initial
pragmatism with which EIA can be credited brought with it a cost whereby the traditional
problem-solving methods applicable to the natural sciences proved to be a barrier to
deriving an adequate understanding of the relationships between the bio-physical and
social components of the environment - upon which the achievement of sustainable
development would later be argued to depend (James et a/., 1983: 9). The failure of its
instrumental methods to deal holistically with the relationship between human society
and other linked constituents of the non-human natural environment provided little
evidence of a deterministic dialogue indicative of a close co-evolutionary relationship
with environmentalism beyond the conceptual basis for such a relatlonshtp.l'"
Although a statutory mechanism had been created to enable participation in
development decisions during the 1970s, the litigative form which this assumed
indicates that the approach to EIA at the time did not permit effective participation.
Without a broadened focus beyond the positivistic scientific emphasis of EIA, a rich
dialogue with the environmentalist movement would prove illusory and the new
paradigm of environmental decision-support was faced with an anomalous situation that
could not be rejected; i.e. it demanded attention in the form of an improved process and
method to ensure its resolution (see Section 2.3.2.1). The key defining aspects of the
dialectical relationship that existed between environmentalism and EIA during the 1970s
189 In essence, this failure of EIA was determined by the disaggregation of the natural environment from the social,
cultural and historical environmental contexts (Giesecke, 1981:138).To illustratethis,it is revealingto consider
the cause of failure of ElA applied in USAID projects, which Carpenter (1981: 179) attributes to the
disaggregation of the bio-physical environment from the social, economic and other aspects of the
environment.
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are summarised in Box 4.1, which draws on the modelled relationship described in
window 1 of Figure 4.1 (b).
Box 4.1: Key defining aspects of a dialectical relationship between environmentalism
and environmental assessment during the 1970s
• The potential for dialogue between environmentalism and EIA was defined by
the extent to which human interests promised to shape the dialectical
relationship
• The class of problems expected by environmentalism to be resolved through EIA
was located within the paradigm's conceptual scope of response
• A response to the crisis of participation proved difficult to formulate through the
instrumental tools of EIA
• Participation was achieved through recourse to legal intervention
• The narrow objectivity of EIA scientific method proved an inadequate response
to the subjectivity of multiple social preferences and values arising from the crisis
of participation
4.5.1.2 Dialectical relationship between environmentalism and EIA: 1980s
Due to the limitations of the instrumental tools of EIA to respond effectively to the crisis
of participation, the dialectical relationship between its practice and the environmentalist
movement during the 1970s did not strengthen much beyond the conceptual linkage
that was clearly in place. However, as discussed in Section 2.3.2.1, significant
developments in EIA occurred during the 1980s to change this situation, when the
evolutionary advancement of the process sought to internalise the social dimension of
the environment and to accommodate this as an important aspect of impact
assessment (Figure 4.1 (a), window 4). In this respect, the environmental crisis as it was
perceived at the time and the trend towards participatory rather than representative
democracy concerning development decisions would make its full impact on the
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practice of EIA in its second decade (Nicholson, 1980: 5). The significant shift towards
enabling public participation in the assessment process and the initiatives designed to
consolidate social issues within the broader definition of the environment made EIA
increasingly more effective in terms of arriving at better social decisions (Enk, 1980:
224). In this respect, closer [but only partial] alignment was achieved between the
analysis of the bio-physical environmental impacts of proposed developments and the
multidimensional value profiles and worldviews of society. The evolutionary trend in the
development of the instrumental tools of EIA during the 1980s was thus inclined
towards a strengthened, albeit somewhat unsynchronised and incomplete, dialectical
relationship with the participatory eco-political theme which dominated the 1970s.
Such incompleteness of relationship became evident during the 1980s through the
inability of the inherently reducttontstic method of EIA to contribute to the participatory
dialogue that it invited (Figure 4.1(b), window 4). Whilst EIA had acquired the
instrumental methods to promote such dialogue (public consultation methods, scoping),
it had not acquired (and probably can never acquire) a method capable of responding to
all of the multiple I-languages (diverse expressions of environmental value and
individual preference) through which demands for response were articulated. Applied as
an objective process, EIA could not discriminate between and/or attribute priority status
to one I-language above another. In this respect, it raised the expectation of dialogue (in
multiple I-languages), but lacked the capacity to satisfy the many individual preferences
that its shift towards participatory method promised. Although attempts were made to
assist the reversal in the alienation of decision-making from the interior I-languages of
environmentalists, its failure to resolve the environmental problematic can be seen to be
a manifestation of its continued reliance on the familiar it-language of scientific method
which dominated impact assessment. However, such it-language was perhaps initially
considered appropriate for dealing with concerns linked to an emerging new form of
environmentalism.
As previously described in Section 3.2.2, the conceptualisation of the environmental
problematic at the beginning of the 1980s began to assume a new identity defined as
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the crisis of survival (Eckersley, 1992: 11-17), which displaced the participatory theme
from its position of dominance (Figure 4.1 (a), window 5). However, whilst participation in
EIA would become important in terms of influencing development decisions in the
course of this decade, there would be poor political alignment with the newly perceived
environmental crisis insofar as NEPA (and EIA) would become a policy instrument to
deal with this situation. In this respect, there was general policy failure to seriously
acknowledge that human survival was at stake and the main policy response around
this time was the publication of regulations which signaled the view that the approach to
dealing with environmental crisis was reducible to standardised procedures for impact
assessment (CEQ, 1978).190 Although these regulations delivered an effective guiding
mechanism for EIA, which has remained more or less unchanged up to the present,
their promulgation was no substitute for the type of policy intervention in the
environmental arena that the crisis of survival might have invoked.191
Whilst the effects of 3rd generation environmental problems [global warming, massive
loss in biodiversity (Norton, 1991a: 207-214)] had been an emerging phenomenon in
the preceding decade, the high levels of consumption during the 1980s began to
translate into environmental impacts of extremely high significance - thereby fueling the
crisis of survival arguments. However, in the US (and elsewhere in the developed world)
the focus of government since the mid 1970s contradicted rather than was aligned with
the emerging crisis articulated by the environmentalist movement. This focus was
explicitly directed at securing adequate resources necessary to sustain economic
growth - a response that has increasingly characterised the socioeconomic system for
more than two hundred years (Meadows et al., 1992: 3). Between the mid-1970s and
190 Although this is the record of the CEQ response to the perceived crisis 0/suroival, cognizance must be taken of a key
provision of the statute which states " ... that it is the continuingpoliry 0/the Federal government ... to createand maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive barmosy, andfulfill the social, economic, and other requirements 0/
present and future generations 0/Americans." Given the political will to realise this provision of NEP A, which
extends beyond the quantifiable environmental issues which can be addressed in NEPA's ElA provisions
(Caldwell, 1997: 33), the act itself cannot necessarily be regarded as deficient with respect to an alignment
between its grounding philosophy and the concerns upon which the crisis 0/suroivalwas constructed.
191 An exemption from the provisions of NEP A of the Alaska Pipeline Bill of 1973 is revealing in terms of the political
attitude of the time which did not perceive the environmental crisis to be one of survival due (inter alia) to
global resource scarcity, but rather one of securing access to resources.
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the late 1980s the environment was off the political agenda (Jacobs, 1999: 29), and
throughout the developed world the 1980s was an era of marked consumer
extravagance underpinned by laissez-faire economic policies (Durning, 1992: 33).
To illustrate the focus on economic growth as a global socioeconomic paradigm,
reference can be made to developments in the US at the time when attention was
directed at sourcing alternatives to the supplies of crude oil (essential for enabling
economic growth)- which had been placed under threat by developments in the Middle
East in the mid-1970s. In this situation, maintenance/growth of consumption patterns
sustained by reserves of crude oil was perceived to be a greater imperative than
investment in alternative (sustainable) sources of energy. Merchant (1992: 26) explains
this as a typical (capitalist) response during periods of recession when concerns for
environmental issues (quality, sustainability) are overridden by attempts to increase
productivity. Paradoxically, support for this growth paradigm would re-emerge a decade
later in the recommendations of the World Commission on Environment and
Development (WeED) which propose that vigorous economic growth in both industrial
and developing countries is a necessary prerequisite to enable the achievement of an
environmentally sustainable future (WeED, 1987:1; Rees, 1988: 274). Sessions (1995:
411) citing Lewis (1993) regards the endorsement of the paradigm of economic growth
by the WeED as a global sanction of the 1980s era of materialism. According to Lewis it
also placed into question the statements of scientists formulated during the preceding
decades predicting the magnitude of the ecological crisis that needed to be resolved
and not exacerbated by expanding world industrial output as advocated by WeED
(1987). In the context of the crisis of survival theme, Worster (1995: 418) concludes that
the underpinning arguments developed during the 1960s and 70s (i.e. which confirmed
the magnitude of this crisis) would be severely compromised and obscured by the new
concept of sustainable development.
The focus of economic policy was on production guided by the economic and monetary
aspects of markets, not the physical environmental content of such activity and the
associated environmental externality costs (Bresso cited in Ravaioli, 1995: 123;
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Mikesell, 1992: 3). Clearly, this had little to do with the alternative imperative to reduce
consumption of resources, which was the central theme of the Limits to growth
argument - aimed at raising global awareness of the threats to human survival posed by
population growth and the even higher growth in production. In this respect, the
argument centred firstly, on the finite capacity of the environment (the earth's sources)
to provide the streams of materials and energy to sustain growth and secondly, on the
limits of the earth's sinks to absorb the associated pollution and waste (Club of Rome,
1972: 24; Meadows et aI., 1992: 8).
The above contradiction is explained by the entrenchment in economic policy of the
phenomenon of increasing consumption as a key social value - the rationale for this
being that if no one buys, no one sells, and if no one sells, no one works (Durning,
1992: 21, 106; Merchant, 1992: 25). These effects also extended to non-Western and
developing countries via a reliance on commodity exports to the developed world for the
bulk of their foreign earnings and the concomitant economic growth that this (and/or
rapid industrialisation) promised became the perceived best route for escape from
poverty and dependence on foreign aid (Meadows et aI., 1992: 5; Mikesell, 1992: 1;
Daly cited in Ravaioli, 1995: 94). As described by Labini cited in Ravaioli (1995: 89) the
serious state of underdevelopment in the Third World is seen to require material and
quantitative growth to address poverty issues.192 In this respect, Carpenter (1981: 176)
explains the wariness of developing countries at the time to apply environmental
standards that could interfere with these economic objectives and, for example, EIA
was regarded as a tool to facilitate (rather than constrain) the economic exploitation of
the resources which such countries have to offer (Carpenter, 1981: 183-184, 187).
Developed and developing countries alike thus demonstrated an unwillingness to adopt
policies aimed at reducing consumption (Daly cited in Ravaioli, 1995: 93), and it is not
surprising that the Limits to growth and crisis of survival argument of the 1980s
generated little policy support.l'" As stated by Barbour (1980: 109), although significant
192 Georgescu-Roegen cited in Ravaioli (1995: 95) makes it clear that much of the industrial production of1bird World
countries is not a response to local demand; it is largely alien to the culture of these countries and is a response
to the consumption needs of the developed world.
193 Although the authors of umits togrowth acknowledge that in the 20 years since this publication there have been policy
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steps were taken in the US to respond to environmental problems, these did not deal
with the issue of resource scarcity and the threats this posed to the prospects of survival
of the human species in the long term.
History suggests that the effectiveness of two of the main elements of NEPA - the CEQ
and the act's declarative statement on national environmental policy - became politically
marginalised since their original conceptlon."?' Political support for NEPA that was
evident during the early 1970s was not sustained and a divergence developed between
US economic policy and the environmentalist movement which regarded NEPA as an
instrument capable of responding to the crisis of survival. This divergence can be
explained through reference to the influence that high financial stakes and the special
interests [the short-term preferences] of powerful stakeholders in the economy have on
the political process (Barbour, 1980: 111). In this respect, the remoteness of political
concern from the crisis of survival is also a manifestation of the historic separation of
economics from the natural sciences - which was an important medium through which
attempts were made to empirically define the environmental crisis (vide Club of Rome,
1972; Meadows et aI., 1992: 2). This separation, which was initiated at the start of the
Industrial Revolution, would converge only towards the end of the zo" century in
response to political re-sensitisation of the cost of environmental protection (Jacobs,
1994: 67).
Throughout much of the 1980s economics and environmental issues were merged
mainly through neoclassical economic methods which focused on the economic
relationship between human society and the natural environment - an approach which
and other responses to the environmental crisis in terms of the development of technologies, concepts and
institutions that can create a sustainable future, much has also happened which perpetuates poverty, the waste
of resources and the general depletion of the earth's capacity to support human life. Resource and pollution
flows have grown to levels exceeding predictions made in 1972 (Meadows et al, 1992: xiv- xvi). Third World
countries have also increasingly become burdened by huge debts to the richer countries as a result of the
importation of production technologies designed to assist the global trend in growth economies (Ravaioli,1995:
90).
194 Evidence of the lack of political will to realise the full impact of NEP A is the failure of the US to ratify the
Biodiversity Convention and, more recently, the Kyoto Protocol pertaining to global warming - due to the
potential constraints that this could impose on economic performance.
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was advocated in terms of its application, for example, to EIA via benefit-cost analysis,
which attempted the monetisation of non-market environmental aspects of development
(Carpenter 1981: 185-187).195 Through this mode of analysis, policy is required to be
morally neutral; i.e. facts must be distinguished from and assume dominance over
values (Jacobs, 1994: 70). The strong utilitarianist approach to neoclassical
environmental valuation and its lack of attention to inter-generational equity in dealing
with resource distribution was clearly aligned with the political view of the 1980s which
had a strong focus on present generation interests; i.e. are-affirmation of the Pinchotist
conservation philosophy as a guiding doctrine. This response is explained by Dobelstein
(1980: 109), Sagoff (1988: 150) and others as a classical liberal view on human
individuality - a view that supports political intervention only to the extent that it
promotes efficient functioning of markets. Sustainability - a fundamental concept
underpinning the crisis of survival- was not assumed to be a key priority of policy. In
this respect, the short term political perspective on environmental issues [i.e. the
attention given to the satisfaction of immediate economic preferences (Durning, 1992:
12)] suggested a degree of incommensurability between EIA - an action-forcing policy
provision and potentially a tool for enabling sustainable development [eg. insofar as it
can direct sustainable industrial development (WCED, 1987: 220)] - and the concerns
for human survival, articulated through the dominant theme of environmentalism, which
expressed the perceived limits to, rather than the opportunities for, growth (Figure
4.1 (b), window 4).
Whilst the practice of EIA during the 1980s significantly opened up the assessment
process to stakeholder involvement, its methods could not provide a locus for providing
responses to the many divergent values and moral/ethical precepts articulated by the
environmentalist movement and society in general. EIA had not acquired (and cannot
ever acquire) the instrumental methods to interpret and respond to the multiple 1-
languages of human subjectivity used to defend environmental and other values
(Section 1.3). Consequently, where method permitted, the many expressions of value
195 The introduction of the environment into economic development theory and policy would only begin to influence
development economics in the late 19805 and 19905 (Mikesell, 1992: 4).
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and subjective preferences, which the EIA process invited, could only be reduced,
quantified and assessed through normal empirical mode of investigation (Drengson,
1980: 226) - exemplified by the employment in EIA of methods such as environmental
benefit-cost analysis. The results of such analysis, which were communicated in the
familiar it-language of traditional EIA, would find a limited receptiveness in
environmentalism during the 1980s, thus constraining the depth of the dialectical
relationship that promised to materialise during this decade (Figure 4.1 (b), window 4).
The key defining aspects of the dialectical relationship that existed between
environmentalism and EIA during the 1980s are summarised in Box 4.2, which draws
on the modelled relationship described in window 4 of Figure 4.1 (b).
Box 4.2: Key defining aspects of the dialectical relationship between environmentalism
and environmental assessment during the 1980s
• A strengthened dialectical relationship between EIA and environmentalism was
promoted by the shift towards participatory democracy (the dominant eco-
political theme of the 1970s)
• An incompleteness of dialectical relationship was attributable to the inadequacy
of EIA methods to respond to the participatory dialogue which the (EIA) process
invited
• EIA had not acquired methods capable of responding to multiple I-languages of
participants (their diverse expressions of environmental value) through which
demands for response were articulated
• EIA output was communicated in the familiar it-language, which proved largely
incompatible with the multiple I-languages of participation
• An inadequate response was provided by NEPA (and EIA as its action-forcing
provision) to the newly perceived crisis of survival
• Response to the crisis was assumed to be reducible to standardised methods for
EIA
• As part of the economic growth paradigm of the 1980s, EIA was regarded as a
tool to facilitate (not constrain) growth within the limits of diminishing resources
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• Alignment of EIA with the political emphasis on neo-classical economics evident
in the adoption of shared analytical methods such as benefit-cost analysis; i.e. a
strong emphasis on the monetisation of environmental resources.
4.5.1.3 Dialectical relationship between environmentalism and EIA: 1990s
A significant development in environmentalism occurred during the 1990s to
supplement the existing themes of participation and survival. This was triggered by the
increasing severity of the earth's environmental problems, in particular those of 3rd
generation significance, which caused a shift towards the advocacy of emancipatory
opportunity (Eckersley, 1992: 17-21) in dealing with the environmental problematic
(Figure 4.1 (a), window 7). In this respect, the dominant theme of the environmentalist
movement at the time has been described in Section 3.2.3 as one which sought
emancipation from the environmental crisis through a metaphysical, non-
anthropocentric reconstruction of the human relationship with earth's broader
community. A movement towards a more communitarian society and a rejection of
liberalist ideals and technology as the primary means of dealing with environmental
crisis was regarded as pre-requisite for the realisation of this opportunity. Archetypal in
this respect are the arguments posed, for example, by the deep ecology movement,
which represent a radical departure from earlier environmentalist positions based simply
on evolutionary change in the traditions of conservationism and preservationism.
Given the radical shift in the trend in environmentalism, an accommodation of the
emancipatory theme in EIA would imply a significant discontinuity in its development
which, based on a Kuhnian explanation, would be reflected in a revolutionary change in
the principles and tradition upon which its practice was previously based. To explain this
change would require the revelation of a causal process which could be interpreted as
instrumental in terms of triggering the non-cumulative, or revolutionary, advancement of
EIA with respect to process, its methods etc. Whether there is a case to explain a
revolutionary development in EIA during its third decade of practice as symptomatic of
the emergence of anomaly triggered by its failure to resolve the environmental
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problematic will be discussed later in this chapter. However, before moving to this point
of enquiry the discussion will first focus on the trends in the evolutionary and
incremental advancement of EIA based on its strengthening alignment with the
dominant themes of environmentalism during the preceding two decades.
Developments in EIA during the 1990s suggest a continued closing alignment with the
participatory theme in environmentalism, which took the form of a linear response to the
increasing societal demand for equitable access to environmental goods and services
(Figure 4.1 (b), window 7). An example of this response, which is a manifestation of the
alignment of EIA with the crisis of participation, is the introduction of the concept of
environmental justice during the 1990s as an important aspect of EIA (Council on
Environmental Quality, 1997: 1). Hartley (1995: 281) attributes this development to the
synergistic efforts of civil rights activists and environmentalists and collaboration across
the historic fracture that previously existed between the two movements (see Section
2.3.3.2). As described in Section 2.3.3.2, environmental justice is an extension of
traditional moral theory pertaining to civil rights, where the emphasis is on
anthropocentric environmental equity. In this respect, its accommodation within the EIA
process cannot be interpreted as a significantly novel development in the conceptual or
theoretical basis of environmental assessment. In the Kuhnian tradition of 'normal
science' (Kuhn, 1970a: 23-24), it simply reflects progress made in the resolution of a
class of problem first defined in the 1970s - which is the resolution of threats that
emerging environmental problems pose to human well-being. The need to determine
the extent of equity in the distribution of environmental goods and services did,
however, require some revision to the instrumental standards of EIA which had proved
inadequate in terms of responding to environmental discrimination in society (Hartley,
1995: 282). Such revision .sternmed from the inadequacies of EIA methods, such as
benefit-cost analysis, which focused on the quantification of aggregate net gains for
society which development could offer, with little emphasis on distributional issues.
A major catalyst for evolutionary change in EIA during the 1990s, which was linked to
the crisis of survival, was the greater acknowledgment given to the concept of
sustainable development as this was first articulated by the World Commission on
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Environment and Development, WCED (1987) and promoted globally through the UN
Conference on Environment and Development (1992) and other initiatives (Figure
4.1 (a), window 6). Whilst various constituencies have attempted to define the meaning
of sustainable development self-servingly (Callicott et al., 2000: 28), in the Leopoldian
tradition these initiatives have expressed through rational argument a concern for
human survival in the long term based on the need to protect the natural environment
(Barrett and Grizzle, 1999: 25).
Unlike the dismissal of the environmentalist concerns linked to the Limits to growth era
of the 1980s, the widespread acknowledgment of the consequences for humanity of 3rd
generation environmental problems and the global acceptance of the sustainability
arguments had a profound effect in galvanizing action to begin the process of reversing
the trends in unsustainable development. In this respect EIA, and more importantly its
derivatives, including for example, Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and
Sustainability Analysis, which would begin to evolve during the 1990s, were viewed as
key tools that could put into effect the principles of sustainable development (WCED,
1987: 63; Barrow, 1997: 8; Dalal-Clayton, 1992: 6). The holistic analytical techniques of
new generation approaches to environmental assessment revealed the interrelatedness
of the multiple problems of population growth, industrial and social development,
poverty and the depletion of natural resources; i.e. the substance of concern upon
which the ideals of sustainable development are grounded (Brown and Lemons,
1995: 2).
SEA, for example, seeks to investigate in a novel way the controls which the
environment imposes on development - a different approach to that of EIA, which
focuses on the impact of development on the environment (CSIR, 1999). As an
evolutionary extension of the integrative EIA techniques of the 1980s, which as
described in Chapter 2, began to acknowledge the relationships between ecosystem
components, linking processes etc., the strategic approaches to environmental
assessment continued to define a course of convergence towards the Leopoldian
cognizance of man's position as member of the biotic community. In his essay Thinking
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Like a Mountain Leopold (1991: 244-247) argues that for human activity to be
sustainable in the long term it must be responsive to the larger, autonomously
functioning environmental context upon which human existence is ultimately dependent.
Aligned with this view, the general aim of new generation methods of environmental
assessment is to derive an understanding of the greater environmental context and the
controls that this places on human activities in order for them to be sustainable. In a
sense, a tool such as SEA ideally aims to achieve what Leopold would describe as the
science of ecosystem health, which is to "determine the ecological parameters within
which land may be humanly occupied without making it dysfunctional" [according to the
interpretation that Callicott et al. (2000: 27) give of Leopold (1991)]. This is addressed
by defining aspects such as limits of acceptable change, management objectives
related to these limits and indicators of sustainability. In this way, development
sustainability is gauged at a scale and perspective that EIA had previously proved
incapable of providing.
Whilst the new generation tools for environmental assessment became conceptually
firmly grounded in the principles of sustainable development (a response to the crisis of
participation and survival), they have begun to reflect an important advancement in
terms of acquiring and ordering the instrumentaltoals necessary to put these principles
into effect (Figure 4.1 (b), window 7). Most important in this respect, is the
acknowledgment given to the importance of language and its priority in the conduct, for
example, of SEA. For the first time in its course of evolution, the primacy of we-
language in the process of environmental assessment and management is now
recognised. There is a realisation that it is the essential medium for engaging (through
discourse) the diversity of I-languages of environmentalism according to which
individual preferences are expressed, and for achieving convergence out of the
heterogeneity and complex intersubjectivity that defines human society (vide Sections
1.2 and 1.3). Through a participatory emphasis on common visioning as the point of
origin for SEA, attention is directed at the up-front securement of shared ideals - to
which the effort of achieving sustainable development can be directed. Regan (1984)
describes the enabling conditions for the construction of ideals, and these are well
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aligned with the approach to visioning that is adopted in new generation tools such as
SEA. These emphasise the importance of clarity of concept (eg. the imperative of
sustainable development and what it means in theory and in practice); knowledge
necessary to inform a vision/ideal (eg. information on the state of environment, trends,
consequences of different choices etc.); avoidance of contradiction (between the
vision/ideal and practice) through rational discourse and contemplation; and impartiality
implicit in a vision/ideal in the sense of justice principles (Regan, 1984: 18-21).
By focusing on visioning, and the grounding of this endeavour in the principles of
sustainable development, the challenge of engaging in participatory dialogue - which
previously could not be accomplished through EIA by its promise of response to
multiple individual preferences - has largely been overcome. In the process, the
importance of it-language (the value of scientific method, how its results can inform
decision-making) has not been reduced; however, the focus of scientific objectivity (still
the methodological mainstay of environmental assessment) is now one of response to
the achievement of shared ideals and vision - not vice versa.
The key defining aspects of the dialectical relationship that has existed between
environmentalism and EIA during the 1990s up to the present are summarised in Box
4.3, which draws on the modelled relationship described in window 7 of Figure 4.1(b).
Box 4.3: Key defining aspects of a dialectical relationship between environmentalism
and environmental assessment during the 1990s - present
• Strengthening alignment of EIA with the eco-political themes of the two
preceding decades
• A response to the participatory theme of environmentalism was demonstrated by
the introduction of an environmental justice assessment process as part of EIA
• New generation approaches to environmental assessment and management
(SEA, Sustainability Analysis) were conceptually firmly grounded in the principles
of sustainable development (a response to the crisis of participation and survival)
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• The acquisition of instrumental tools for environmental assessment, such as
SEA, became necessary in order to put the principles of sustainable
development into effect - particularly with respect to the language employed and
its priority of application
• The importance of we-language is recognised as an essential medium for
environmental assessment in order to engage the diversity of I-languages (of
environmentalism)
• In response to the participation imperative, an emphasis on common visioning as
the point of departure has been incorporated into new generation approaches to
environmental assessment - to secure shared ideals (in spite of value
differences), which could direct the effort of achieving sustainable development
• Objectivity of scientific method has been retained as a key component of
environmental assessment in order to test and optimise the selection of
alternatives for achieving the common vision
4.5.1.4 Evaluation
Based on the preceding discussion and the above summary of recent developments in
the dialectical relationship between environmentalism and environmental assessment,
this section of the chapter concludes with a brief evaluation of how 'well' the evolution of
environmental assessment has responded to the issues raised by environmentalists
relating to participation, survival and emancipation.
Essentially, the analysis thus far shows that the dialectic between environmentalism and
environmental assessment has historically manifested as a direct, but temporally
staggered, relationship. The relationship has been direct, in the sense that a relatively
clear pattern of cause-and-effect is evident, whereby key issues emerging from the
various themes of environmentalism have triggered related effects in the development
of environmental assessment. So, for example, the environmentalist issue of
participation has been increasingly accommodated in the process of environmental
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assessment, particularly with respect to its new generation tools, which acknowledge
the multiple environmental preferences of interested and affected parties, yet formulate
a rational response based on shared ideals that are defined. Similarly, the attention
increasingly directed at determining environmental capacity, thresholds, limits etc.,
based on ecosystem level approaches to environmental assessment and the
incorporation of humans into the definition of environment, make its practice acutely
sensitive to the issues of survival raised by environmentalists; i.e. a sensitivity framed
within the imperative of sustainable development.
In contrast to the above cause-and-effect pattern in the dialectical relationship between
the participation and survival issues arising from environmentalism, and the response
elicited through environmental assessment, emancipation issues are not obviously
accommodated in the new generation tools, such as SEA. In this respect, no compelling
argument can be offered to indicate that environmental assessment has promoted, in a
radical sense, the cultural and institutional transformation of human society as a way of
halting the pathology in the human-environment relationship. Environmental
assessment finds its scope of application in the prevailing modern political context and
cannot be credited with having shifted liberal political philosophy towards, for example,
a system of communitarianism, which is a key emancipatory ideal. It can also not be
credited with having promoted a new cultural paradigm and changed human
consciousness, which is based on the metaphysical reconstruction of human
relationships with the earth's broader biotic community.
Since its revolutionary origin in NEPA, environmental assessment has undergone
cumulative, evolutionary change in the tradition of what Kuhn (1970a) would describe as
normal development. Such development has been responsive to, and accommodating
of, the environmentalist's issues pertaining to participation and survival, and the process
has had recourse to the conceptual and instrumental tools that have been appropriate
for resolving the issues and problems with which it has been challenged. However,
environmental assessment has not undergone revolutionary change to the extent that it
embodies the ideals of a new paradigm of emancipation. Whether its evolutionary
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trajectory may take the process to a point where it undergoes change that is
discontinuous with its early and current development trajectory, cannot be anticipated at
present. However, considering the scope of unresolved environmental problems and the
many responses that are continually proposed as options to address this situation,
revolution (in the Kuhnian sense) is perhaps a future possibility. In this event,
environmental assessment may still undergo radical change to the extent that its
conceptual and instrumental tools find application in a new emancipatory paradigm.
4.5.2 Dialectical relationship between environmentalism and environmental ethics
4.5.2.1 Dialectical relationship between environmentalismand environmental ethics: 1970s
Similar to EIA, the discipline of environmental ethics has as its raison d'etre the support
of the practical agenda of environmentalism (Hattingh, 1999: 68), which through various
temporally related themes (Eckersley, 1992: 7-31), seeks the resolution of
environmental problems affecting the state of both the natural environment and human
well-being (Light and Katz, 1996: 1). From the outset, the essential aim of the discipline
has been challenged on the basis that environmental philosophy is inconsistent with
Western philosophy and tradition (Passmore, 1974 cited in Hargrove, 1989: 3), and the
question thus arises whether a paradigm claim - concerning a new environmental ethic-
could ever secure societal allegiance to the extent that it would warrant paradigm status
(vide Kuhn, 1970a: 102)? Given this uncertainty - attributable, perhaps, to the relatively
short time that the discipline has been in existence - it is questionable whether
environmental ethics has yet been able to support the agenda of environmentalism by
providing the response first sought to the crisis of participation, and later, responses to
the crisis of survival and the opportunity for emancipation. The extent to which the
discipline has provided such support will emerge from the following discussion.
The development of environmental ethics has proceeded from its initial purpose
(formulated in the early 1970s), which was to derive a moral theory that would ethically
enfranchise nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole (Figure 4.1 (a), window 3);
i.e. an ethic of the environment (Callicott, 1990: 99; Regan, 1981: 20; Holmes Rolston,
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1975: 93). Such an ethic was seen as distinctive from standard ethics in the sense that
it was expected to be founded upon principles which presuppose that non-human
natural entities have value independent of human value (Norton, 1984a: 132).
Mainstream environmental ethics set out to achieve its purpose under a narrow
predisposition that only certain ways of developing an environmental philosophy can
yield a morally justifiable environmental policy, and thereby respond to the expectations
of the environmentalist movement (Light and Katz, 1996: 2). In this respect, it was
initially assumed that an adequate environmental ethic must embrace non-
anthropocentrism, moral monism and a commitment to some form of intrinsic
environmental value. Axiological questions linked to the search for a few central
principles from which all moral judgments pertaining to the environment could be
derived thus framed the direction of theoretical enquiry during the first decade or so of
environmental ethics (Norton, 1996b: 105).
Environmental ethics has grappled with a number of major obstacles (Stone, 1988b:
140). It has had to make coherent its objective concerning the environment's value - in
the sense that if it is not valued by humans, then in what sense does it have value? It
has also had to develop a rational moral foundation for an environmental ethic, which, if
not based on utilitarianism, must draw on some inherent moral property of the
environment (its sentience, autopoeisis, etc.). As might be anticipated of any emerging
discipline responding to crises that have demanded resolution during its pre-paradigm
phase, environmental ethics - in attempting to overcome the obstacles that it has faced
- has delivered a multitude of theories pertaining to both the environment and the
human-environment relationship. Generally, these theories have tended to be distinct
and mutually inconsistent - and have failed when challenged in situations of practical
application requiring response to a broad scope of moral concern (Callicott, 1990: 101).
Whilst many of the early theories have sought the advantages of ethical monism,
including the comfort of logical consistency and intemal coherency which this potentially
offers, they have not proved capable of resolving complex situations in which conflicts
between competing, equally justifiable moral claims are exposed (Norton, 1996b: 105).
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Animal and natural rights theory, which dominated developments in environmental
ethics during its first decade generally took the form of neo-Kantian ethics, for example,
based on conation/sentience as a qualifying attribute to which intrinsic value attached
(eg. Taylor, 1986; Attfield, 1981; Holmes Rolston, 1988; Regan, 1983; Singer, 1995).
This was accompanied by debates concerning hierarchies of rights based on
arguments, for example, that animals like humans should enjoy rights, but not the same
rights, and that whilst humans have strong rights due to their autonomy, sentient
animals should have weaker rights (eg. Holmes Rolston, 1988: 45, citing Bentham,
1789). Complicating this debate of hierarchies, Callicott's (1980) interpretation of
Leopold's attribution of intrinsic value to the biotic community (as opposed to its
constituent elements) invoked charges of environmental fascism, in that the rights of
individuals [for example, animals (Regan, 1983)] are seemingly held secondary to the
systemic functional value of the community.
In contrast to its purpose of securing convergence towards a single theory of value-
suitable for threading into policy formulation - early debate within environmental ethics
was initially internally focused, directed mainly at divergent arguments pertaining to the
moral considerability of entities, communities etc., and the refutation of competing
claims - anthropocentric, or otherwise (vide Hattingh, 1999: 79). Over much of what
might be termed the gestation period of environmental ethics, the metaphysical search
for a foundation of value that exists independently of human preferences and values
and which provides an ontological foundation for value in nature has failed to create a
strong single basis for environmentalism. The vagueness as to what beings are morally
considerable left environmentalists without a policy base which clearly defines what they
are obligated to protect (Katz, 1985: 241-256; Aitken, 1984: 269). Thus, a defence of
the environment from a confused position linked to an elusive monistic theory of value
did not provide environmentalists with an adequate justification for claims of priority of
environmental goals, and according to Light and Katz (1996: 1) environmental ethics (in
its first decade or so) was ineffectual as a practical discipline.
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There is no evidence that a constructive dialectical relationship was established
between environmental ethics and environmentalism over this period (Figure 4.1 (b),
window 2). Certainly, there were no developments within the discipline that offered a
palliative to the environmentalist movement at the time which can be interpreted as a
response to anthropocentric concerns for equitable access to environmental goods and
services arising from 1st and 2nd generation environmental problems. As a
consequence, there was perhaps a measure of disillusionment in the poor return on the
high expectations that environmentalists may have had in terms of the potential unifying
effect that a single theory of environmental value might have provided.
The factors explaining the absence of a dialectical relationship between
environmentalism and environmental ethics during the1970s are summarised in Box
4.4, which draws on the modelled relationship described in window 2 of Figure 4.1 (b).
Box 4.4: Key defining aspects explaining the absence of a dialectical relationship
between environmentalism and environmental ethics during the 1970s
• No constructive dialectical relationship was established between environmental
ethics and environmentalism
• Internally focused, academic arguments within environmental ethics did not
equip environmentalism with an adequate justification for claims of priority of
environmental goals
• The vagueness concerning moral considerability of environmental entities left
environmentalism without a policy base that clearly defined obligations for the
protection of such entities
• Environmental ethics failed to create a strong single foundation for
environmentalism
• No palliative was offered to environmentalism for dealing with the
anthropocentric concerns of equitable access to environmental goods and
services
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4.5.2.2 Dialectical relationship between environmentalism and environmental ethics: 19805
and 19905
The various endeavours at theory formulation within the discipline of environmental
ethics during its first decade or so of existence generally attempted to reduce all ethical
environmental concerns to a defence from a single moral position (Norton, 1996b: 106).
Its early focus on theoretical monism thus signaled an unyielding approach to value
theory, leaving little space for accommodation of values experienced in multiple modes
and contexts. This inflexibility is stated by Minteer and Manning (1999: 191) as a key
source of disillusionment regarding the failure of the discipline to support
environmentalism. Aligned with the views of Norton (1995b), these authors suggest that,
as a consequence, the mode of philosophical enquiry shifted towards the practical
resolution of real world dilemmas through the accommodation of moral pluralism as a
more tenable position in environmental philosophy.
As stated in Chapter 3, a new discipline such as environmental ethics, which is still in its
originary phase, should not be constrained by theoretical and methodological dogma
demanded of monistic approaches to theory formulation (Weston, 1996: 147). This
perhaps explains what might be perceived to have been the failure of early attempts to
deliver a single breakthrough environmental ethic in the mold of a new paradigm that
could have supported the environmentalist movement in dealing with the crisis of
participation and survival. It also explains the origin of the many breakaway initiatives
that have richly advanced the discipline beyond its narrow initial focus on theoretical
homogenisation and which have created the diversity of value theory that the discipline
has acquired more recently (Figure 4.1 (a), window 8). In this respect, it will be argued
that a diversity of value theory - "a collection of independent ethical generalisations,
norms and principles, that are only loosely related" (Hargrove, 1989: 8) - serves as a
more appropriate platform of support for environmentalism than a single theory of value.
In presenting this argument, reference will be made to what Norton (1991a: 187-243)
describes as a convergence hypothesis - which suggests that environmentalists are
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evolving toward a consensus in policy even though they remain divided regarding basic
values.
The abstract, philosophical debates, which sought to determine what might and might
not be philosophically supportable, initially promoted little positive dialogue with the
environmentalist movement and, as a consequence, the practical intent of the discipline
was largely obscured (Hargrove, 1989: ix). However, as new philosophical approaches
were proposed to resolve the environmental problematic (particularly the situation
created by the emergence of 3rd generation environmental problems), a significant
strengthening dialogue with environmentalism would be achieved (Figure 4.1 (b),
window 5). In this respect, the greatest impact of environmental ethics in terms of
positively influencing environmental policy and supporting the agenda of
environmentalism was provided by an emerging form of practical philosophy, which
operates at the informal interface between the pluralism of human environmental values
and the decisions that they inform in real cases (Norton, 1991a: 198; Norton and
Hargrove, 1994: 240).
Practical philosophy functions similar to the circular reasoning of justice theory which
Rawls (1971: 48-51) describes as the process whereby a reflective equilibrium is
progressively achieved through alternating attempts to formulate and apply theory to
cases and to check principles against intuitions about what should be done in particular
situations. Practical philosophy does not assume that useful theoretical principles will be
developed and established independent of practices, institutions and decision-making
processes, but acknowledges that theory is introduced only insofar as it may help in
understanding specific management problems. It is thus a philosophy based on the
generation of principles from practice (not vice versa) and it is this internal (rather than a
detached) perspective that provides its credible empirical foundation (Minteer and
Manning, 1999: 193, 200). In this respect, it enables environmental practice (Weston,
1995: 466).
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The pragmatism of an emergent practical philosophy in environmental ethics - following
the discipline's earlier focus on the applied philosophical endeavour of developing a
monistic theory of environmental value - is described by Norton and Hargrove (1994:
236) as a response that seeks to avoid dogma, arguing for the urgency of addressing
management issues without the impediment of theoretical differences. In this respect, it
exhibits a pragmatism fashioned in the political strategies employed at times by
environmental advocates such as Aldo Leopold and Rachel Carson - both of whom
were largely committed to biocentrism, but employed and emphasised human-oriented
argument when in the political and policy arena (vide Sections 3.2.2 and 3.4.2).
Norton (1991a: 82-83) describes, for example, how Carson initially used ecological
reasoning to challenge human arrogance toward other species, but adjusted her
arguments in the policy arena to emphasise, for example, the threat of chemicals to
human health and survival in order to achieve her ultimate goal of changing human
attitudes to nature.l'" Similarly, Norton (1996a: 92, 95) concludes that in policy debates
Leopold chose not to base his moral strictures on non-anthropocentrism or on too great
an emphasis on philosophical theory. Rather, he made reference to real world situations
which he had experienced as an environmental manager to develop his arguments
pertaining to the need for change in the relationship between humans and their
sustaining environment.?" In this respect, Rodman (1983: 89-92) concludes that
Leopold, in a very practical way, challenged anthropocentric value theory from within,
(i.e. its autonomy was not invalidated) anticipating that such a challenge would need to
be progressively worked out in the way that utilitarian and deontological theories have
been refined overtime [vide Weston (1996: 139, 148)].
196 In her arguments against the excessive use of chemical pesticides Carson (1999: 26) admits, for example, that there
may well be a case for pest control - but not to the extent that humans are destroyed as a consequence; i.e. an
argument with an anthropocentric grounding.
197 Whilst Leopold might have found the strategy of anthropocentric appeal appropriate, Sagoff (1991, in Pierce and
VanDeVeer 1995: 174) suggests that such argument is increasingly being overtaken by a moral rationale for
valuing the nonhuman world. For example, current environmental legislation tends to answer more directly to
moral concerns relating to the ''health'' of the natural environment rather than to only human health. Similarly,
the advance of technology, through which the substitution of natural goods is achieved, is transforming the
instrumental value of many species (whales, for example) to one of moral value,which is largelyindependent of
any direct human utility.
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Although Norton believes that practical philosophy has been more effective in terms of
influencing environmental policy and providing a platform for environmentalism than the
applied philosophy of non-anthropocentric theoretical monism, he argues that this
influence is derived in a somewhat 'virtual' sense from the pluralism of views held by
environmentalists who operate from seemingly opposed camps.l'" In this respect, the
different themes of environmentalism (crisis of participation and survival and the
opportunity for emancipation) suggest an inherent multiplicity of environmental concern
and motive attached to different spheres of environmentalism. The contradiction that
would seem to arise from an acknowledgement of the positive influence on policy of
certain views held by 'classified' non-anthropocentrists for example, is explained by
Norton's conclusion that the supposed polarised positions, which many
environmentalists believe they defend, has more to do with an exaggerated fabrication
of such dichotomies than with the actual behaviours of environmentalists in practlse.l'"
In this respect, Norton (1999) questions the validity of what might be termed a
divergence theory of environmentalism based on a metaphysical principle which
distinguishes between two exclusively defined systems of anthropocentric and non-
anthropocentric value.
Norton (1991a:187-204) is sceptical whether there is empirical evidence that proves
environmentalists behave as members of exclusive and opposed groups and that such
behaviour is driven by paradigms of closed belief systems supported by sets of axioms
and principles that are either rejected or accepted monolithically. He suggests that there
is little evidence to support this since most people most of the time operate with open
systems of belief and are not guided in all their decisions by unquestioned, complete
198 Examples of such polarisation include Naess's (1973a) location of deep ecologists in the camp of individuals who
believe that non-human elements of nature have independent value - which differentiates them from human-
centred shallow ecology; similarly, Devall and Sessions (1985) use the label "reform environmentalists"
(equivalent to Naess's shallow ecologists) to contrast this faction from that which believes in biospecies
equality; etc.
199 Like Norton, Minteer and Manning (1999: 196) believe that the philosophical dichotomy in environmental value
theory overstates the situation that exists in the real world in which ethical pluralism predominates. According
to Barrett and Grizzle (1999: 24) consensus that emerges from such pluralism is enabled through participative
decision-making and an increasing acceptance and understanding of ecological science.
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sets of axioms. 200Paradigms do not characterise and determine human actions; rather,
it is their worldviews [i.e. views that exceed the demand for satisfaction of momentary
inclination (Regan, 1980: 364)] or opportunistic references to selected fragments of
worldviews that assist in their understanding of the world and guide their decisions in
various situations (Hartley, 1995: 282). According to Norton (1991a: 75, 84), worldviews
may be parllyfounded on central and formative principles, but do not necessarily reflect
a well developed systematic philosophy; i.e. they refer to a constellation of beliefs,
values, concepts and a set of background assumptions against which humans
recognise the world and act in it.201In this respect, Norton's worldview definition is
aligned with Weston's (1996: 139) observation that "ethical ideas are deeply interwoven
with and dependent upon multiple contexts - other prevailing ideas and values, cultural
institutions and practices, a vast range of experiences, and natural settings as well".202It
is also aligned with Toulmin's (1972: 98) explanation of how human thought and
perception can vary rapidly in certain situations, yet can reflect a consistency
determined by central principles in other situations.
The earlier reference to the actions of Leopold and Carson, who embraced biocentrism
but argued in public from anthropocentric principles, explains how people who may
appeal to divergent values may share a similar desired outcome. Closed system
thinking is generally not possible where moral choices have to be made because the
facts which inform such choices are seldom unquestionable, there is seldom a choice
between only one or another option and moral principles seldom point in directly
200 Sagoff (1991, in Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995:175, 176) argues that there are often instrumental as well as intrinsic
values justifying the protection of the environment. For example, the level of investment in water pollution
control in the USA cannot be justified solely on instrumental grounds alone (derived from human health
concerns); it also has much to do with the emotion upon which moral arguments are constructed. If only
beneficial use rather than the intrinsic value of the natural environment was of concern, controlling harmful
impacts such as pollution would often not be worth the cost.
201 In his discussion of institutional environmental economicsJacobs (1994: 85) provides support for Norton's worldview
definition. The author argues that people have economistic preferences and moral and cultural attitudes towards
the environment and these variously provide the context from which people express their views concerning the
environment in different situations.
202 Describing the context -dependent nature of'ethical ideas', Weston (1996: 144) uses the analogy of Rawls' (1980:318)
views on how conceptions of justice are sought, not in terms of applicability for all societies,but for a particular
society of concern.
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opposing directions. Competing principles more often than not suggest similar moral
strategies, and it is on this premise that Norton (1991 a: 187-243) presents a hypothesis
of convergence in environmentalism. This is based on the thesis that environmentalists
are evolving toward a consensus in policy even though they remain divided regarding
basic values; i.e. policy can serve as a mechanism for reconciling divergent interests,
for example, in maintaining ecosystem integrity and securing equity in the distribution of
resources within and between generations (Angermeier, 2000: 374; Barrett and Grizzle,
1999: 25).203Norton defends this thesis by reviewing four complex areas of policy
debate in the US and explores the mechanism through which policy convergence is
achieved in this debate. In his policy analysis he focuses on the common denominator
objectives or goals that virtually all environmentalists support and which are expressed,
explained and justified by appealing to a variety of value axioms and worldview
fragments (biocentrism, enlightened utilitarianism etc.) to justify policy positions.
Through the convergence hypothesis Norton challenges the view that environmentalists
hold no common ground, even though they may not have accepted a common shared
worldview. He believes that, most importantly, there are shared policy goals and that
this feature characterises the unity upon which his thesis is based.204 Human appeal to
a diversity of values and their pursuit of multiple and distinct aims and objectives within
policy (Barrett and Grizzle, 1999: 24) is not merely peripheral to the area in which unity
exists, but it is a strength of the movement which is used, in the first instance, to secure
coalitionary support from a broad spectrum of people who share a commonly sought
general outcome to an environmental issue under debate. This outcome, which Norton
believes is being achieved in the US, includes environmental policies which militate
against simple economic aggregationism and which respond sensibly to the constraints
203 Norton's convergence f?ypothesis suggests that the interests of humans and the interests of nature differ only in the short
run. An acknowledgement that humans form an integral part of the community of life implies that long term
human interests coincide with the "interests" of nature. Careful management of the full community of life is to
protect the far-distant future of the human species and its evolutionary successors, and vice versa (Norton, 1996a:
99-100).
204 Weston (1992) believes that an emerging consensus in all areas of these policy debates is an optimistic claim by
Norton. Others see environmentalists diverging rather than converging, or converging only temporarily, or
diverging over other issues as they converge over policy. A safer conclusion might be that potential consensus
positions have emerged. Weston acknowledges that this is, nevertheless, grounds for optimism.
Michael Burns Chapter 4, The Dialectical Relationship Between Environmental Assessment
And Environmental Ethics, Page 194
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Co-Evolutionary Relationships Between Environmental Ethics And Environmental Assessment
associated with human exploitationist activities. The new policy currency is the concept
of sustainability - a response to the environmental problematic, in particular the suite of
3rd generation problems - not in the economic, demand-oriented sense of definition, but
one which recognises limits inherent in the complexity and organisational integrity of
larger ecological systems.
The common denominator that can unite environmentalists is not a commitment to a
particular moral principle, but a consensus view that the activities of economic man are
constrained because of the impacts behaviours impose on their larger context. A shared
concern for the consequences of such impacts prompts stakeholders to press for
inclusion in policy, for example, goals that aim to maintain biological diversity and
complexity and protect associated controlling processes. The rationale for such concern
is the recognition that these issues are also integral to the global environing systems
that provide the larger context for human life. Neither economic productivity nor
aesthetic and intergenerational moral values can be protected without protecting the
complex, organised system that provides the ecological context upon which all values
depend. This is the realisation of Leopold's pluralistic integrationism; i.e. an ethics
supported not by shared metaphysical or moral axioms, but by an emerging worldview
which, although accommodating in terms of moral pluralism, is based largely on
scientific principle and the language of ecology. 205, 206. 207
205 Light and Katz (1996) suggest that environmentalists call for two distinct types of pluralism: theoreticalpluralism (the
accommodation of theoretically incommensureable bases for moral consideration), and metatheoretica! pluralism
(openness to the plausibility of divergent ethical theories working together in a single moral enterprise -
justifying an ideal from different value positions).
206 In this respect, Barrett and Grizzle (1999: 29) suggest that ethical enquiry into issues of sustainability benefits from
contact with the natural sciences.
207 Shrader-Frechette (1989) and Shrader-Frechette and McCoy (1994) caution against a reliance on ecology as an
ultimate philosophical grounding. They question the assertion that ecological science can determine
environmental values and/or provide imperatives for environmental ethics and policy. The authors argue that
there are no general ecological theories that have the predictive power to do this to the extent that is perhaps
expected of the science. The contribution of ecology to informing environmental ethics and values lies more in
the realm of natural history and case studies (i.e. case studies useful in the context of Norton's practical
philosophy).
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The convergence hypothesis also credits environmentalists with Leopold's style of
pragmatism, which recognises that politics are ultimately influenced by economic
imperatives. In the context of political debate, they acknowledge that individual rights,
moral obligations to protect species and scientifically modelled sustainability thresholds
of ecological systems are the variables that are factored into the goals of environmental
policy initiatives.208 Convergence via the shared goals of environmentalists in the
practical and pragmatic arena of environmental policy development is considered to be
more important than the achievement of theoretical unity in environmental ethics.209 The
convergence that Norton believes has been achieved through policy defines a
constructive raison d'etre for the discipline of environmental ethics, which contrasts with
the academic debate on the sidelines concerning the problems associated with
divergency in value systems. In this respect, Norton argues that the growing consensus
(just described) has not been accompanied by a narrowing of the value positions that
environmentalists might employ in policy debates, but is achieved through arguments
pertaining to values which might arise from reference to worldviews as divergent as
those characterised by a grounding, for example, in deep ecology and environmental
economics."? Supporting this view, Hattingh (1999: 80) suggests that the diverse pool
of value theory originating from within the discipline of environmental ethics opens up,
rather than solves key environmental questions - which are then carried through for
resolution through policy.
208 Once political buy-in is secured for the shared goals of policy initiatives, Norton (1991a: 189-191) argues that
environmentalists can accept some measure of economic eificienry analysis to determine the ranking of
programmes that may be implemented to give effect to these goals. Equally, there may also be a measure of
dispute amongst environmentalists concerning which programme or strategy would be most appropriate in
different situations; however, such dispute does not detract from the positive achievement in terms of
consensus relating to policy goals which are agreed upon.
209 As discussed previously, Weston (1992), for example, does not believe that it should now be a mandate of the
discipline to achieve theoretical unity.
210 Taking a contrary view, Simon in Myers and Simon (1994: 43) suggests that this broadening of value positions, which
is exemplified by the vagueness which arises, for example, from the diversity of goals which environmentalists
might state as the raison d'etre for conserving biodiversity makes it difficult to compare the worth of a species-
saving activity against another value.
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Whilst moral monists believe that the role of environmental ethics is to deliver a unified
worldview, Norton suggests that, although this might be strategically politically useful for
environmentalism, it is perhaps questionable whether there is one correct worldview. He
concludes that at present, the environmental movement operates quite successfully by
drawing on a pluralism of values and conceptual tools (vide Parker, 1996: 21 )211 and is
gainfully pragmatic through political compromise and ideological non-exclusivity. This
loose model of operation avoids the dilemma of having to assign value in nature that is
reducible only to monetary units or the rights of species. However, Norton believes that
the role for environmental ethics might be to further the development of a new
integrated worldview - one that captures the pluralism of existing first-order moral
criteria but supported by second-order principles or rules defining which moral criteria
should apply in given situations.212 The defining role of these second-order principles
should be one that takes cognisance of the systemic context of the situations requiring
moral resolution at the temporal and spatial scales that are consistent with Leopold's
land ethic.
The key defining aspects of an emerging dialectical relationship between
environmentalism and environmental ethics during the 1980s and 1990s are
summarised in Box 4.5, which draws on the modelled relationship described in window
5 of Figure 4.1 (b).
Box 4.5: Key defining aspects of an emerging dialectical relationship between
environmentalism and environmental ethics during the 1980s and 1990s
• Breakaway initiatives in environmental ethics from the narrow monistic
approaches to value theory - i.e. the accommodation of moral pluralism - provide
a practical response to the expectations of environmentalism
211 Norton's argument in support of moral pluralism finds a parallel in Jacobs' (1994: 88) advocacy of methodological
pluralism in the domain of economic environmental valuation; i.e. that economics should allowinto its analysis
contributions from other disciplines.
212 In a contrary view,Weston (1992) does not believe that an ethic should be reduced to a type of algorithm that would
result from the introduction of second-order principles (rules) of the kind envisaged by Norton.
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• The emerging practical philosophy in environmental ethics is capable of
operating at the informal interface between the pluralism of environmental values
held by environmentalists and the decisions informed in real cases
• Environmental theory has advanced to assist the understanding of specific, real
situations facing environmentalists
• There is a realisation that the pluralism of views held by environmentalists does
not create a situation of dichotomy, which places the holders of such views in
opposed camps
• Novel approaches to value theory acknowledge that convergence towards
shared ideals in environmentalism - most notably those grounded in the
principles of sustainable development - can be achieved in spite of the
justification of these ideals from different value positions
• Consensus in environmentalism around key objectives is achieved through the
accommodation of a broadening, not narrowing, of value positions
4.5.2.3 Evaluation
From the above discussion and summary of recent developments in the dialectical
relationship between environmentalism and environmental ethics, the question arises
whether a pluralist, pragmatic approach can adequately respond to the participation,
survival and emancipation issues raised by environmentalists? i.e. a question posed in
a similar vein to the evaluation of the relationship between environmentalism and
environmental assessment presented in Section 4.5.1.4.
A first response to the above would be to make reference to the argument presented in
this chapter, and elsewhere in this dissertation, that applied philosophy, in which
theoretical monism finds its grounding, would not seem to offer better possibilities in this
respect. The main reason for this lies, ironically enough, in the preoccupation of applied
philosophy with abstract theoretical issues and intricate internal debates. Although this
may change in future, these issues and debates in a double irony, nevertheless indicate
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the areas of environmental philosophy where solutions to the diverse issues of
environmentalism, in the form of viable policy options, are unlikely to be found at
present.
The serious implications arising from the current pathology in the human-environment
relationship, about which environmentalism is concerned, require an urgent and
practical response. In this respect, any contribution from within the discipline of
environmental ethics that is inclined towards the pragmatism that is demanded of the
situation, offers the potential to make a constructive and measurable impact.
Confirmation of the promise that this mode of influence offers, is provided by the
exemplar of Aldo Leopold's arguments grounded in real world management
imperatives, which call for change in the relationship between humans and their
sustaining environment - not through revolution, but through evolutionary change from
within the prevailing social-political paradigm.
Whilst an extension of the response offered by Leopold to the current situation - i.e. his
advocacy of pragmatism through evolutionary, as opposed to revolutionary, change -
does not obviously suggest an inability to accommodate the environmentalist's issues of
participation and survival, some conflict with emancipatorytheory, which calls for radical
cultural and institutional transformation, is evident. The relevance of this conflict, given
the current evolutionary trajectory in environmental ethics, is apparent, since it might be
seen to diminish the promise offered by ethical pluralism and pragmatism to contribute
to the resolution of the environmental problematic. However, much of the discussion in
this chapter focuses on the questionable distinction that is made, for example, between
advocates of emancipatory theory, and other environmentalist 'factions' - which
presents an artificial polarisation of the situation, given the behaviour of such 'factions'
in practice. The counter-argument offered in earlier discussion is that environmentalists
do not operate within silos, according to closed value systems, and in fact, they tend to
draw on a variety of arguments and values that generally converge towards a broadly
shared outcome, which, although variously expressed, quite adequately finds its locus
in the definition of sustainable development.
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A pluralistic approach to environmental ethics promotes the validity of diverse positions
in value theory, thereby accommodating to a far greater extent the issues of
participation, survival and emancipation than any alternative monistic value theory
offered thus far. This approach also finds alignment with Thomas Kuhn's explanation of
how crises are resolved from a plurality of ideas generated in response to the persistent
failure of an existing single theory to provide such resolution. In the current absence of
a dramatic change in allegiance to the current global social-political paradigm (a future
possibility that should not be discounted), pluralism in environmental ethics provides the
important breadth of possible justifications for implementing the broadly shared ideal of
sustainable development. What is important, is the recognition that there is
convergence towards this ideal, as manifested by the many environmental policies
(supported by the principles of sustainable development) that have been developed in
response to the pressures of environmentalism. Less important, is the debate
concerning the priority of any single value position over another in justifying sustainable
development. As indicated elsewhere in this dissertation, the present era of
experimentation with environmental value theory and the generation of a plurality of
options is a situation that should be anticipated and welcomed during this originary
stage of environmental ethics and its relationship with environmentalism.
4.6 INTERPRETATION OF A MEDIATED DIALECTICAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN EIA AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
The promise of a close dialectical relationship between EIA and environmental ethics -
which their common origin in an appreciation of 1st and 2nd generation environmental
problems might have suggested - did not manifest during the first decade of practice
and philosophical endeavour of the two disciplines (Figure 4.1(b), window 3). This can
be explained by the immediate dichotomy that developed between the anthropocentric
emphasis of EIA (its response at a conceptual level to the environmental crisis of
participation) and the nonanthropocentric focus of environmental ethics on the
assignation of intrinsic value to the non-human natural environment (its failure to
respond to the crisis of participation). In the absence of dialogue between
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environmentalism and environmental ethics the opportunity for a dialectical relationship
between EIA and environmental ethics (mediated by the evolutionary trajectory of
environmentalism) also failed to exist.
During the 1970s there is little evidence to suggest that NEPA's advancement of
democratic participation in decision-making contributed in any way to the defence of a
non-anthropocentric environmental ethic. In this respect, the evolutionary course of
development in EIA did not force a shift in the ethics of decision-making away from a
predominantly anthropocentric doctrine towards a position of alignment with the
nonanthropocentric ethical deliberations underway within the discipline of environmental
ethics at the time. This can be attributed to the recourse in EIA to the entrenched
concepts of conservation that Sagoff (1988: 148) describes as having their focus on the
maximisation of social welfare as this is understood in economic theory. It also signaled
an affirmation of faith in the positivism of science (a pillar of Pinchotist conservationism),
which as described by Bacow (1980: 109), was employed in EIA to inform decision-
making at the time. In this respect, the early vocabulary of EIA - for example, its
reductionistic scientific methods and its oversimplified checklist analytical approach
[vide Bendix and Graham (1978: vii); Carpenter (1981: 182)] - proved familiar to the
persistent dominance of a reductionistic calculus in political decision-making.
The key factors explaining the absence of a mediated dialectical relationship between
EIA and environmental ethics during the 1970s are summarised in Box 4.6, which draws
on the modelled relationship described in window 3 of Figure 4.1 (b).
Box 4.6: Key factors explaining the absence of a mediated dialectical relationship
between environmental assessment and environmental ethics during the 1970s
• There was no alignment in the evolutionary trajectories of EIA and environmental
ethics in spite of the mediation effect of the participatory theme of
environmentalism
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• The anthropocentric participatory theme of environmentalism invited a weakly
aligned conceptual response in the practice of EIA, which was not possible in
environmental ethics given the discipline's strong nonanthropocentric inclination
• The monological language of both EIA (its use of objective it-language) and
environmental ethics (its narrow, monological subjectivity) proved incapable of
responding to the intersubjectivity (multiple I-languages) of environmentalism
Human regard for the environment during the 1980s had changed little since Aldo
Leopold's observation almost half a century earlier that land use ethics were governed
by economics and short term human self-interest (Leopold, 1991: 245). Developments
in EIA during this decade indicated closer alignment in this respect rather than an
advancement of the ethical extensionism with respect to humanity's relationship to land,
plants and animals, which Leopold argued lay within the potential of human evolution;
i.e. the evolutionary potential of human social sentiments to be extended to the broader
biotic community (Callicott, 1989: 79). However, in spite of the alignment of EIA with
development activity which tended to set humans apart from and in a relatively narrow
utilitarian relationship with the biotic community, its evolutionary course nevertheless did
indicate a closing position related to Leopold's land ethic in two important areas (Figure
4.1(b), window 6).
The first, was the enhancement of the social dimension of environmental assessment
and, more importantly, an acknowledgment of the dependency of humans on - and their
right to defend their interests with respect to - their bio-physical environing context
(Susskind, 1982: 7). Although these interests clearly have an anthropocentric
grounding, the extent to which EIA could accommodate them was not contradictory to
Leopold's views concerning the human privilege of utilizing and managing the earth's
resources (Leopold, 1979: 141). The main deficiency of EIA in this respect - which
would receive attention only in the following decade - was the failure of the process to
adequately respond to the interests of future generations and to ensure the protection
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of nature and natural processes into the indefinite future; i.e. Leopold's long-sighted
view of humanity's position within the biotic community (Norton, 1995b: 353).
A second development in EIA that reflected a closing alignment with Leopold's land
ethic was the evolutionary trend towards an integrative systems approach to
environmental management. This was an important shift in the process of impact
assessment from the traditional fragmentation of the bio-physical environment into
discrete components for the purpose of analysis (narrow scientific reductionism)
towards ecosystem and landscape level approaches to EIA (Sadler, 1996: 27). An
acknowledgment of the systemic functional relationships between constituent elements
of ecosystems - and a tentative sensitivity towards the management of human impacts
affecting the integrity of such systems - thus began to emerge within EIA. This
departure from the previous atomistic mode of scientific analysis enhanced the
grounding of EIA in the type of science which was proposed by Leopold as representing
an essential first-order requirement for understanding the ecological functioning of the
biotic community (Norton, 1991a: 40; 1996a: 89). More generally, it was also an
advancement aligned with a developing trend among environmental philosophers at the
time (eg. Holmes Rolston, 1975) of selecting ecological principles upon which to base
ethical norms for land use, resource management and conservation - an approach
which was defended as being as sound as any other ethical rationale (Marietta, 1979:
195, 207). The greater analytical holism that was introduced into EIA did not extend to
include Leopold's organicist conceptualisation of the environment. However, Norton
(1996a: 89) argues that Leopold would not consider the more mechanistic scientific
conceptualisation that was applied in EIA to be automatically in conflict with the ideals
of the land ethic, since it acknowledges - albeit in a different descriptive language to that
of organicism - the inherent interrelatedness of the elements of the biotic community.
Through this evolutionary advancement in EIA greater cognizance was therefore taken
of the synchrony between human activity in the short term and the larger, autonomously
functioning environmental context within which such activity occurs - a fundamental
aspect of Leopold's land ethic (Leopold, 1949 (rep 1991): 137-141,262; Norton, 1995b:
353). According to Kuhnian theory, developments in EIA during the second decade,
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which promoted the understanding of ecosystem functioning, permitted the
environmental problematic to be stated in terms which enhanced the potential for its
resolution. Considering the impact of Leopold's views on the generation of theory within
the discipline of environmental ethics, the increased alignment of EIA with a key tenet of
the land ethic (i.e. that human activity should be perceived in the context of the greater
systemic whole) is considered the most significant development in the dialectical
relationship between environmental ethics and EIA during the 1980s.
A summary of key aspects of an emerging dialectical relationship between EIA and
environmental ethics during the 1980s is presented in Box 4.7, which draws on the
modelled relationship described in window 6 of Figure 4.1 (b).
Box 4.7: Key aspects of an emerging mediated dialectical relationship between
environmental assessment and environmental ethics during the 1980s
• A weakened monological grounding of both EIA (its opening up to the multiple 1-
languages of participation) and environmental ethics (its evolution towards
theoretical pluralism) initiated a dialectical evolutionary relationship focused on
resolving the crisis of participation
• Enhancement of the social dimension of environmental assessment indicated a
developing dialectical relationship with environmental ethics grounded in the
Leopoldian principle of human interrelatedness (dependency) on their complex
bio-physical environing context
• The potential existed, but was not effectively exploited, for a mediated dialogue
between EIA and environmental ethics concerning the resolution of the crisis of
survival theme in environmentalism
• In EIA, although cognizance was taken of the synchrony between human activity
in the short term and the larger, autonomously functioning environmental context
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• within which such activity occurs - a fundamental aspect of Leopold's land ethic-
no response was offered with respect to the development of an instrumental
method capable of responding to the emerging imperative of sustainable
development
In the tradition of 'normal science' (Kuhn, 1970a: 42), the conceptual, theoretical,
instrumental and methodological tools of environmental assessment were extended and
revised during the 1980s and 1990s to attempt the resolution of a familiar, albeit freshly
articulated, class of problem which is the promotion of human survival- in the long term.
In this respect, the revision of the paradigmatic standards of EIA [vide Kuhn (1970a:
186)] which was required to respond to the global concern for sustainability was the shift
in emphasis from what Norton (1984a: 133-136) describes as the satisfaction of short
term felt human preferences to more rationally derived considered preferences (see
Section 3.4.3). Whilst traditional EIA could be viewed as the tool of choice for
responding to felt preferences (short term human needs), new generation tools for
environmental assessment and management such as SEA found application in the
domain of considered preferences. This approach is consistent with Leopold's rejection
of shortsighted, environmentally harmful economic reasoning, and is one that provides
rational decision-making support based on systemic ecological knowledge - which the
new generation tools can generate - as an alternative. It is also consistent with Norton's
(1984a) concept of enlightened anthropocentrism, whereby humans are retained as the
important (and only) locus of value, but with the acknowledgment that there is a critical
interdependency between human existence and the complex environmental whole
which sustains them in the long term (Section 3.4.3). SEA and Sustainability Analysis,
for example, promote a non-individualistic ethics - based on the employment of we-
language to secure shared ideals (in spite of differences in basic environmental values)
- concerning distributional fairness within generations and the promotion of cross-
generational human environmental interests; i.e. they are tools that are responsive to an
enlightened anthropocentric basis for decision-making (Figure 4.1(b), window 8).
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A summary of key aspects of the dialectical relationship between EIA and
environmental ethics forged during the 1980s and 1990s is presented in Box 4.8, which
draws on the modelled relationship described in window 8 of Figure 4.1 (b).
Box 4.8: Key aspects of a mediated dialectical relationship between environmental
assessment and environmental ethics forged during the 1980s and 1990s
• The imperative of sustainable development (arising from the crisis of
participation and survival in environmentalism) currently provides a strong basis
for a dialectical relationship between new generation approaches to
environmental assessment (eg. SEA) and a practical philosophy in
environmental ethics
• The common denominator objectives of environmentalism pertaining to
sustainability - expressed as the crisis of participation, survival - provide the
focus for both new generation approaches to environmental assessment and
emerging pragmatist approaches to environmental ethics
• The issues of emancipation raised by environmentalists have not mediated a co-
evolutionary response in environmental assessment and environmental ethics
• Environmental ethics has responded directly to the theme of emancipation, but
has yet to yield a viable basis for policy. Set in the context of the prevailing
modern social-political paradigm, environmental assessment has delivered no
response to the radical appeal for emancipation
• The priority of we-language used to define sustainability objectives through
appeals to a variety of values, which dialogical opportunity in the fields of both
new generation approaches to environmental assessment and moral pluralism
promotes, provides the basis of the current phase of co-evolutionary
development between the two disciplines
Whilst it is suggested that the accommodation of a sustainability rationale within the
process of environmental assessment and management indicates an evolutionary
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convergence with the Leopoldian sentiment of environmental ethics, the extent of such
convergence is clearly contingent upon which of the multiple interpretations of and
approaches to sustainable development it most obviously accommodates (Section
2.3.3.1 ).213 In this respect, a skeptical perspective is offered by O'Riordan (1986: 4-6)
who suggests that the evolution of environmental assessment and management has
taken a strongly positivist route which is revealed by the attention directed at defining
sustainability in terms of the boundaries of environmental tolerance to human impacts.
The argument here is that environmental assessment has become a tool that enables
the economic break-even point to be more accurately calculated at which marginal
investments in environmental enhancement balance marginal costs. This is aligned with
Baxter's (1974 in Pierce and VanDeVeer, 1995: 384) view that humans will strive to
reduce pollution, for example, through the diversion and investment of resources up to
the point (calculated through SEA, for example) where the achievement of a desired
state does not compromise the realisation of some other more valued preference.i"
Based on O'Riordan's views, EIA, SEA, and Sustainability Analysis could be regarded
as manipulative tools that open the way to exploitative environmental abuse, which is
rationalised as being located within the bounds of sustainability. Their potential could
thus be seen to fall short of responding to the interpretation of sustainability which
recognises that its attainment is determined by factors such as ecological processes
operating in the long term - i.e. beyond short term human control (Daily, 1997) - which
cannot be revealed through the prevailing method of environmental assessment.
However, whilst EIA might be judged to be derived from an economic exploitative
framework (eg. in which the test of development acceptability could require the
213 Different models of sustainability/ sustainable development can be distinguished. For example, the limits to growth
model described by Club of Rome (1972) suggests a radical interpretation, whilst the interpretation provided by
Our commonfuture (WCED, 1987) is more conservative. Using the radical/conservative typology developed by
Jacobs (1999), a detailed discussion of the shared theoretical and different practical interpretations of
sustainability / sustainable is provided in Chapter 5.
214 In their criticism of views such as this, Callicott et al. (2000: 28) argue that the substitutability axiom of neoclassical
economics implies that there are no irreplaceable natural resources. As resources become scarce substitutes are
found, and needs (of the present generation) are met through exploitation of currently available resources,
which results in the bequeathment to future generations of a depleted natural resource base - justified by the
legacy of wealth, technology and a strengthened culture of human inventiveness which is passed on to future
generations.
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monetary benefits of a project to exceed its costs), there would seem to be a
reasonable argument that its new generation derivatives such SEA are strongly
grounded in the ideals of ecological sustainability.215
Attempting to establish whether the evolutionary course of environmental assessment
and management reflects either the positivist route presumed by O'Riordan (1986) or it
has been (or should be) guided, for example, by an ethics defined only by the prevailing
emancipatory theme in environmentalism is unlikely to be fruitful. Essentially, such effort
would be an extension of the philosophically rich but practically unhelpful dialectic in
environmental ethics that (inter alia) places anthropocentrically based ethical arguments
in opposition to those grounded in a nonanthropocentric environmental ethic. As
discussed earlier in this chapter, humans operate with open systems of belief and are
not guided in their decisions by unquestioned, complete sets of axioms (Norton, 1999).
Attitudes are not easily changed only through narrow moral persuasion of the kind
promoted through any particular stream of environmentalism (Nelson, 1979: 263) or
through short term economic reasoning.216 Humans face specific problems armed with
the ethical attitudes and biases which they possess and they are directed in their
decision-making not so much by a priori perceptions of morally correct environmental
ends as by ethically correct procedures according to which a locally relevant end - which
is 'to do what is right' - is generated (Nelson, 1979: 270). This is the way of democratic
culture which gains its credibility from an accommodation of diversity in moral thinking,
thus enabling it to deal with the unpredictable variability of human experience with the
natural world (Minteer and Manning, 1999: 194).
215 Callicott and Mumford (1997) would define ecologically sustainable development as human activity that does not
compromise ecosystem health; i.e. human occupation/use of land to the extent that it is not made
dysfunctional (Leopold, 1941).
216 Many contrary views suggest that greater effort should be invested in moral persuasion concerning crucial environmental
values (eg. Angermeier, 2000: 374).
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4.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter has taken the information derived from the analysis of the individual
evolutionary trajectories of environmental assessment and environmental ethics, which
is contained in the two preceding chapters, and advanced part of the dissertation's main
research theme by revealing a co-evolutionary dialectical relationship between the two
disciplines.
Based on the analysis of the development trends in environmental assessment and the
divergence in value theory generated from within the discipline of environmental ethics,
it is concluded that a relatively strong dialectical relationship exists between the two
disciplines. Mediated by the issues arising from the various themes in
environmentalism, this relationship indicates a close alignment between the new
generation approaches to environmental assessment and the practical philosophy of
enlightened anthropocentrism.
Environmental assessment has been shown to be responsive, in a pragmatic sense, to
the issues arising from environmentalism. This is illustrated, for example, by the extent
to which it invites participation and is thereby guided in its approach. Whilst
environmental assessment has always had a conceptual grounding in this demand for
participation, it is concluded that it is only in its new generation approaches that an
effective response to this demand has proved possible. This has not been achieved
through attempts to respond to multiple individual human preferences (expressed in
multiple I-languages), which the early EIA consultative process invited. Rather, the
focus has been on the definition of shared ideals, which are underpinned by broadly
accepted principles of sustainable development (expressed in we-language). Both new
generation approaches to environmental assessment and recent developments in
environmental ethics, recognise that there is convergence in environmentalism around
these principles, although they may be justified by appeals to very different values and
ethical positions.
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Environmental assessment has traditionally been practiced from a strong foundation in
scientific objectivity. It is concluded that throughout its course of evolutionary
development, the significance of this foundation has not diminished, but has increased
as the survival issues arising from environmentalism have been added to the issues of
participation. Holistic approaches to environmental assessment, based on sound
ecological theory now makes it possible to establish environmental thresholds, limits
etc. at which the survival of humans within their environing context may be jeopardised.
Here, there is a commonality with enlightened anthropocentrism, which focuses on the
importance of ecosystem protection in order to guarantee the sustainability of
environmental services necessary for the perpetuation of human consciousness.
In the case of both new generation approaches to environmental assessment and the
practical philosophy of enlightened anthropocentrism, the common emphasis is,
therefore, on the subjective process of seeking and establishing convergence around
the ideals of sustainable development. This is initiated in advance of objective scientific
method, which may be employed, for example, to inform rational approaches to
achieving sustainable development.
It is concluded that the issues of emancipation arising from environmentalism have not
contributed to a mediated dialectical relationship between environmental assessment
and environmental ethics. Although many supporting value theories and philosophies
have emerged from within the discipline of environmental ethics in support of the theme
of emancipation in environmentalism (eg. deep ecology, ecofeminism, social ecology,
bioregionalism etc.), no equivalent response is evident in the new generation
approaches to environmental assessment. Environmental assessment has retained its
grounding in the liberal social-political paradigm, which is essentially incommensurable
with the radical communitarianism and other cultural changes advocated by
emancipatory theorists. The fact that radical positions in environmental ethics have yet
to yield a theory that provides a viable basis for informing policy choices probably
explains the failure of environmental assessment to respond to the environmentalist
issues of emancipation.
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In the following chapter, which summarises the key conclusions emerging from the
dissertation's overall theme of investigation, there will be further investigation of the
alignment between new generation approaches to environmental assessment,
specifically SEA, and the practical philosophy of enlightened anthropocentrism. This will
be achieved through confirmation of the common grounding of their underpinning
principles in what will be defined as certain core ideas of sustainable development.
Importantly, this alignment will be shown to exist not only at a conceptual level of
interpretation of these core ideas, but also with respect to their practical meaning. In this
respect, it will be argued that if the dialectical relationship between environmental
assessment and environmental ethics is to be effective in terms of arresting the
pathology in the human-environment relationship, a common interpretation of what
sustainable development implies in practice is essential.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
In drawing this dissertation to its conclusion, it is necessary to re-visit the research
intent outlined in the introductory chapter, and to review the progress that has been
made in terms of achieving what it has promised. In this respect, the intention has been
to investigate the individual evolutionary trajectories of environmental assessment and
environmental ethics, and to reveal a co-evolutionary dialectical relationship between
the two disciplines. By making the assumption that the principles of sustainable
development offer the potential to arrest the current pathology in the human-
environment relationship, the intention has also been to establish whether the revealed
relationship has its grounding in these principles.
The dissertation's conclusions pertaining to the individual evolutionary trajectories of
environmental assessment and environmental ethics are summarised in Sections 5.2
and 5.3, respectively. This creates the context for a review of the main conclusions
pertaining to the revealed dialectical relationship between the two disciplines, which is
provided in Section 5.4. This review will, however, be shown to fall short in terms of
responding to the research question concerning the relationship's grounding in the
principles of sustainable development, and further attention will be directed at this issue
in Section 5.5. Here, the contested status of sustainable development will be described,
and a taxonomy will be created from the main dichotomies in practical interpretation of a
number of core ideas of sustainable development.
The taxonomy of sustainable development will be used as a framework in which to
locate both the grounding principles of SEA, which is an example of a new generation
approach to environmental assessment, and enlightened anthropocentrism, which has
been proposed as a viable, practical environmental ethics. Through this approach, a
comparative evaluation of the taxonomic profiles ofthe two disciplines is possible, and it
will be established whether the relationship between environmental assessment and
environmental ethics is grounded in a common interpretation of the practical
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implications of sustainable development; i.e. a common grounding revealed through
similar taxonomic profiles.
5.2 EVOLUTIONARY TRAJECTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT
From the discussion presented in Chapter 2, it is concluded that the emergence of
environmental assessment, as an action-forcing provision of NEPA, represents a major
non-cumulative break in the past tradition of narrow economic determinism, following
many unsuccessful previous attempts to resolve the developing environmental crisis.
The switch in global allegiance to this new paradigm in environmental policy is
explained by the promise offered by its new fundamentals, which require that economic
and environmental quality should be compatible, and that the fulfillment of social,
economic and other requirements of present and future generations must permit
humans and nature to live in harmony.
At its point of origin, the practice of environmental assessment promised to accomplish
what previous policy initiatives had failed to do in terms of resolving the environmental
crisis. However, it is clear that, as in the case of most paradigms, it did not immediately
fully meet the expectations of its constituency of allegiants.
Reflection on the initial evolutionary development of environmental assessment brings
to the fore its very strong rational grounding in scientific materialism. In its first decade
of practice it is concluded that this was relatively narrowly focussed on the bio-physical
natural environment - reduced to its constituent components - and dealt with impact
prediction through an atomistic, empirical mode of enquiry. Environmental impacts were
typically revealed, in a monological fashion, as empirical statements reflecting the
condition of the concrete world. Essentially, a simple procedure was applied to
objectively 'map' the current or predicted state of affairs concerning those sensory
aspects of the environment that have physical location. Value-free, it-language served
as the dominant medium for the conduct and communication of environmental
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assessment, which was a language familiar to, and framed by, the prevailing rational
worldview.
Also described in Chapter 2, is the infusion of advanced ecological sciences into the
process of environmental assessment during its second decade of practice, which
manifested as a more holistic understanding and assessment of environmental impacts
affecting the natural environment. Systems theory thinking, evident in the emergence,
for example, of ecological impact assessment, began to direct the approaches that were
adopted. Although these developments represented an advancement on previous
excessively reductionistic methods of impact assessment, it is concluded that the
introduction of systems theory applications held little promise of an appropriate
response to arrest the pathology in the human-environment relationship. In this respect,
it made little impact in terms of securing the integration of the subjective human cultural
value spheres with the objectivity implicit in scientific materialism - which, it has been
argued, is a necessary condition for effectively dealing with the environmental crisis.
This is attributed to the continued focus on scientific empiricism as the basis for
environmental assessment, and its conduct and communication in objective, value-free
it-language.
In reaction to its initial failure to effectively accommodate social issues in the process of
environmental assessment, it is concluded that significant developments occurred
during its second decade of practice. Whilst these developments represented a major
advancement in terms of enhancing the effectiveness of environmental assessment, it
has emerged that this was constrained by the incoherency that existed between the 1-
languages through which the multiple subjective preferences and values of
stakeholders were expressed, and the it-language of response that the process was
capable of delivering. Although the evolution of environmental assessment had, in a
sense, moved closer to the integration of the objective and subjective spheres of human
perception of the environment, it could not achieve this, since it lacked the tools to
effectively deal with diverse subjective values and often contradictory moral dispositions
concerning the environment arising from the process of invited participation. It-language
remained the dominant medium of enquiry and communication for environmental
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assessment - a situation that would inevitably fail with respect to its ability to interpret
and respond to the multiple I-language issues arising from its acquired participatory
process.
Recent evolutionary advancement of environmental assessment has focused on
responding to the above deficiencies, by developing approaches that integrate humans,
and their social and economic traits, into the definition of environment. In this respect, it
is concluded that environmental assessment is now capable of engaging the multiple
subjective I-languages of human society and making dialogue possible with the
objectivity of it-language employed in its traditional methods. This is reflected in the
emergence of new generation approaches to environmental assessment, such as SEA,
which engages we-language in order to secure broad agreement on shared ideals
around sustainable development, which can be articulated in spite of divergent
justifications of these ideals. The impossibility of responding to multiple I-languages
according to which such justifications are made, is thereby avoided.
It is this latest development that perhaps captures the most significant evolutionary
advancement in the practice of environmental assessment, and which makes it truly
capable of contributing to the arrest in the pathology in the human-environment
relationship. It is concluded that its new generation approaches can potentially promote,
through practically impiementabie method, the essential integration of the dissociated
subjective and objective human cultural value spheres.
5.3 EVOLUTIONARY TRAJECTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
From the discussion presented in Chapter 3, it is concluded that the emergence and
evolution of the discipline of environmental ethics is a response to the failure of
traditional human ethics, such as utilitarianism, to resolve the developing environmental
crisis. This failure of 'normal' ethics to deal with crisis has placed into question its
validity as a value paradigm, and this explains the opportunity that exists for a discipline
such as environmental ethics to deliver a more capable paradigm in this respect.
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Measured against the tradition of human ethics, in which the environment is valued
mainly in terms of its instrumental utility, the aim of environmental ethics, which is to
situate the environment as the object of human moral concern rather than one of mere
utility, is considered to be a revolutionary endeavour.
In contrast to the high expectations of environmental ethics to deliver a viable new
theory of environmental value, it is concluded that developments within the discipline do
not yet reflect a revolution in value theory. Similar to the way in which human ethics
have resulted from a protracted and complex cultural process of testing and
assimilation, the current evolutionary trajectory in environmental ethics is not expected
to immediately deliver a single, unifying theory of environmental value. The discipline is
still at an originary stage, which is characterised by the high degree of experimentation
and uncertainty that exists as the effects of unresolved environmental crisis trigger a
proliferation of different ideas and value theories intended as a response to this crisis.
This situation is to be expected as environmental ethics challenges tradition and opens
up new possibilities, rather that narrows the debate at this early stage towards any
particular theory of value.
The divergence in value theory that has emerged in environmental ethics has been
described through reference to a central dichotomy. This exists in the form of competing
theoretical arguments grounded in entrenched paradigms of instrumental environmental
value, on the one hand, and 'new-paradigm' claims pertaining to either the intrinsic
value of the environment or calls for radical cultural and institutional change in human
society, on the other. Whilst the entrenched value paradigms are relatively familiar in
terms of their close relationship with human ethics, it is concluded that the 'new-
paradigm' claims are largely 'slogan-driven' at present, and cannot be defended, in the
paradigmatic tradition, on the basis of tested and viable fundamental principles.
The high degree of reductionism implicit in the many initiatives concerning the notion of
intrinsic environmental value is a major contributing factor that explains their failure thus
far to attract an allegiance that is indicative of their potential paradigm status. It is
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argued that this is attributable to the failure of attempts to both narrowly systematise
human moral intuitions concerning the environment, and to adequately justify the
boundaries of the moral considerability of nature. It is concluded that, paradoxically,
attempts at reductionistic and monological representations of value systems, are viewed
as having a number of parallels with the reductionism of neoclassical economics, which
the discipline of environmental ethics seeks to replace.
In response to the above limitations in value theory, it is concluded that the evolutionary
trajectory of the discipline is currently moving towards a practical philosophy, based on
a pragmatism that is accommodating of moral pluralism. Enlightened anthropocentrism,
which is one form of such philosophy, offers an alternative to theoretical monism and
some of the radical ethics described in Chapter 3. It is dialogical in the dual sense of its
rejection of monological accounts of human valuation of the environment, and its
differentiation from the individualistic values of conventional ethical systems. It assumes
that it is a worthy cause for human culture and consciousness to be perpetuated in the
long term and that it is this justification that can persuade current human generations,
perhaps from a variety of value positions, to maintain the integrity and health of
ecosystems on which human life and consciousness depends.
5.4 CO-EVOLUTIONARY DIALECTICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
5.4.1 Dialectical relationship between environmentalism and environmental assessment
The dissertation has clearly differentiated between the paradigmatic qualities of
environmental assessment and the contrasting non-paradigmatic qualities of
environmental ethics. In this situation, where there would seem to be little potential for
discovering a direct dialectical relationship between the two disciplines, the rationale for
incorporating the evolutionary progression of environmentalism as a dialectical
intermediary, to reveal an indirect relationship between the two disciplines, is apparent.
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Considering the relationship between environmentalism and environmental assessment,
it is concluded that this manifests as a direct, but temporally staggered, dialectic. The
relationship reflects a relatively clear pattern of cause-and-effect, whereby key issues
emerging from the various themes of environmentalism have triggered related effects in
the development of environmental assessment. For example, the theme of participation
in environmentalism has been increasingly accommodated in the process of
environmental assessment, particularly with respect to its new generation tools that
acknowledge the multiple values and preferences of interested and affected parties,
through a focus on shared sustainability ideals. Also, the increasing attention directed at
determining environmental capacities, thresholds, limits, etc., based on ecosystem
scale approaches to environmental assessment, and the incorporation of humans into
the definition of environment, make its practice acutely sensitive to the theme of survival
as this has emerged in environmentalism.
In contrast to the above cause-and-effect pattern in the dialectical relationship between
the participation and survival issues arising from environmentalism and the response
elicited in the practice of environmental assessment, it is concluded that the theme of
emancipation in environmentalism is not obviously accommodated. In this respect, there
is no evidence to suggest that new generation approaches to environmental
assessment promote, in a radical sense, cultural and institutional transformation of
human society as a way of halting the pathology in the human-environment relationship.
It is also concluded that environmental assessment cannot be credited with having
promoted a changed human consciousness, based on the metaphysical reconstruction
of human relationships with the earth's broader biotic community - in the mold of
emancipatory theory.
Since its revolutionary origin through NEPA, environmental assessment has undergone
continuous evolutionary development, which has been responsive to, and
accommodating of, the participation and survival themes of environmentalism; i.e. it has
acquired the conceptual and instrumental tools necessary for responding to issues of
participation and survival. Whether the evolutionary trajectory of environmental
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assessment will take the process to a point where it undergoes revolutionary change
that is discontinuous with its current development trajectory - to the extent that it is
directly responsive to the theme of emancipation in environmentalism - cannot be
anticipated at present. However, considering the scope of unresolved environmental
problems and the many responses that are continually proposed as options to address
this situation, revolution in the approach resolving to environmental issues is perhaps a
future possibility. In this event, environmental assessment may still undergo radical
change to the extent that its conceptual and instrumental tools find application in a new
emancipatory paradigm.
5.4.2 Dialectical relationship between environmentalism and environmental ethics
It is concluded that early developments within environmental ethics were shaped by an
applied philosophy, whereby the focus of abstract debate was largely on the
determination of what aspects of the natural environment might or might not be
philosophically supportable in terms of their intrinsic value. In this respect, the effort of
theory formulation was directed towards reducing all ethical concerns to a defence from
a single moral position. This promoted little positive dialogue with environmentalism,
firstly, because developments contradicted the expectation that the discipline would
engage in the practical (not abstract) exercise of delivering a viable, anthropocentrically
inclined ethics capable of resolving the environmental crisis of participation, and
secondly, because the pluralism of values from which environmentalism traditionally
draws could not be accommodated in the unyielding approach to theoretical monism.
Value theory proposed during the first decade or so of environmental ethics was a
source of disillusionment regarding the failure of the discipline to support
environmentalism in a practical sense. As a consequence, the more recent
philosophical enquiry has shifted towards support for the resolution of real world
dilemmas; i.e. the focus shifted towards making a constructive, measurable impact in
terms of resolving the environmental crisis of both participation and survival.
Contributing to this shift, has been an accommodation of moral pluralism as a tenable
position in environmental philosophy. In contrast to its early evolutionary trajectory, it is,
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therefore, concluded that recent developments in environmental ethics have resulted in
a strengthening dialogue with environmentalism, particularly in so far as this relates to
the themes of participation and survival.
It is perhaps questionable whether evolutionary advancement towards a pragmatic and
pluralistic ethics is responsive to the emancipatory theme in environmentalism.
However, it is concluded that the distinction that is made between advocates of
emancipatory theory, and other environmentalist 'factions' presents an artificial
polarisation of the situation, given the behaviour of such 'factions' in practice. The
counter-argument that has been presented in this dissertation is that environmentalists
do not operate according to closed value systems, but tend to draw on a variety of
arguments and values that converge towards broadly shared outcomes, which, although
variously expressed, generally find their locus in the definition of sustainable
development. It is concluded that a pluralistic approach to environmental ethics
acknowledges the validity of diverse positions in value theory, thereby accommodating,
to a far greater extent, the issues of participation, survival and emancipation than any
alternative monistic value theory offered thus far.
5.4.3 Mediated dialectical relationship between environmental assessment and
environmental ethics
It is concluded that a relatively strong dialectical relationship currently exists between
the disciplines of environmental assessment and environmental ethics. Mediated by
developments in environmentalism pertaining to the crisis of participation and survival,
this relationship manifests as a close alignment between the new generation
approaches to environmental assessment and the pragmatic ethics, for example, of
enlightened anthropocentrism. Such alignment is evident in the similar evolutionary
trajectories of both disciplines as these have been directed by the broadly
acknowledged imperative of sustainable development. In this respect, it is concluded
that there has been a shift away from the narrow monistic approaches that
characterised early developments in both disciplines (the narrow scientific objectivity of
EIA; the search for a monistic theory of value in environmental ethics) towards an
Michael Burns Chapter 5, Conclusion, Page 220
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Co-Evolutionary Relationships Between Environmental Ethics And Environmental Assessment
acknowledgement of the autonomy of multiple environmental values - the holders of
which can, nevertheless, find convergence about the shared ideals of sustainable
development.
It is concluded that developments in both the disciplines of environmental assessment
and environmental ethics have promoted the integration of the dissociated subjective
and objective human cultural value spheres, and in this way they have the potential to
contribute to an arrest of the pathology in the human-environment relationship. This is
possible through the practical support for decision-making provided by a tool such as
SEA, which is dialectically linked to a pragmatic environmental ethics, such as
enlightened anthropocentrism. Through such relationship, the integration of the
objective and diverse subjective aspects of human perception of the environment
becomes a real possibility. The enabling condition for this is the priority of we-language,
used to articulate shared sustainability ideals, that is acknowledged by these recent
evolutionary products of environmental assessment and environmental ethics.
Whilst the imperative of sustainable development has clearly served as a catalyst in
terms of the forged dialectical relationship between environmental assessment and
environmental ethics, uncertainty concerning what this concept implies in practice
places into question the significance of its supporting principles as a context within
which alignment between the two disciplines is shown to exist. Although the idea of
sustainable development commands widespread allegiance at a theoretical level, it
remains a contested concept with respect to its practical interpretation. The contested
views relating to a number of core ideas of sustainable development create what might
be termed a taxonomy within which new generation approaches to environmental
assessment (eg. SEA) and, for example, enlightened anthropocentrism can assume
particular profiles. Depending on the degree of their taxonomic alignment, this holds
certain implications for the constructive advancement of the dialectical relationship
between the two disciplines. A closer examination of this taxonomy is, therefore,
necessary to ultimately bring the dissertation's research theme to its conclusion.
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5.5 SEA AND ENLIGHTENED ANTHROPOCENTRISM: LOCATING THEIR
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN THE TAXONOMY OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
5.5.1 Contested status of sustainable development
Whilst the twin concepts of sustainability and sustainable development hold dominant
positions in the field of policy and politics (Jacobs, 1999: 21), Hattingh (2000: 2) notes
that their interpretation is fraught with a number of internal tensions. These potentially
place into question the practical usefulness of the concept of sustainable
developrnent.F" Unless these tensions are recognised and made explicit, allegiance to
its principles, for example by the disciplines of environmental assessment and
environmental ethics, is unlikely to contribute to the arrest of the pathology in the
human-environment relationship.
The internal tensions that currently strain the ideal of a common interpretation of
sustainable development have their origin in a number of key initiatives promoted during
the 1970s to address the environmental problematic as this was perceived at the time.
The concept of sustainability is linked to developments in Western countries when, as
described in Chapters 2 and 3, the seriousness of the effects on the environment of
consumption and production, which was attributable to post-war industrialisation,
became widely realised. These were documented in two keystone reports - Limits to
growth (Club of Rome, 1972) and A blueprint for survival (Goldsmith et aI., 1972) -
which had a significant impact on subsequent economic and environmental policy
debates.
Triggered by the above initiatives, and in response to a similar cognisance of the global
state of environmental deterioration linked, in particular, to the social issue of poverty, a
number of United Nations conferences dealing with the environment and development
were convened to debate the situation (eg. the 1972 Conference on the Human
217 ngeably - most commonly
conflated as the single concept of sustainable development - they have their origins in quite different historical
contexts, which explains much of the contested status of the concept of sustainable development.
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Environment, Stockholm; 1992 Earth Summit, Rio de Janeiro). A series of reports was
also compiled which both informed and flowed from these conferences, and important
publications in this respect include the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN, 1980) and
Our common future (World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED),
1987). In a sense, these reactive initiatives reflected the level of discontentment of
poorer countries with the Western preoccupation with the importance of protection of
the natural environment rather than with the responses required to deal with global
poverty issues and inequalities concerning access to environmental resources.
A dichotomy thus emerged in the fundamental principles upon which the rationale for
sustainability and sustainable development, respectively, would later be variously
defended from the platforms provided by the above initiatives. This is explained by
Hattingh (2000: 3) as having originated from the two distinct historical contexts: The
Limits to growth and Blueprint for survival initiatives provide one context, from which
calls were made for a halt in material growth through structural adjustments to the
global economy and social systems, in order to achieve a state of equilibrium [vide
Daly's (1973) arguments for a steady state economy]; i.e. a breakaway from the linear
model of growth and accumulation (Redclift, 1989: 4). The second context relates to the
focus on development, considered necessary to address the essential needs of the
world's poor (Rees, 1988: 273), which is implicit in the UN initiatives, such as WCED's
(1987:43) interpretation of sustainable development as this is articulated in Our
common future.218In a somewhat different emphasis to the Limits to growth arguments,
Our common future indicates an allegiance to the principle of intersubstitutability of
natural capital with human and financial capital (vide Norton, 1992: 99), and
emphasises the issue of intra-, rather than inter-generational justice.
218· Sustainable development is defined as 'development that meets the needs of present generations without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their needs'. This latter definition is clarifiedby two (often ignored) key
provisions which include: the egalitarian imperative to respond to the unmet needs of the world's poor through
development and the equitable distribution of resources; and the assumption that the limits for such development
are imposed '[more] by present states of technology and social organisation [than by any other environmental
limitations]' (WeED, 1987: 7).
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Responding to concerns relating (inter alia) to the loose interpretation of the principle of
resource intersubstitutability, an approach to merging the aims of sustainability and
sustainable development was attempted by the IUCN in 1991. In Caring for the earth: A
strategy for sustainable living, IUCN (1991) proposes a set of principles that centres on
the need for equity, stakeholder participation in decision-making, the conservation of
nature, and economic efficiency. According to these principles, the maintenance of an
intact reserve of natural resources defines the basis of economic sustainability, with
development enabled through human adaptation to change, for example, through
improvements in knowledge, organisation and technical efficiency (Achterberg, 1994:
29). This principle is illustrated by the assumption that natural capital and other forms of
capital are not intersubstitutable to the extent suggested, for example, in Our common
future (Hattingh, 2000: 5). Quality of life, not merely survival, emerges as a core idea of
sustainable development according to the IUCN (1991), as well as an appreciation of
the value of nature, which is expressed as a principle of respect for all life, now and in
the future. A weaker anthropocentric conceptualisation of sustainable development is
thus evident in Caring for the earth, which deviates from the strong anthropocentrism of
Our common future.
According to Hattingh (2000: 6) the integration of the concepts of sustainability and
sustainable development that was proposed by the IUCN (1991) has not resolved the
basic interpretive dichotomy, and as a consequence, the conflation of the two concepts
into the single idea of sustainable development brings with it the previously described
interpretive tensions. Nevertheless, a set of core ideas concerning sustainable
development has emerged in a cumulative way, which attracts a broad base of support.
Based on these core ideas, sustainable development has been introduced into the
vocabularies of diverse groups, such as politicians, business, industry and
environmentalists, who have previously defended divergent positions with respect to
economic and environmental policies through recourse to quite different 'languages'.
Through the acquisition of a new vocabulary, a common medium for dialogue has
evolved which - according to Quine's (1963: 42; 1969: 81) views on the role of language
in terms of community expression of their interpretation of the world - now enables the
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articulation of a broadly accepted understanding of the global environmental
problematic and an expression of the urgency regarding its resolution. A secured first
level of understanding of the concept's core ideas thus exists, in the sense that there is
broad acknowledgement that sustainable development can serve as a new trajectory for
development (Jacobs, 1999: 26-27). Explained in terms of Kuhnian theory, the notion of
sustainable development theoretically provides a set of rules that informs a common
appreciation of the key issues characterizing the environmental problematic and the
general response that is required in this respect [vide Kuhn (1970a: 23-34)).
In spite of the fact that the concept of sustainable development has now achieved
'common currency' status - manifested most explicitly by the commitments to its
implementation elicited from most countries attending the 1992 Earth Summit - its
usefulness is beginning to be questioned since little progress has been achieved in
terms of reversing the unsustainable course of global development. There is a growing
realisation that this has resulted from the confusion about what is meant by the concept
at a second level of understanding. In this respect, Jacobs (1999: 22) classifies the
fractures which are developing in the allegiance to the goal of implementing sustainable
development through reference to the following three areas from which criticism is
lodged: its vagueness of definition and lack of agreement on what it means in practice
(vide Achterhuis, 1994: 198); its obscurement, rather than resolution, of fundamental
divisions in environmental values (eg. divisions between advocates of economic growth
and parties who promote the maintenance of ecological integrity); and a rejection, for
example, by emancipatory theorists, of its cultural source in modernism and scientific
positivism - to which the origin of the environmental problematic is widely attributed in
the first instance (vide Eckersley, 1992: 17-21).
Through reference to the dual historical context of the concepts of sustainability and
sustainable development, which has been described above, a taxonomy that covers the
divergence of interpretation of its practical meaning can be constructed. From this
basis, taxonomic profiles of new generation approaches to environmental assessment
and environmental ethics can also be constructed, making it possible to test their
alignment with regard to their particular interpretations of sustainable development -
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which is implicit in their supporting principles. The construction of this taxonomy will now
be described.
5.5.2 A taxonomy of'sustainable development
Whilst there is a persistence in the theoretical validity of the broad range of core ideas
or moral objectives of sustainable development (eg. that environment and economy
should be integrated; that the interests of future generations should be protected),
disillusionment with its potential to realise these objectives confirms what Jacobs
describes as a typical characteristic of any contested concept (similar to democracy and
social justice, for example). This is the controversy generated at what has been
described as the second level of interpretation of what the core ideas of sustainable
development mean in practice (Jacobs, 1999: 25; Rees, 1988: 273). With an
understanding of the main sources of fracture in allegiance to sustainable development
Jacobs defines four major 'faultlines of contestation' (degree of environmental
protection, equity, participation, and scope of subject area) through which two opposing
and competing second level interpretations of the core ideas of sustainable
development can be shown to arise (Jacobs, 1999: 31-38).
Table 5.1 presents a taxonomy that is created by the matrix of eight sources of
interpretation yielded by the faultlines through the four main contested ideas of
sustainable development. This matrix, which is discussed below, describes the multiple
opposing positions of practical interpretation of the concept. Depending on which
combination of interpretations are assumed to be valid, it is clear that multiple and
distinct models of sustainable development can be adopted by various constituencies,
which largely explains the concept's contested status and the failure of its ideals to be
advanced.
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Table 5.1: A taxonomy of sustainable development (SO)
Contested core ideas of sustainable Opposing interpretations of sustainable
development development (SO)
(cf. Jacobs, 1999)
Degree of environmental protection Strong Weak interpretation of SO
interpretation of SO
Equity Egalitarian Non-egalitarian conception
conception of SO of SO
Participation Bottom-up Top-down interpretation of
interpretation of SO SO
Scope of subject area Environmental Social development
protection
With regard to the dichotomy in views concerning the degree of environmental
protection that is necessary to promote sustainable development, Table 5.1 indicates
that this manifests as either a weak or strong lnterpretation.i" From a weak perspective
of sustainable development, levels of environmental protection are not assumed to
place strict limitations on economic activity. This view, which typically characterises the
perspective of governments and business, is that economic benefits can be traded off
against those of environmental protection. The opposing strong view of sustainable
development, to which, for example, the sciences of ecology and environmental
economics typically give expression, is that economic activity should be promoted only
to the extent that it does not exceed the carrying capacity of the environment. The
concern here is that natural capital should be retained in an intact state and that current
use of resources should not diminish the environment's capacity to sustain equivalent
levels of usage in the future. Taken to the extreme, the strong view is also constructed
around arguments for the intrinsic value of nature.
Table 5.1 indicates that equity as a second faultline in the taxonomy of sustainable
development yields both the demand for an egalitarian world, in which equitable access
219 This dichotomy of interpretation typically fuels debates between anthropocentric and ecocentric value advocates
Oacob~ 1999: 31).
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to and re-distribution of resources favours developing countries and the poor in general,
and the dominant non-egalitarian view that places little practical emphasis on equity as
a key issue of sustainable development. Previous reference has been made to this
interpretive tension, which has its origins in the dual historical context of the concepts of
sustainability and sustainable development, and the contrasting emphases placed, for
example, on development and environment in Our common future (WCED, 1987) and
Limits to growth (Club of Rome, 1972) respectively.
The imperative of development - in order to promote the socio-economic upliftment of
poor countries through the distribution of global environmental resources, and calls for
the equitable access to these resources, is a general egalitarian trait evident in the
rationale for sustainable development emanating from developing countries. Associated
with this conceptualisation of sustainable development are the related demands for a
reduction of consumption of global resources and the shrinkage of ecological footprints
of Northern countries to free up the ecological space required by developing (Southern)
countries. The emphasis on environmental limitations on economic activity - i.e.
attention to green, rather than brown (social and poverty) issues - defines some of the
non-egalitarian base arguments around sustainability emanating from developed
countries. Related positions on sustainable development tend to exhibit little
commitment to global resource distribution, and respond to the imperative for reducing
consumption patterns by shifting, elsewhere, the mitigation of impacts of
maintained/increasing levels of consumption in the developed world - which is,
generally, to the countries of the developing world. An illustrative example is the
expectation of developed countries that forest ecosystems in developing countries will
be protected in order to serve as carbon sinks in counteracting global warming.
As indicated in Table 5.1, participation as third faultline in the taxonomy of sustainable
development manifests either in a top-down or bottom-up approach with respect to its
contribution to the discourse around sustainable development. In a top-down approach,
governments and business tend to seek participation mainly from expert and key
stakeholder groups in the process of establishing sustainability objectives. Broader
participation only later becomes an instrumental requirement for achieving these
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objectives - for example, during the implementation of policy. The bottom-up approach
manifests in situations of strong participative democracy, where public participation is
sought from the outset, for example, with respect to determining community visions of
their localities and setting related targets for key environmental and social objectives.
Taken to the extreme, bottom-up participation becomes a 'good' in its own right and
tends to lose its objective relationship with other key determinants of sustainable
development, such as carrying capacity and environmental limits.
The scope of subject area covered by the concept of sustainable development is
shown in Table 5.1 to define the fourth faultline through which the environment is either
narrowly or broadly perceived. Here, the motivation for sustainable development either
takes the form of a narrowly defined emphasis on the protection of the natural
environmental resource base - from which human needs are met - or it is more broadly
articulated to include human development needs as central to the achievement of
sustainable development; i.e. the attention is focussed on aspects such as the
opportunity for self-fulfilment, participative rights, and protection of culture. This broad
interpretation of sustainable development is described by Jacobs (1999: 37) as "[being]
not just an environmental concept, but a general one, describing a new goal of
economic and social life". The narrow scope of interpretation is a position typically
adopted by green lobby groups, whilst the conservative, broad interpretation is typically
associated with government and business. Concerns that the broad conceptualisation
of sustainable development has shifted the focus beyond the environment to a position
where the advocacy of general progress and concerns for social sustainability are
raised to positions of priority give rise to an important source of tension which exists in
terms of the practical definition of sustainable development.
Whilst various combinations of interpretation of the above four contested ideas of
sustainable development could be regarded by different constituencies as being valid
models for practical implementation, two extreme taxonomic profiles are described by
Jacobs (1999) as the conservative and radical models of sustainable development. The
weak, non-egalitarian, top-down and narrow interpretation of sustainable development
combine to form a conservative model, which is typically espoused by national
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governments and business. The radical model, which assumes its taxonomic profile
through contrasting interpretations of the four contested core ideas of sustainable
development, is typically adopted (inter alia) by environmental activists and
development oriented community organisations.
Through reference to the described taxonomy of sustainable development and the
extreme models according to which the concept is allied in practice, it is now possible to
define the taxonomic profiles of new generation approaches to environmental
assessment (eg. SEA) and enlightened anthropocentrism. These have been previously
described as existing in dialectical relationship with one another through their common
grounding in the principles of sustainable development. Depending on the alignment of
these profiles, the validity of this relationship in terms of its practical impact on decision-
making, for example pertaining to policy formulation and implementation, would either
be strengthened or weakened. The question in this regard is whether the relationship
exists at only the conceptual first level of interpretation of sustainable development, or
whether it extends to the practical second level of interpretation as well?
5.5.3 Taxonomies of SEA and enlightened anthropocentrism
Thérivel and Partidário (1996: 5) describe the strategic component of SEA as referring
to the set of objectives and principles that shape the vision and development intentions
of policies, plans and programmes. In the case of the guidelines for SEA practice in
South Africa (DEAT, 2000), these are represented by the 10 key principles listed in
Table 5.2, which are shown to be clustered about the four core ideas of sustainable
development and the associated faultlines of contestation defined by Jacobs (1999).
Three principles (i.e. that SEA 'identifies environmental opportunities and constraints',
'sets criteria for levels of environmental quality/limits of acceptable change', and
'includes concepts of precaution and continuous improvement) are clustered about the
core idea relating to the degree of environmental protection required for sustainable
development; five principles are clustered about the core idea of participation; and one
principle is shown to be associated with the core idea relating to the scope of subject
area covered by the concept of sustainable development.
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Caring for the earth (IUCN, 1991) proposes nine principles as a basis for sustainable
living. These principles relate not only to the justification of sustainable development,
but also to its implementation through concrete actions (Hattingh, 2000: 6). They are
also consistent with, and capture, Norton's (1984) views on the practical philosophy of
enlightened anthropocentrism. Similar to the grouping of the principles of SEA, they are
clustered in Table 5.2 about the four contested core ideas of sustainable development.
Four principles (i.e. that 'the vitality and diversity of the earth should be conserved', 'the
exhaustion of non-renewable resources should be minimised', 'development should be
kept within the carrying capacity of the earth' and 'respect and care for the community of
life now and in the future) are shown to be associated with the core idea relating to the
degree of environmental protection required for sustainable development; three
principles are associated with the core idea of equity; one principle is shown to be
associated with the core idea relating to participation, and one principle is associated
with the scope of the subject area covered by the concept of sustainable development.
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Core ideas
of SO
(after Jacobs,
1999)
Table 5.2: Taxonomy of sustainable development (SO):
Profiles of SEA and enlightened anthropocentrism
Principles of SEA
(after DEA T, 2000)
Opposing
interpretations of
SO
(after Jacobs, 1999)
Principles of
enlightened
anthropocentrism
(after IveN et al., 1991)
Opposing
interpretations
of SO
Conservinq the vitality
and diversity of the earth
Stro~ inimizing the
renewable resources
Respect and care for the
community of life - a duty
to care for other people
and all forms of life, now
Degree of SEA identifies
environmental environmental
protection opportunities and
constraints
SEA sets the
criteria for levels of
environmental f-----------j Keeping
quality/limits of carrying
acceptable change Weak earth
interpretation of
SEA includes SD
concepts of
precaution &
continuous
improvement
within the
capacity of the
Weak
interpretation of
SD
Equity
Michael Burns
No explicit equity
principle; however,
SEA principles are
set in the context
of the National
Environmental
Management Act,
1998 (NEMA),
which advocates
development that
is socially
sustainable
(DEAT, 2000: 14)
Forming a world affiance
I-=~~~~ __ ~ to implement
sustainability on a global
scale
Non-
egalitarian conception
of SD Changing personal
attitudes and practices,
in accordance with an
ethics for sustainable
living
Non-egalitarian
conception
of SD
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Core ideas Principles of SEA
of SO (after DEA T, 2000)
(after Jacobs,
1999)
Opposing
interpretations of
SO
(after Jacobs, 1999)
Principles of
enlightened
anthropocentrism
(after IveN et al., 1991)
Opposing
interpretations
of SO
Participation SEA is a
participative
process
SEA is part
tiered approach
SEA is set within
context of
alternative
scenarios
SEA b . wiuï Top-downegms I interpretation
conceptualisation of SD
SEA is flexible,
adaptable to
planning and
sectoral
development cycle
Scope of
subject area Scope of SEA
determined within
wider context of
environmental
processes
Social
development
Enabling communities to
care for their own
environments
Forming a national
framework for the
integration of
development and
conservation
Top-down
interpretation of
SD
Social
development
An appraisal of the three SEA principles clustered about the core idea of environmental
protection (Table 5.2) indicates a taxonomic association with the strong interpretation of
sustainable development. The requirement that both quantity and quality of resources
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should be maintained and enhanced in the long term is an explicitly stated principle of
SEA, and is aligned with the strong commitment to maintaining current levels of natural
capital stock and living within the carrying capacity of the biosphere. In this regard, there
is a definite emphasis on environmental capacity being the point of departure in terms
of defining the constraints and opportunities that the environment places on
development (Rossouwet ai., 2000: 4). Spatiotemporal scale is thus an important
taxonomic determinant of SEA, which perceives environmental protection in the context
of a community-oriented scale, dealing with aspects of a culture's interaction with the
greater ecological community (vide Norton, 1995a: 55-56). This time scale corresponds
to an ecological time scale (conceivably, more than 100 years) on which multiple
generations of human communities relate to populations of other species sharing the
same habitat (Norton, 1995a: 57).220
The strong position on environmental protection that is expressed in the sub-set of
principles for SEA is somewhat of an anomaly given the 'developing country' status of
South Africa, and the alignment of national policy with the development imperative and
resource substitutability concept articulated, for example, in Our common future. In this
respect, the taxonomy of SEA that aligns it with the 'dark green' approach to
sustainability defined by Thérivel and Partidário (2000: 276) is one that is also quite at
odds with the SEA philosophy elsewhere in the world - which exhibits greater alignment
with the 'light green/ecological modernisation' approach to sustainable development
(Thérivel and Partidário, 2000: 277); i.e. alignment with the development philosophy
articulated in Our common future.
As stated by Hattingh (2000: 2), the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) -
in which SEA in South Africa may ultimately find its statutory context - clearly subscribes
to this latter conceptualisation of sustainable development.i" Thus, despite policy
220 TIlls is different to EIA, for example, which typically deals with environmental protection issues arising from locally
developed values that express the preferences of individuals located in the context of established limits and
rules (eg. regulations, market conditions) according to which individual transactions take place; eg. development
projects considered in the context of say a 5-10 year time horizon.
221 South Africa is a country that has only recently emerged from a long history of racially discriminating policies
(apartheid, racially separate development) that have left the majority of the population struggling participants in
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commitments to environmental protection, the socio-economic conditions in South
Africa indicate that the priorities of government are likely to more easily lean towards
responding to immediate social needs rather than to any other environmental
imperative.222• 223 It is a situation about which, for example, Norton (1986c: 283)
acknowledges that it is difficult to take the long view required of sustainable
development policies, and the extent to which the principles of SEA will be effective in
practice in terms of forcing this long view is likely to be an evolving rather than
immediate phenomenon.
The four principles of enlightened anthropocentrism that are clustered in Table 5.2
about the core idea of environmental protection have a similar taxonomic definition to
the SEA principles with which they are shown to be associated. For example, the notion
of conserving the vitality and diversity of the earth, the principle of alertness to the
carrying capacity of the earth and the long range view concerning the duty to care for
humans and all forms of life are clearly associated with the strong interpretation of
sustainable development. In this respect, Holling's (1992) views on adaptive
environmental assessment and management provide useful reinforcement of the
enlightened anthropocentric taxonomy regarding the protection of ecologically
significant processes (keystone processes). The strong view concerning these
a third world subsistence economy. Given this political history, it is not surprising that the present
democratically elected government finds itself in a position where it is required to deliver on expectations for
massive social reconstruction and economic development. To this effect, national imperatives that focus on the
most pressing problems facing the country include strategies for poverty relief, rural development and job
creation. Directing the government response to these imperatives are new policy instruments such as the
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) - the implementation of which is critical for maintenance of
government legitimacy (Lewis, 1999) - and the Growth, Empll!Yment and Redistribution Poliry or GEAR (Republic of
South Africa, 1996), which sets out the government's macroeconomic strategy for enhancing economic growth
and employment creation by freeing financial resources for development.
222 Neither the RDP White Paper (which describes the programme's implementation strategy) nor GEAR makes obvious
provision for environmental issues (i.e. beyond the social aspects of the environment, which focus mainly on
promoting intra- rather than inter-generational equity).
223 It is stated in the Drcift White Paper on the Energy Poliry rif the Republic rif South Africa, for example, that in the post-oil-
crisis era the "Limits to growth" school of thought has receded (Department of Minerals and Energy, 1998: 17).
In this context, the energy policy response which emerges is one of revised strategy which is focused quite
strongly on reduction of supply risk through securing greater diversification and flexibility in the primary energy
supply base (sources and types) of mainly non-renewable resources for energy generation. Although there is
attention given to the long-term issue of developing renewable energy resources, this does not indicate a strong
commitment to reducing dependency on (or promoting intergenerational equity in terms of access to) non-renewable
energy resource such as crude oil and gas (Department of Minerals and Energy, 1998: 21,26,66).
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processes is that they should be maintained in order to ensure that renewal capital (eg.
regeneration potential of existing plant species) is maintained (Holling, 1992: 478,482).
Recourse to scientific method - inter alia, the science of ecology - is a principle shared
by both enlightened anthropocentrism and SEA in order to determine the levels of
resilience of such keystone processes to anthropogenic perturbation; i.e. the amount
and type of economic activity that natural ecosystems are capable of supporting (vide
Sections 2.3.3.2 and 3.4.3).
The notion of equity is not explicitly stated by DEAT (2000) as a principle of SEA, but is
shown in Table 5.2 to flow from the principles supporting the National Environmental
Management Act (NEMA, 1998) - in which SEA finds its contextual setting - which
clearly advocate development that is socially sustatnable/equltable.i" As described by
Hattingh (in prep.) the first principle of NEMA is that environmental management must
put people and their needs at the forefront and must serve their interests fairly (vide
DEAT, 1999: 6), and, therefore, it clearly finds its taxonomic definition in the egalitarian
conception of sustainable development, as indicated in Table 5.2. Similarly, the
principles of equity implicit in enlightened anthropocentrism promote a global
egalitarianism fashioned according to the Leopoldian evolutionary ideal which supports
the fitness of the global community (Section 3.4.2); i.e. a fitness that requires some
limitation on freedom of individual actions of, for example, developed countries, through
the curtailment of their high levels of resource consumption. In promoting an egalitarian
view on human interests into the indefinite future, enlightened anthropocentrism
recognises the enabling condition for this, which is the maintenance of the integrity of
ecosystems and ecosystem processes necessary to sustain human life.
The application of SEA in South Africa moves beyond the top-down approach to
participation, through which governments have traditionally retained control of the
sustainable development agenda, and directed this largely through technocratic strategy
(Davidson, 2000: 30-31). The SEA principles pertaining to participation have a strong
bottom-up emphasis (Table 5.2), which clearly identifies its associated taxonomic
224 The principle of equity in SEA is receiving increasing international attention, as described in Gosling's (1999: 1)
interpretation of its evolution in the UK.
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position around this core idea of sustainable development. 225 The participation that is
invited through SEA is also intended to function differently to the general provision
incorporated, for example, in NEMA, which according to Hattingh (in prep.) is evident in
the structures that the Act provides for an adversarial mode of participation - through
which the right to argue 'for' or 'against' proposed development, or act as 'whistle-
blower' in the case of breaches in environmental law, is strongly supported. As
previously stated, the South African conceptualisation of SEA is that it is a process that
assumes no prior formulation of 'development intention', which reduces the risk of
adversarial participatory conflict as long as its main pillar of participatory visioning is
employed effectively; i.e. the requirement that the aim of participatory dialogue
ultimately finds expression in the use of we-, and not multiple (adversarial) I-languages.
Enlightened anthropocentrism holds a similar taxonomic position to SEA insofar as
bottom-up participation is viewed as a necessary principle that empowers communities
to direct decisions pertaining to their environment. The values that inform community
discourse around sustainable development are experienced in a context and scale that
is typically multi-generational - they emerge across multiple generations in a culture -
and in this respect they can be described as 'constitutional-type' values (Norton, 1995a:
54). The process through which these 'constitutional-type' values are defined ['citizen',
as opposed to 'consumer', values (vide Sagoff, 1988: 8)] requires that there is
acknowledgement of the multiple ways in which communities justify them through a
bottom-up mode of participation. Enlightened anthropocentrism assumes that
convergence (articulated in we-language) around the 'constitutional' values that guide
sustainable development is unlikely to be secured through top-down approaches, which
includes in this definition, the narrowness of participation permitted by theoretical
monism (Section 3.4.1).
The principle of SEA, according to which its scope is determined within the wider
context of environmental processes, clearly has its emphasis on the relatively narrow
225 As discussed by Norton and Ulanowicz (1992: 244-249) environmental problems are rarely clearly formulated when
they first emerge in public discourse, which requires an interactive (cyclical 'bottom-up') public process in
which public values guide the modelling of solutions; i.e. the process precedes technocratic directive.
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priority of environmental protection as the dominant motivation for sustainable
development. Similar to the alignment of other SEA principles with the strong position
on the degree of environmental protection necessary for sustainable development, this
is perhaps surprising, given South Africa's developing country status. In this respect, it
might have reasonably been assumed that SEA would take a much broader
interpretation of sustainable development, to include human needs and preferences as
central to the achievement of sustainable development. The position of enlightened
anthropocentrism with respect to the scope of environmental protection necessary for
sustainable development is similarly characterised by a relatively narrow emphasis on
the maintenance of the vitality and functioning of the natural environment, which
enables the perpetuation of human culture and consciousness. Whilst the broader
issues of human needs and preferences are not considered to be an unimportant
aspect of enlightened anthropocentrism, these are assumed to be dependent in the first
instance on intact and functional ecosystems, and assume their secondary position of
priority accordingly.
From the above analysis, it can, therefore, be concluded that the disciplines of
environmental assessment (its new generation approaches) and environmental ethics
(enlightened anthropocentrism) show a common alignment with regard to their
grounding in the key (contested) principles of sustainable development. Significantly,
the related taxonomic profiles of both disciplines reflect what Jacobs (1999) defines as
a radical model of the concept's practical interpretation, which implies a strong,
egalitarian, bottom-up and broad interpretation of sustainable development at the level
of implementation of sustainable development. The significance of this will now be
described in terms of the potential for the dialectical relationship between environmental
assessment and environmental ethics to support the realisation of the ideals of
sustainable development.
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5.6 THE DIALECTICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: ITS POTENTIAL TO
SUPPORT THE REALISATION OF THE IDEALS OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
In the introduction to the dissertation it is suggested that sustainable development offers
the potential to arrest the current pathology in the human-environment relationship.
However, from the discussion in this concluding chapter, it is clear that this cannot
assume its validity merely from a global allegiance to the idea of sustainable
development; i.e. an allegiance restricted only to a shared theoretical level of
understanding of what is implied by the concept. Importantly, there is a requirement that
this should be extended to a common appreciation of the practical interpretation of
sustainable development.
The radical model of sustainable development, in which both new generation
approaches to environmental assessment and enlightened anthropocentrism are
located, places a particular emphasis on participative democracy, and in this respect,
the current trajectories of both disciplines strongly promote the type of bottom-up
participation that is implied by this model. Approaches to environmental assessment,
such as SEA, and the practical ethics of enlightened anthropocentrism respect the
autonomy of the subjective human cultural value sphere, and elevate the associated 1-
languages, through which subjective human values are articulated, to a level that is no
longer subordinate to the it-language of scientific materialism. Importantly, the
disciplines are capable of dealing with the potential for linguistic incoherency, which
might accompany the invitation of participative democracy by focussing on the inter-
subjective we-language of shared sustainability ideals, which are defendable, in multiple
I-languages, through reference to divergent environmental values and moral positions.
Sustainable development, according to the radical model, does not imply a diminished
appreciation of the objective human cultural value sphere, represented, for example, by
the value attached to science and its objective methods. If anything, the practice of SEA
and the philosophy of enlightened anthropocentrism attach an increased importance to
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science as an essential medium for achieving the ideals of sustainable development.
For example, it is recognised in SEA that there is a need for continued advancement in
scientific understanding of the capacity and thresholds (also indicators), within which the
environment is capable of delivering environmental services necessary for human
survival and improving the quality of life. Similarly, the objectivity of ecological science is
an important underpinning principle of enlightened anthropocentrism, which perceives
its role in promoting the perpetuation of human consciousness into the indefinite future,
through the understanding of ecosystem management that it provides to present
generations, which, as a consequence, can pass on to future generations functional
ecological reserves necessary to sustain human consciousness.
Importantly, the radical model of sustainable development offers the potential to
integrate the subjective and objective human cultural value spheres, not only at a
conceptual level, but also in practice. In this respect, the revealed dialectical relationship
between environmental assessment and environmental ethics can make an important
contribution through application of its practical philosophical principles and instruments,
which can be employed to support decision-making around issues of sustainable
development. The alternative, which is a continued allegiance to the conservative model
of sustainable development, leaves the world more or less in its current pathological
state (Hattingh, 2001: 7). This state is one that is characterised by the dominance of
scientific materialism and the persistence of short-term economic policies and
individualistic preferences of societies that subscribe to this conservative model, which
are depleting the environmental resource base upon which the persistence of human
consciousness depends.
The radical model of sustainable development and the related taxonomies of
environmental assessment and environmental ethics reject conservatism, and open up
the possibility for the emergence of a new intersubjective moral disposition concerning
human perception and valuation of the environment. This is unlikely to manifest as a
narrowly defined new ideology, based on a single conceptualisation of sustainable
development, but will be successful only if it is continually open to dialogue and
accommodation of different values and positions relevant to sustainability - particularly
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in the multiple contexts in which these arise. It is also unlikely to manifest through
business-as-usual, and it is here that the possibility for revolution arises. In the Kuhnian
tradition of revolution, the new paradigm of human-environment relationship that may
emerge through global allegiance to the radical model of sustainable development will
be one that displaces the present conservative model, and makes possible the
realisation of the concept's adequately justified ideals.
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